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ABSTRACT
The origin of this thesis was a long-standing interest in the perfonnancs cf bulldings in the years after
completlon, when the deslgners and builders lnve all moved onto the nsxt n€u/ work. That interest
grelv as a result cf conducting building surveys ln the course of professlonal practice. The survep
often rwealed inclpient or actml building fallures which required careful dhgnosis to disco/er the
caus€, so that the failure could b€ prevented in ftrture.
For the knowledge gained from irwestigation and diagnosis to benefil the wiJer community, rather
than merely the individuals concemed wilh one building, lt became obvlous that some system cf
oblective and anonymous recording of the circumstances of each buildlng f,allure was necessary.
This thesis proposes a basis for ldentifying and evaluating bullding failures. Building failure is deflned
from the viewpoint of both the producer of the building and the user to ensure that it is the
expectations of both that are considered when a building failure is being irJentified and evaluated.
ldentitying and evaluating building failures is a precursor to dhgnosing the cause or causes of that
failure. lt ls argued here lhat any evaluation of the causes of building fallures must acknowledge the
part dayed by natural causes as well as the part sometimes played by human error. lt ls also argued
that placing emphasis on blame, and hence on legal liability, encourages universal denial of fault and
works against the search for the truth.
A system for classification of building failures by their causes is proposed as a means by which the
knowledge gained lrom dlagnosis of individual building failure events can be aggregated to revealthe
panem of failures in a sampe of buildings. The results from apflylng the system of kJentifying,
evaluatlng, and dassifylng building tallures In a sample of New Zealand dlve|llngs are presented.
The rnaln conduslon drawn from the work ls that because natural causes are so diflicult an Influenc-e
to regulate, the best prospect for reducing the incldence of building failures is the avoidance of
human enor. Because hurnan error can never be entirely discounted Insurance agalnst the rlsk of
enor ls only wlse.
A second conclusion reached is that the proposed system of klentitying, evaluating, and classitylng
building fallures has been sholn to produce useful results, even when the Eystem has had only a
written record from whlch to work.
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CHAPTER 1
GENESIS OF THE STUDY
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This chapter explains how the research sprang from perception of a
clear need, revealed during earlier research, to obtain data about the
way buildings perform so that decisions about the controls to be
imposed on the building industry could be based on researched fact
rather than on conservative theory or expert belief. The reason for
concentrating on buitding failures is explained, and the range of
investigations of failures, and aspects of failure, is surveyed briefly.
Indications that building failures do matter are discussed. The
apparent inability of the Building Control system to affect the incidence
of building failures and the stifling effect of the adversarial legal system
on the search for truth uncoloured by considerations of blame are
outlined.
The benefits which might be expected to flow from a better
understanding of building failures, their causes and etfects, are
considered. These are short, medium, and long-term in nature and
promise economic as well as less tangible gains.
Finally the chapter concludes with a summary of the directions in
which research must proceed if the phenomenon of building failure is
to be properly understood and the benefits of that understanding
obtained.
1.1
1.1.1
THE CASE FOR RESEARCHING FAILURES
A starting point
The impetus to carry out research into building failures originated from
the findings of research carried out in 1980 into the cost impact of
New Zealand Standards fiippett, 1980). The findings revealed it was
possible for a mandatory building code (the NZ Standard under
examination) to be modified on hearsay evidence to become so
stringent that compliance became demonstrably impossible.
Examination of the process by which such an absurd situation could
arise soon showed that much of the detailed requirements of building
codes relied more on theory and opinion than on any researched
proof of the need for those requirements. Thus it was possible for the
fastening requirements for suspended ceiling tiles to be made more
onerous, on the grounds that there had been accidents in New
Zealand arising from tiles falling in earthquakes, when research
revealed not one record of such an event.
This discovery seemed to suggest not only that there were few data
about building failures in New Zealand but also that, in the absence of
such data, the building codes were possibly being written on the basis
of undue caution. While caution has its place in building, unjustified
caution was shown by Tippett to contribute to the cost of building.
The initial search for failure data
The search for failure data was based on empirical evidence that
building failures are more likely to be recorded than building
successes. A building which performs satisfactorily attracts much less
notice from its users than one which exhibits failure of some sort.
Similarly, the cause of sound buildings is less likely to attract notice
than the cause of building failures.
1.1.2
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Early enquiries (Porteous, 1982) revealed that there has been no
national agency in New Zealand collecting data about each building
failure event. Instead the available data has consisted of written
queries or complaints made to such organisations as the Building
Research Association of New Zealand (BRANZ) or the Consumers
Institute, or in the case of building contrac.ts indemnified by the
Building Performance Guarantee Corporation, to the Corporation.
Complaints made to local branches of the Master Builders Association
have not been recorded in any systematic way.
The inevitable result of such a dispersed and incomplete system of
gathering building failure data is that no one in New Zealand has
known, even roughly, how many failures occurred in a year, where
they occurred, why they occurred, their nature and extent,
approximate cost, or any other significant detail which might provide
an insight to ways of reducing the incidence and/or severity of
failures.
Internationally the problem is the same. Data is incomplete because
of erratic or inconsistent reporting. Buildings are not constructed in
laboratories where they may be studied in a controlled setting, but are,
like the people studied in medical research, spread randomly across
countries.
Despite these difficulties interested organisations in some countries
have attempted to collect failure data on a nation-wide scale.
Amongst these attempts are those of the National House Builders
Registration Council (NHBRC) in the United Kingdom (National House
Building Registration Council, 1979), and the Nippon Telegraph and
Telephone Corporation N-fD in Japan (Morishita et al, 1989). The
first of these records the work of a researcher employed to analyse
the reports of NHBRC inspectors investigating defects in a block
sample of 1028 complaint cases. The second records a method for
3
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diagnosing deterioration and appropriate repair techniques for NTT's
portfolio of more than 30,000 buildings.
As examination of the Bibliography will show, there has been
considerable international interest in the subject of building failures, but
a search of the literature over a period of ten years to the present time
has failed to discover any on-going nation-wide system for the
recording of building failure data. Like the British National House
Building Registration Gouncil and the Japanese NTT Corporation,
other individuals and organisations have researched and reported on
aspects of building failures, but usually with an emphasis on legal
liability (Cecil, 1983, 1984), structuralfailure (Di Pasquale, 1982), cost
of failure (Drury, 1981), design (Harper, 1974) or some other
specialised viewpoint which either disregards cause, or ascribes all
failures to negligence. AEPIC (Architecture and Engineering
Pedormance Information Centre) at the University of Maryland, USA
(Allen, 1983) is another organisation collecting data nationwide, largely
from professional liability insurers. lt attributes cause to broad
headings such as'architectural services' and'management problems',
but does not appear to examine or classify the nature of human
errors.
Why the cause is important
It is important to find the causes of building failures because until the
causes are known their eradication or reduction will be, at best,
difficult to achieve. The controls which our society imposes on
facilities which may be built are intended to ensure that building is
carried out "in a manner which will not put at risk the health safety and
well-being of the public." (Department of the Environment, UK, 1980).
lf it is argued that building failures are detrimental to the well-being of
the public, then their evaluation or reduction will accord with the intent
of the building controls.
4
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1.2.1
More importantly, finding the causes of building failures enables the
appropriate instruments to be used to prevent or reduce those
failures. lt may be discovered, for example, that the cause of frequent
plumbing failures lies with the inadequacy of the crimping toolsupplied
to plumbers and not with a defect in the plastics materials. A buiHing
control ban on the use of plastics plumbing materials would clearly be
draconian and possibly add to the cost of the building by forcing the
use of more expensive materials, whereas improving the crimping tool
would solve the failure problem without adding to the cost of all future
plumbing.
INDICATIONS THAT FAILURES MIGHT MATTER
Diversion ol funds to repair instead of new work
It is tempting to think that lack of building failure data matters little in
New Zealand given that the building industry in this country is small by
international standards. To do so is to ignore economic data (NZ's
Dept of Statistics, 1991) which shows that construction made a
contribution of NZ$2215 million to New Zealand's Gross Domestic
Product in 1989, an amount which is not insignificant when it is
realized that agriculture for which New Zealand is well-known in
international markets, contributed $NZa281 million in the same yeat.
The building industry in New Zealand is not small seen in that context.
Also often overlooked is the fact that it is not the cost of making good
the failures that matters so much as it is the proportion of building
industry resources diverted away from new building and expended on
the execution of premature repairs and modifications following building
failure.
In the Architects' Journal (Rabeneck, 1981) it was reported:
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'The GLG for example, spent 812 million * last year and has allocated
the same this year for what it calls 'major technical problems'. lt is not
alone; many other local authorities and private owners face large bills
for remedying defects. The National House Builders' Gouncil (NHBC)
is also paying out €4 million a year on defects under its insurance
scheme. Most people were shocked at press predictions that the bill
for remedial works to local authority housing could exceed 9200
million, (a figure I would judge conservative) or that the London
Borough of Hillingdon had to find f8.5 million for remedialworks to its
Bison Wallframe housing'.
For the year ended 31 March 1990 the value of all notified building of
dwellings in New Zealand was NZ$2553.6 million of which NZ$383.1
million (15olo) was described as additions and alterations.
Significance of the proportion ol expenditure on fixing failure
Those cost figures, while certainly not inconsequential, mean liftle
unless put into perspective against the United Kingdom expenditure
on the whole building industry. For that reason it is salutary to note
a report in New Scientist (Marsh, 1978) which stated (with reference
to the intended lifespan of buildings):
'Some maintenance is, of course, to be expected - just as
humans need a dose of medical care once in a while - but
repairs and improvement nowadays account for about €3.5
billion of the industry's annual output of t12 billion...'.
costs are pounds sterling, but it is the relative amount, not the
absolute value that matters.
1.3
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It is possible that the proportion of monies spent on repairs and
improvements in New Zealand has been just as high, but without the
necessary evidence being collecled this cannot be substantiated or
refuted. For the year ended 31 March 1990 the value of all notified
building work carried out in New Zealand was NZ$3885.3 million of
which NZ$935.5 million (24Vo) was described as 'additions and
alterations'. How much of the 'additions and alterations' was actually
remedial work is not known.
GOVERNING IN IGNORANCE
Building Control system
The building industry in new Zealand as in most developed countries
has been governed by various acls and regulations imposed on it by
central government, by codes imposed by government departments,
by bylaws imposed by local authorities and by its own internal
networks of professional and trade organisations, and teaching
training, and research institutions and systems.
While some parts of the governance system are largely self-imposed
to ensure that certain work can only be done by certain trades and
professions and may be seen to be not unconnected with the profit
motive, other parts, especially those imposed by law, are intended to
protecl public health and safety and, to some extent, amenity. The
imposed system is commonly called the 'Building Control system', a
title which implies that the system controls all aspects of building. In
faCI it does not. lt is highly selective as to which aspects of the design,
construstion, use and maintenance of buildings it controls, and to
what extent that control is justified by research. That part of the
system intended to protect public health and safety in the event of
earthquake, for example, has been the subject of almost continuous
modification in the light of the latest research theory and knowledge
to the point where the industry began to question whether the cost of
compliance could be justified, or even whether compliance was
possible (Iippett, 1980).
Other parts of the system, also ostensibly concerned with the
preservation of public heahh and safety, remained unaltered despite
advancing knowledge proving them to be redundant. For example,
two local authorities continued to require interceptor traps in domestic
soil drains long after most others had removed such traps from bylaw
requirements. Interceptor traps add cost to the drainage installation
and do not allow a blockage-clearing cleaning rod to pass through.
Their retention simply imposed additional installation cost and possibly
greater maintenance cost on the house-owner. Anecdotal reports tell
of similar conservatism being encountered by the designers of a new
hotel who wished to install a single-stack drainage system at a
considerable cost saving compared with previously used dual-stack
systems. The designers found the local authority to be ignorant of the
research evidence that the proposed system was sound.
The inconsistent application of new knowledge to building control
requirements is the inevitable result of a 'prescriptive' system, which
prescribes what must be installed, being used instead of a
'performance' system which specifies how the installation should
perform. Unless prescriptive building control systems are frequently
updated to take account of the latest knowledge they cause the
building process to be governed in ignorance.
By its very nature, a prescriptive system is far more vulnerable to the
influence of powerful lobby groups (such as a fire-fighter organisation)
than a performance system is likely to be. That is because a
prescriptive system relies upon more or less informed opinion as to
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what is desirable while a performance system specifies more or less
precisely measurable criteria.
Bulldlng Control system and building failure
There are types of building failure which do threaten public health and
safety. Failures causing fire are one obvious type, but that most well-
known and obvious failure, the water leak, is another. Living or
working in perpetually or even spasmodically damp conditions is not
conducive to good health (Platt et al, 1989), yet, in the past, the
Building Control system offered little prospect of preventing the
building-owner suffering from this class of building failure. The
requirements for fire safety on the other hand are far more rigidly
imposed and enforced, involving annual inspections in some cases.
The Building Control system cannot, with certainty, prevent or reduce
the incidence of building failures because there is, at present,
insufficient information to show how it might be done, or whether it is
possible for the incidence of building failures to be affected in any way
by a building control system. The exception to this general statement
is that class of failures which might be classed as catastrophic. The
Building Gontrol system has much to say about structural strength to
resist wind, earthquake, dead and live loads, and it is likely that new
and complying drainage and electrical installations will not spread
disease or cause electrocution, but the system has nothing effective
to say about more common, less drastic shortcomings in buildings.
How can it when only catastrophic events draw attention, just as the
squeaky wheel receives the oil?
New Building Act 1991
The new Building Act, recently passed in New Zealand (and replacing
more than 30 earlier Acts) paves the way for a performance based
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system in place of the old prescriptive one. The passage of time will
show what improvements this will bring to the Building Gontrol system,
but, by itself, the Act is unlikely to affect directly the incidence of
building failures. The regulations to be made under the new Act will
include the New Zealand Building Code (NZBC) which will render
obsolete over 50 old regulations and 213 local government bylaws.
The simplicity of the NZBC and its performance - specifying nature
may be expected to assist in the definition of building failures. As
discussed in Chapter 3 such definition is no simple matter.
The Building Industry Authority (BlA), which will administer the NZBC
and approve documents, building systems and materials shown to
comply with the code requirements, may become a repository for
reports on investigation of cases in which failures to comply have
occurred. Such a centralised collection of data would offer enormous
potential for research into building failures.
LAW AND BUILDING FAILURE
Reluctance to make written records
The adversarial system of law in New Zealand, a system which is
shared with the United Kingdom, Australia and other Commonwealth
countries has encouraged certain conventions in the behaviour of
disputants. Chief amongst these is the convention that no fault is to
be admitted. This leads to the curious situation in which two or more
parties to a dispute over a defective building will all deny liability even
when it is obvious that one or more of them must be at least partly
responsible for the error. Because the lawyers for each party may
seek to obtain copies of any reports written by an investigator, and
seek to use them in court, some investigating organisations record
only a few sparse facts and report verbally and privately to their
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clients. This situation changes if the case goes to court and the
investigator is nominated as an expert witness. An expert witness
(Webb, 1989) is a servant of the court and may be obliged to provide
an expert opinion as to the attribution of blame.
Consequences of universal denial ol fault
The chief consequence of the convention of denial of fault is to
encourage the complainant to seek compensation from the party most
likely to be well insured against such claims. Architects sometimes
find themselves the subject of a professional negligence claim which
the owner has commenced only because the building contractor has
no resources and no insurance from which to meet such a claim
(Gaulfield, 1991). In other words the convention of denial of fault may
lead to legal disputes (and decisions) which have less to do with the
complexity of the cause(s) of the building defect (see Chapter 4) than
they do with whether the only (or best) insured party can be made to
pay.
From the outset, this research has sought to examine the nature of
the human errors that contributed to building failures in the belief that
to do so would reveal much about the causes of building failures that
the use of the legal catch-all label 'negligence' seems only to conceal.
The only purpose served by delving into the mistakes of the past has
been a constructive one, much more concerned with reducing the
incidence of failures in the future, than with apportioning blame for
those in the past.
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LIKELY BENEFITS FROM THE RESEARCH
Discovery of what data exists
As no data-base on building failures in New Zealand existed before the
research began, one obvious benefit to building research is the
establishment of a database comprising whatever data can be gleaned
from existing sources. Once a database is established the current and
future incidence of failures can be compared with it.
Design of a procedure for objective identification, evaluation, and
subsequent classification of building failures and their causes
The need for the ideal database to contain data objectively identified,
evaluated, and classified, is evident. The design of a procedure which
makes such a database possible, and which offers the further real
benefit of permitting data to be aggregated to obtain general results,
is an essential product of the research. The ability to identity, evaluate
and classify failures makes possible the medium and long-term benefit
of monitoring the incidence of failures of various types (see 1.5.4).
Analysis of existing data
The analysis of existing data, no matter that the data may be imperfect
or incomplete, will provide rare (and possibly the first) indicative
information about the cause, cost and other aspects of building failure
in New Zealand. This is a realizable short-term benefit. Given more
and better recorded data there is also the prospect of a sustained
benefit, as the analysis assists the long-term benefit outlined in 1.5.4.
12
1.5.4
1.6
1.6.1
lmprovement of building procedures to reduce the incldence ol
building failures
When the causes of building failures are known with some certainty
the resources devoted to the control of quality in building can be
concentrated on those aspects of building most prone to errors or to
the most expensive errors. This is a medium to long-term benefit
which will flow more strongly as more evidence about the causes of
building failure is accumulated.
DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH
Deciding on a basis for ldentitying and evaluating each failure
event
The number and geographic distribution of the buildings within New
Zealand was seen as likely to atfect the ability of a researcher to visit
all the failure sites, even if it was otherwise possible to do so before
the failures were fixed and thus concealed. Therefore, although it
would be less than ideal, a system for identifying and evaluating the
failures away from the sites would have to be devised. This system
would sutfice for obtaining indicative research results, although it
would fall short of the ideal system in which every site would be visited
while the building failure still existed.
In Chapter 2 the proposed method of identification and evaluation is
shown to be an adaptation of well established techniques used
successfully all over the world.
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Defining a building failure
Earlier reference to catastrophic and smaller building failures (see
1.3.2) made it clear that some definition would be needed if the term
'building failure' was to be used with any precision. The question of
definition is pursued in Chapter 3.
Establishing the causes of building failure
It was not certain that any new cause of building failure, previously
unknown to the arts and science of building, would be found.
Nonetheless, in Chapter 4 a fresh view of the complexity of the cause
of some failures involving both natural causes and human error is
discussed, drawing on the literature and represented in a model of the
process of failure.
Finding some facts about failures
As none of the most likely industry organisations in New Zealand,
such as the Building Research Association of New Zealand (BRANZ)
or the Masters Builders Associations, had maintained collections of
data about building failure it was necessary to look further afield. As
it turned out, some of the organisations that insure buildings eventually
proved to be the most useful sources of factual information.
ln the light of the legal conventions discussed in 1.4.1 and 1.4.2the
search for facts about building failures was given a sharper focus by
the need to find a source of data which contained information freely
recorded without regard for acceptance or denial of fault.
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1.6.5 Findlng facts about a sultable sample of fallures
Assuming that it would not be possible for a solo researcher even to
find, let alone read, every failure record in New Zealand, it was
obvious that the selection of a sample of failure records would be
necessary. The selection might have to be by building Vpe, location,
cost, age or similar factors, or a combination of these. The other
possibility was that the sample might be dictated by the desirability of
using the most complete and consistently assembled data available.
SUMMARY
This chapter began by explaining the genesis of the study. lt went on
to point out that building failures, while attracting little attention in New
Zealand, are a matter of considerable interest internationally.
The chapter argued that building failures may be a matter for concern
which cannot be regulated simply by a building control system. lt
made reference to the short, medium and long-term benefit which
might flow from a better understanding of building failures, their
causes and effects.
Finally the chapter concluded with a summary of the directions in
which research must progress if the phenomenon of building failure is
to be properly understood and the benefits of that understanding
obtained. The first of these directions is followed in the next chapter.
The second (defining a building failure) is pursued in Chapter 3, the
third (establishing causes of failure) in Chapter 4, while the fourth and
fifth, concerned with obtaining a sample of usable data, are the basis
of Chapter 5.
'4.7
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CHAPTER 2
EVALUATING FAILURE
2.O INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter listed the directions in which the research would need
to move to advance the study of building failure. First amongst these was
the establishment of a basis for identifying and evaluating each failure
event. Such a basis was necessary so that each investigated or reported
failure could be treated consistently. While the ideal identification and
evaluation procedure would be one carried out on the site immediately after
the failure was notified, for the purposes of the research that was not
possible (see 1.6.1) and recourse was had, instead, to the written records
of the failures.
As mentioned in Chapter 1 (see 1.1.2) it was easier to write about written
records of failure than it was to find some. In the chapter the successful
search to find a well-recorded suitable sample of buildings on which to
apply an identification and evaluation technique is described. Although the
evaluation procedure proposed is applicable to all types of occupied
buildings, the only suitable sample of failure records located was in a
collection of claim files in the Building Performance Guarantee Corporation
of New Zealand, an organisation which dealt with dwellings.
The chapter begins with a commentary on the variable tolerance and
perception displayed by people towards defects or shortcomings in
products. In this context it is argued that buildings are products in which
defects will be regarded with similar variability by their owners and
occupiers.
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2.1.2
The chapter goes on to set out the basis of the evaluation procedure as it
can be applied to simple and to complex buildings. The rationale behind
a partial evaluation of a building, limited to evaluation of the technical
aspects of the building is explained, noting that building failures, as defined
in Chapter 3, represent a shortfall on the technical per.formance of the
building.
Finally the practical aspects of carrying out an evaluation are described.
The procedure can be carried out on site or 'at arm's length - that is,
remote from the site and reliant on the observations and records of others.
This latter application of the procedure will always be necessary in cases
where issues of confidentiality or legal liability prevent investigators of
building failure from gaining access to the failure site. For the purpose of
the research it was the only practicable course to follow.
BUILDINGS AND CONSUMERS
Buildings as products
A building is a product, the consequence of a series of processes involving
materialand human resources. Not all products are perfect in every aspect
while others are unacceptably defective.
Variable tolerance of defects
sometimes the trade-off of price and quality implicit in buying factory
'seconds' is acceptable, but some products are not regarded as good
enough to sell at all. The individual's personaltolerance of imperfection in
buildings and consequent willingness to allow a strength to compensate for
a weakness is implicit in the way a steep or awkward access to a building
site is sometimes accepted as the price to be paid for superb views, all-day
sun, or the convenience of inner-city living.
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lf the imperfection is in a dwelling owned and occupied by an individual,
then the tolerance of imperfection may be affected by the extent of that
individual's ability to fix the imperfection or to pay someone to fix it. The
less affluent may tolerate imperfection not from natural inclination but of
necessity, while the well-off can afford to be intolerant, "to have high
standards", because they can pay for the achievement of perfection.
When people group together in a business entity there may be a low
tolerance of imperfections which might discourage business clients or
customers but it is observably common for commercial enterprises to
tolerate the inconvenience of less than ideal buildings, albeit sometimes
renovated, in return for gaining advantages such as association with a
landmark building or proximity to streets with high pedestrian counts.
On the other hand individuals working for a business may be less tolerant
of imperfections in the building in which they work because they know the
cost of fixing the imperfection will fall not on them but on the firm.
An obseruer of the way in which people adapt to less than ideal spaces in
commercial and industrial buildings or appear to be able to live happily by
choice in houses, flats and motels will require no convincing that people are
the most flexible elements in a building.
Whether the building users are thinking and behaving as individuals or as
a corporate entity there is also likely to be present the "newer is better" and
"brand-new is faultless" factors which much persuasive advertising works
assiduously to keep raised in our society's collective sub-conscious. These
may cause building users to expect a new building to be better than an old
one, and will almost certainly reinforce their belief that a new building
should be faultless at the time of delivery, an expectation most people have
about any new purchase, and one to which the plethora of guarantees and
warranties offered to purchasers is obviously geared.
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2.1.3 Variable perception ot defects
While individuals may have differing degrees of tolerance of building
imperfections for various reasons including those just discussed, they may
also have differing perceptions of what constitutes an imperfection.
Someone who has spent a life-time in a succession of skilfully designed,
well-crafted, and meticulously maintained buildings will be irritated by
squeaking hinges and erratic lifts to a greater extent than someone
accustomed to living in ramshackle poorly maintained buildings in which
doors that still swing on their hinges and windows that are glazed represent
a high point in amenity.
2.1.4 Taklng account of variable tolerance and perception
The variable tolerance and perception of individual building users are
unique to those individuals and may not be matched by the tolerance and
perception of the individual builder - the producer of the product. This
variability and possible (even likely) mismatch needs to be borne in mind
when evaluation of buildings is discussed. Aggregation of the viewpoints
of many individual building users and producers makes it possible to obtain
the general viewpoint of each group by revealing the common aspects of
those viewpoints.
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2.2.
2.2.1
AN INITIAL MODEL OF BUILDING FAILURE
Maklng allowance for Individual tolerance and perceptlon
It is axiomatic that for a building failure to be perceived there must be some
real or perceived defect in the building. The relationship can be graphically
represented thus:
Real or perceived
building defect
Perceived building
failure
Fig 2.1. A defect is the origin of a lailure
An illustration of this simple relationship would be an instance where
untreated timber is used for house piles and the resulting premature decay
causes the building to settle unevenly, leading to serious cracking of wall
linings, jamming doors and undulating floors.
The situation is more complicated where there is less certainty about
whether there really is a defect, or, if the defect is indisputable, whether
there really is a building failure as a consequence. As discussed in 2.1.2
and 2.1.3 different people may have different tolerances and perceptions
of defects and therefore of failures. Modifying the model to allow for these
factors leads to the following:
Fig. 2.2 Perception and tolerance in the defectfailure connection.
real or perceived
building defect
individual tolerance
and perception of
building quality
individually perceived
building failure
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In Chapter 3 the definition of a building failure is explored from the point of
view of both the lay user of a dwelling (the owner/occupier) and of building
industry related experts. The purpose of such an exploration is to discover
more about the personal perceptions of defects and failures which lay users
and industry experts bring to bear when they are identifying and evaluating
building failures.
2.3 FINDING A SUITABLE SAMPLE
2.3.1 Searchlng for a well-recorded sample
Before evaluation of building failures could be carried out, it was necessary
to locate a suitably sized sample of comparable buildings, since
aggregation of the findings of the individual evaluations was contemplated
as the best means of drawing out the trends indicated by the evidence of
the evaluations. As the evaluation was to be done from existing records
made by others, it was also desirable that the records being examined for
each evaluation should have been made in much the same fashion, and for
the same purpose in each case.
In the course of earlier research into building failures in New Zealand
dwellings (Porteous, 1986) it was discovered that there did exist a sample
of dwellings for which the records met these requirements. The Building
Performance Guarantee Corporation (BPGC), then a subsidiary of the state-
funded Housing Corporation had, for some years, been offering a form of
guarantee to new house-owners at the commencement of construction. lt
provided protection against builder insolvency and various classes of defect
arising for a period of up to six years after completion. Claims were lodged
with the BPGC who engaged independent assessors from the Housing
Corporation to inspect and report on the circumstances and validity of each
claim. In essence the inspectors acted in the same impartial way that loss-
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adjustors act in the general insurance industry and can be considered to
be the 'objective expert evaluators' described in 2.6.2.
The BPGC scheme was open to all-comers and there was no restriction on
which builder the client could elect to employ. lt will be shown in Chapter
5 that housing contracts both above and below the average value in the
various regions of New Zealand were protected by the Corporation. In
these circumstances it was clear that the BPGC claim files would contain
a sample of new houses being built all over the country. In the event all
claims over a period of 6 years were investigated in order to include some
dwellings which had reached the age at which the BpGc protection lapsed
and to allow the pattern of time lapse between construction and a claim (if
any claim was made) to be revealed in the aggregated data.
As discussed in Chapter 5 other sources of building failure data related to
dwellings were located, but these tended to be less complete or in other
ways less useful for evaluation purposes.
Quite apart from the availability of the BpGc claim data, the use of a
sample of dwellings has other advantages for an experimental evaluation
procedure.
In particular it was noted that:
Dwellings are the most numerous buildings to be erected in any given
year in New Zealand. This means that even in a trough in the level of
activity in the construction industry there willalways be a range of new
dwellings being constructed in most climatic regions in the country.
Dwellings tend to be relatively simple buildings with few, if any,
mechanical services, and the same range of common utility services.
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They are consequently sufficiently similarto be considered comparable
and for aggregation of data to be valid.
Dwellings are generally occupied day and night and thus exposed to
the maximum possible period of use and consequent scrutiny by the
users.
Dwellings tend to be purchased with personal rather that corporate
funds. This is likely to increase the acuity of the owner's interest in the
performance of the building.
2.3.2 Definition ol a dwelting
For the purpose of this experimental evaluation a 'dwelling' is taken to have
its common meaning of 'place of residence' or 'house' (Concise Oxford
Dictionary, 1976). This definition excludes buildings which are houses but
which are not predominantly used as a place of residence. A place of
residence can be a house (detached or otherwise), a town house,
apartment, or flat. In the sample under consideration allthe dwellings were
owner-occupied and it was the owner who lodged the complaint of building
failure in each case.
2.4
2.4.1
EVALUATING
Evaluating buildings
In a recent publication on building evaluation (Preiser, 1989) developments
in both the theoretical and practical aspects of building evaluation are
cogently summarised. Also summarised is the case for incorporating the
building performance concept into the performance evaluation process
generally known as evaluation of a building in use, or as post occupancy
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Evaluation (POE). This case largely relies on the argument that evaluation
of a completed building in use will produce the most useful results if that
evaluation can compare actual performance with explicitly stated
performance criteria. lt is argued that ideally the planning for a POE should
begin with the earliest planning of the building so that clearly stated and
measurable performance criteria can be deliberately declared as objectives
for the new building before construction commences. A rigorous POE will
reveal which criteria were met and which were not. In accordance with
POE theory the results of the evaluation can be made available to designers
so that the experience of one building will help to achieve an even better
match between intended and actual performance in the next and
subsequent buildings. lmprovement of the evaluated building may also be
an outcome. Fig 2.3 depicts a model of the POE process.
Whether or not the evaluation incorporates the building performance
concept, modern developments in the evaluation field recognise the
differences in outlook and requirements between the building providers and
the users. Very recent work (Kernohan, Gray, Daish, with Joiner 19g2)
refers to the two cultures of users and providers which "rarely make contact
and often conflict or would if it were not for the fact that one side tends to
avoid expressing discontent while the other avoids acknowledging it".
BuiHing evaluation practice strives to bring together these two cultures by
stressing the commonality of their ultimate interest in improving the quality
of the existing and future buildings they may all have to occupy.
26
Performance
criteria
stated at
outset of
planning.
short- term
relief of
problems in
Astual
performance
as measured
or perceived
by occupants
or evaluators.
med term
input into
design of next
building
long term
input into
data base
or collective
memory to
be bases of
improved
criteria.
Flg 2.3
Model of POE process using the
Performance Concept. (After Preiser.)
2.4.2 Elements of Pedormance
Three major elements of performance that POEs attempt to measure,
evaluate and use to improve buildings are said (Preiser, 1989) to be:
technical
functional
behavioral
and it is argued that while there are others, (such as location and
economics) these three are the most important. Of these three, it is the
technical element alone which bears on building failures as they are
defined in Chapter 3. PoE focuses on the requirements and performance
2.4.3
of building occupants' needs, and therefore, the technical performance is
considered only in so far as it atfects the occupants of the buildings.
Building failures, being a shortfall in the expected technical performance of
a building experienced by the occupants can obviously be said to have
affected the occupants in that way.
This theoretical basis for evaluation of building underpins the practice of
post occupancy evaluation which has been carried on since the 1960's.
(Rabinowitz, 1989). POE has developed from an academic pursuit to a
process shown to be practicable in a range of building types, and
productive of useful outcomes. These range from immediate improvements
for the providers and users to long-term benefits in the form of greater
knowledge to apply to the design and construction of future buildings.
Evaluation of simple versus complex buildings
It must be obserued that POE as commonly described and practised is
rendered easier to do when there are explicit criteria by which to evaluate
the completed building. The explicit criteria are more easily educed when
the process of planning and designing the building is very well
documented. This is more likely to be the case with larger buildings than
with smaller ones. At opposite extremes are multi-storey and/or multi-
functional buildings for which an extensive array of briefing documents are
likely to be amassed prior to the production of a detailed specification and
detailed drawings, and the builder designed and built house for which the
only documentation is often limited to an annotated drawing and a very
general specification promising compliance with standards and by{aws.
Evaluation of such a dwelling by a provider, which has been described
(Kernohan et al, 1992) as including the producer and the maintainer of the
building, is unlikely to be possible once the dwelling is occupied and the
30-90 day maintenance period has elapsed, partly because the producer
will feel that any further evaluation may result in the exposure of further
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work (unpaid) to be done on the dwelling, but mainly because there is little
probabilig of the producer and user ever coming into a contractual
relationship again in the future. There is, in other words, no financial
incentive to encourage the producer back to a completed dwelling, except
perhaps in the comparatively rare case in which an architect is involved,
when the owner may use the settlement of the final instalment of fees as
such an incentive.
In the case of commercial buildings and corporate clients there is often not
only the financial incentive of substantial final instalments of fees and
contract sums to be collected, but also the hope that future work will come
from a satisfied owner.
Evaluation without measurable criteria
lf no measurable performance criteria could be used in the PoE of a
dwelling then the evaluations must fall back on the building's actual
performance as perceived by the building's occupants and any other
evaluators. This evaluation will not be a comparison of clearly documented
target performance with actual performance as in the model of the ideal
PoE but will be a subjective evaluation, by the producers and users (and
any other specialist evaluators), of the elitent to which the building's
performance matches the expectations of the producer and user. To that
evaluation will be brought all or any previous experience of dwelling
performance. other non-occupant evaluators may bring more comparative
experience to the evaluation because, for example, they habitually evaluate
more dwellings, but if such an evaluator is not a provider of the dwelling the
evaluation will not be able to take account of anything more than a guess
(possibly a well-informed guess) at the performance expected of the
building. When there are no measurable criteria for evaluation the counter-
balancing effect of the users' evaluation becomes even more important in
the overall evaluation.
2.5 CURRENT AND PARTIAL EVALUATION PRACTICE
2.5.1 Buildlngscurrentlyevatuated
POE is increasingly being used not only as a tool for producing the short-
term relief depicted in the model (Fig 2.3), but as an automatic process to
be followed within an organisation once a newly procured building has
been in use for a short period. lt appears (Bechtel 1989) that the bulk of
POE work has shifted from academic settings to government agencies and
private industry. These organisations both motivate and pay for POEs in
their own buildings. This means that government funded dwellings may be
subjected to POE along with larger departmental buildings, while private
industry carries out POEs on buildings housing commercial operations.
Owner-occupied dwellings appear to fall outside the usual ambit of the POE
practitioners, yet who can say that dwellings as a class of buildings are not
likely to benefit from the POE process? While some POEs of larger
buildings are carried out in response to dissatisfaction with the building in
use, with the cost of the evaluators' time borne by the building owners,
there is no equivalent to this pattern in the case of dwellings.
Of course the users of large commercial buildings are likely to see value in
a POE which may well improve staff morale, productivity, and the general
well-being of the organisation. The owner-occupier of a dwelling may see
only the cost of POE and reason that given the subjective nature of an
evaluation which is not based on measurable criteria, the outcome will not
be worth the expense. Nonetheless, if a POE has the potential to provide
short, medium and long-term information useful for the betterment of one
class of buildings it should be able to do the same for other classes. This
leaves open the question of how to bring dwellings into the evaluators'
orbit.
30
2.5.2 Partial evaluation in connection with buitding faiture
Even if the users of buildings do not elect to have formal evaluations of
those buildings carried out at their own expense, that need not prevent the
carrying out of some evaluation. An invitation to evaluate the building or
access to the records of a suitable evaluator who has been so invited are
all that may be necessary to allow the technical element of an evaluation to
be pursued. Such records are, for example, made by people who are
called in by insurers to investigate the owner-occupier's claim of defective
building performance leading to some loss to the user. The motivation for
the evaluation comes from the users who seek an immediate short-term
benefit - the fixing of a poorly performing building, and who would not be
expected to have much interest in any long-term benefits for the building
industry, or even for building users as an interest group.
2.6 DOING THE EVALUATION
2.6.1 Applying evatuation practice to dweltings
Consider, then, how wellthe theory and the practice of POE can contribute
to the evaluation and improvement of owner-occupied dwellings, products
of the scanty documentation already described in 2.4.3. lt would be difficult
if not impossible to use the concept of building performance to generate
measurable performance criteria since no measurable performance targets
were set for the dwellings at the outset. There will be no target measures
for lighting levels, acoustic performance, interior temperature, or other
measurable quantities.
ldentification of users of dwellings is straightforward. Recent work
(Kernohan et al, 1992) describes users of buildings as generally comprising
the occupants, the owners, and visitors. In the case of owner occupied
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dwellings the occupant and the owners obviously fuse into one category of
users with visitors being another. Because the occupiers are the owners
it can be supposed that whatever influence the owner was able to extend
on the selection and design of a new dwelling will be known to the
occupiers.
2.6.2 Obiectlve expert evaluator
lf evaluation of a dwelling is to be more than an expression of the users'
views the producer (ie the builder) must be represented in some way. (As
explained in 2.4.3, by the time evaluation of a dwelling is sought the
producer is unlikely to have any further interest in the building). The
provider's representative cannot hope to represent all the nuances of the
behaviour, attitudes and performance of the 'real' producer, but could at
least represent the level of technical competence, and the aspirations to
buiHing performance, of the ordinary builder. This representative of the
producers would exercise expert or informed judgement as the 'most
knowledgable person' (Daish et al, 1980) best qualified to make such
judgments.
Where a dwelling is evaluated only by the user and one expert evaluatorthe
scope of the evaluation must be circumscribed by the breadth or
narrowness of expertise of both parties. lf the expert evaluator is expert
only in respect of the technical element, for example, the evaluation must
not purport to be wider than that.
2.6.3 Dwelling evaluation team:
Whereas a large and complex building, or assembly of buildings, may be
evaluated by a team of people representing the various designers, builders,
users and owners, the evaluation of the technical element of a dwelling
requires a very small number of people. In more than g0% of cases in New
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Zealand there will have been no architec't involved in the design of the
dwelling, (NZIA, 1991), the design instead being a standard plan from a
catalogue or a magazine modified by the owner and builder to fit the site
and the budget and possibly to accommodate some of the owner's express
wishes for layout and features. In such cases the person most familiar with
the intended performance of the dwelling and best able to compare it with
the actual performance, is the owner. The builder may also be well
equipped to make such a comparison but unless the intended performance
is well documented (which is most unlikely) the owner and the builder may
well have entirely different expectations of building performance, the former
based on experience of living in dwellings and the latter based on
experience of building them.
Despite their almost inevitable individual differences in expectations of
building performance most dwelling builders attempt to match the owner's
expectations by the end of the 30-90 day maintenance period which follows
hand-over to the owner. By the time a building-in-use evaluation can first
sensibly be done the builder will normally be long gone from the site for
several weeks or months, and become engrossed in another building
contract.
Evaluation by the owner-occupier alone is difficult to defend against the
charge of lack of neutrality and, in most cases, tack of technical
competence. lf the evaluation was conducted by both the owner-occupier
(as the repository of knowledge of the intended performance and the
person most competent to compare the intended with the actual
performance) and by a technically competent evaluator experienced in
evaluation of dwellings (described in 2.s.2), then it could be argued that the
evaluations will stand the scrutiny of both parties, each anxious that the
process should be fair.
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2.6.4 A limlted evaluation of a dweiling
ln 2.4.1, reference is made to three major elements of performance -
technical
func-tional
behavioral
An evaluation does not have to include all three elements and indeed
cannot do so when the evaluation team does not include the necessary
expertise. The process of evaluation could still be followed but the
evaluation outcomes would of necessity be limited.
It is the possibility of carrying out an evaluation limited in scope but still in
theory holding out the promise of useful results that led to the adoption of
an evaluation approach to the investigation of causes and implications of
building failure patterns in New Zealand dwellings.
Central to the investigation is the thesis that enfranchising the dwelling
users by involving them in the evaluation of apparent building failure, along
with so-called expert independent evaluators, would yield immediate
benefits to the users and long-term benefits to the house-building industry
and those who regulate it. The short term benefits were expected to be the
making good of the defective dwelling, while the long-term benefits were
expected to include an understanding of the short-comings if any, in the
processes that produced the building.
2.6.5 Evaluation 'at arms length,
This report records the application of building evaluation practice to the
assessment of technical deficiencies in a sample of owner-occupied
dwellings, and the findings which resulted from aggregation of those
evaluations are described. In every case the evaluations were carried out
as a result of the owner-occupier complaining of a shortfall in the dwellings'
performance. Further, the evaluations were carried out at "arms length"
from the dwelling concerned and relied on the written record of the expert
evaluator and of the user.
Because the evaluation of the owner-occupied dwelling was to be carried
out using only the written evidence on an insurance claim file, recording the
owner-occupier's complaint and an independent assessor's report, it was
conducted in an atmosphere free of any bitterness or rancour between the
owner and the builder. Free of those emotional overtones the evaluation
could, in theory, be totally dispassionate and completely neutral.
2.6.6 Barriers to objectivity in evaluation
While the process of evaluation of building failures (where building failure
is a generic term to describe a short-fall in technical performance) could be
made an objective and dispassionate one in theory, the practice of
evaluation of building failures is fraught with complications which can inhibit
the evaluator on the one hand or lead to misleading distortions of the truth
on the other.
These complications arise from
(a) vague or varying definitions of the term 'building failure'
(b) a poor understanding of why building failures happen, leading to
(c) a tendency for our society to attribute inappropriate blame in order to
bring the force of the law to bear in support of claims for
compensation.
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2.7
In Chapter 3 the difficulty in defining building failure is illustrated, and a
working definition which was used in the evaluation of the dwelling sample
is presented.
The complications in (b) and (c) above are considered in Chapter 4 in
which a model of the building failure process, first introduced in 2.2 is
further developed. The model demonstrates how complex the mechanism
can be and how inappropriate it can be to lay all or any of the blame for a
building failure on one person or even on any human agency.
SUMMARY
This chapter began by discussing buildings as products and noting that
individuals' perception and tolerance of defects in products varies. A
simple model was proposed (Fig 2.2). From this variable evaluation by
individuals the chapter moved to current theories of evaluation of buildings.
Because the study is centred on building failures it was explained that the
proposed evaluation procedure would constitute a partial evaluation from
the view point of practitioners of post-occupancy evaluation.
The requirement to obtain objectively-recorded evidence of past building
failures, free of legal considerations of blame, was alluded to in 1.4, and in
this chapter it was explained how a sample of dwellings, which met this
requirement, was located.
This chapter described how lt was proposed to evaluate the sample of
dwellings failures using the written records of the New Zealand Building
Performance Guarantee Corporation. These records were described as
containing the evaluation of the building user and the objective expert
evaluator engaged by the Corporation to investigate the claim of failure.
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The status of the objective expert evaluator as the equivalent, in behaviour,
attitudes and performance, of the actual builder (producer) of each dwelling
was explained.
The chapter concluded with discussion about the barriers to objectivity in
evaluation. These include varying definitions of the term building failures
happen. The latter problem, it was argued, leads to a tendency in our
society to attribute in appropriate blame in order to bring the force of law
to bear on claims for compensation.
In Chapter 3 the problem of defining building failure is approached, while
in Chapter 4 the causes of building failures are investigated.
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CHAPTER 3
DEFINITION OF BUILDING FAILURE
INTRODUCTION
fn Chapter 2 an approach to the technical evaluation of buildings was
described. That approach was tounded on the developments which have
taken place in recent years in whole-building evaluation and focused part-
evaluation of buildings. How a selection of dwellings was chosen for the
purpose of testing the evaluation procedure was explained.
Also explained was the acceptability of carrying out the technical evaluation
of the sample buildings using existing written records, rather than visits to
the sites, since access to all the sites was not practicable.
Evaluation whether on site, or by examination of the records, requires some
degree of precision both to give the evaluation some communicable
meaning and to cater for the variable tolerance and perception people have
of building failures.
Evaluation of building failure can only begin after the failures have been
identified. ldentification of building failures implies some means of defining
or describing a building failure. This chapter deals with the issue of defining
building failure, a task first identified in Chapter 1.
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3.1 DEFINING BUILDING FAILURE
3.1.1 Why a definition is necessary
fn chapter 2 it was explained how at least one school of thought about
building evaluation believes the evaluation process should start, prior to
construction, with the setting down of measurable performance targets
which the building is intended to reach (2.2.1).lt was also explained that
such pre-set targets, desirable as they may be, are seldom found in
practice. Evaluations must then fall back on the buildings' actual
performance as perceived by the users and other evaluators. Evaluation of
building failure, like any other part of a total building evaluation must
therefore take account of what the users and producers of buildings
perceive to be a building failure. For a definition of building failure to be
useful to the building evaluator it must fairly reflect the perceptions of the
users and producers, through whose eyes the building is being evaluated.
Once a satisfactory definition of building failure is agreed upon, it becomes
possible to evaluate buildings for the presence or absence of building failure
in a consistent and realistic way.
This chapter describes how the producers' and the users' perceptions of
building failure were gauged and considers the extent to which the
perceptions of the two groups tend to coincide.
3.2 EXPERTS' OR PRODUCERS' DEFINITION
3.2.1 Obtaining the experts' definition
As explained in Chapter 2 it was not practicable to suruey the builders of the
dwellings in the sample since by the time the dwellings generated a claim
and thus entered the claims record of the Building Performance Guarantee
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Corporation the builder was generally long gone from the site. Even if it had
been practicable it is dfficult to believe that the builders' stated perception
of building failure would not be affected by any minor or major disputes
between builder and owner over work which the owner required to be done
during the so-called maintenance period after practical completion but
before the final payment to the builder.
To obtain a range of views as to what a building failure is, a literature survey
was conducted (Porteous, 1985). The opinions sought were those of
people professionally involved in the designing, building, maintenance and
management of buildings as well as those of people who contribute to
research and education in the building industry or to the legal and financial
matters which arise from procuring and dealing in buildings. The views may
not all be impartial, in fact each must be coloured by a sector view point,
but in combination it was expected that the views would approximate to
those of a building producer with a level of technical competence and
aspirations to building performance appropriate to an 'ordinary builder.' lt
was argued in 2.5.2 that the perceptions of building failure held by such
persons would equip them to be the objective expert evaluators required to
take the place of the real producers of the dwellings in the sample.
3.2.2 Limiting the use of the term 'building failure'
In searching the literature for references to building failure the decision was
made to limit the use of the epithet 'building failure' to shortfalls in building
pedormance which did not amount to total collapse of the building. There
was a reason for this limitation. The literature survey was intended to reveal
the perceptions of well-informed people as to what constituted building
failure. To e)ilend the use of the term to include total collapse, was
considered unhelpful since such an e)ilreme event at the upper limit of the
scale of failure would be unsusceptible to varied perception. Further more,
total collapse of buildings is usually the result of structural failure of a type
described in 1.3.2 as 'catastrophic'. Such events are rare in countries with
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an enforced building control system because the codes are usually
copiously supplied with structural requirements which are checked at the
design and construction phases for safety reasons. As argued in 1.3.2,
building control systems are less certain in their effect on building failures.
3.2.3 Catastrophes and failures
As it turned out in the course of the survey, there appears to be a
commonsense view point, shared by informed observers, that catastrophic
events in buildings are something separate from building failure. In most
cases the forces necessary to cause such events are of a much higher
order of magnitude than those which cause what most observers would call
a building failure. (Causes of building failure are fully discussed in Chapter
4). Generally the literature survey found no opposition to the idea that
catastrophic malfunction or collapse of a building caused by forces so
unusual, so dreadful and so powerfully malevolent that they are sometimes
described as Acts of God, should be excluded from the otherwise widely-
embracing term'building failure'.
3.2.4 Experts'definitionstated
The following table, ffable 3.1) lists some characteristics of building failure
as reported in the literature by the various sources listed. Also shown is an
indication of the year in which the opinion was reported. The list of sources
does not pretend to be exhaustive but it is representative of a cross-section
of people connected with the building industry, as the key to the sources
shows.
A notable feature of the list of sources is the absence of references to the
literature of the U.S.A. This is because the words 'building faiture' as used
by North American commentators, such as Di pasquale (1982), Feld (1g69),
Janney (1979), Kaminetzky (1981), McKaig (1902), and Richardson (1980),
tend be reserved for failures of a structural nature. Such failures are more
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in the nature of the catastrophic events deliberately distinguished from
building failure in the sense in which it is used in this study (see 3.2.2 and
3.2.3).
From this list of perceived characteristics of building failure can be drawn a
practicable working definition of building failure, sufficiently wide to embrace
a range of views while still supportable by good authority. That experts'
definition says that a building failure is a shortfall in performance which
exhibits one or more of the characteristics in Table 3.1.
TABLE 3.1: CHARACTERISTICS OF FAILURE BY soURcE oF OPINIoN:
CHARACTERISTICS
OF FAILURE
YEAR (FROM 1970-1e82) AND SOURCE OF OptNtON
1e70 /71 /72 /73 /7 4 /7s /76 ln /78 /7s lffi /8't / 82
1.
2.
Liveability reduced
Safety reduced
Maintenance required
increased
Gomponents adversely
affected
AssemHy of components
adversely affected
Performance of materials
adversely affected
Appearance of materials
adversely affected
Balance between running
and capital costs
adversely affected
Not always notlceable
at time of defect
Expected performance of
building reduced
Agreed terms departed from
Governmental or semL
governmental requirements
not observed
Usual satisfactory standard
not attained
4.
7.
10.
11.
12.
degh ill
sgh I
t
I
H
egh k
egh kl
df g
fg lm
Ino
o
p
o
o
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Key to sources ol oplnion:
(a) NHBRC is the National House-Builders Registration Council which was
reported in 1970 to have conducted a computer analysis of 6000-7000
defects in 1000 defective houses in England and Wales.
(b) G E Stringer was solicitor to the Royal Institute of British Architests (RIBA)
and addressed a conference on Quatity Control in London in 1970.
(c) Bickerdike Allen Rich and Partners are architects who, along with Turlogh
O'Brien, structural engineer, as materials consultant, published a series of
information sheets in Building in 1971.
(d) D W Cheetham was a lecturer at the Lanchester Polytechnic who wrote a
series of articles about building defects in Bullding.
(e) I L Freeman was a researcher at the Building Research Establishment (BRE)
who spoke on failure patterns and implications at a BRE:IOB (lnstitute of
Building) seminar on building failures.
0 Karl Fantl was Direstor of the Austrian Institute for Building Research.
(g) GLC (Greater London Council) produced a series of Technical Information
Papers for its staff.
(h) BRE (Building Research Establishment) published findings of building
failures and research in its Digest 176.
(i) Dr Knud Nielsen was Chief Engineer at the Copenhagen Technological
Institute which instigated building failures research in that country.
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Adam Neville was Professor of Civil Engineering at the University of Leeds
and later Vice-Chancellor at the University of Dundee. He cited Professor
E M Brown of London University.
W W Abbott was Principal lecturer in the Department of Civil Engineering
and Building at Lanchester Polytechnic, Goventry.
J Nelson worked in the BRE Advisory Division.
(m) D Little was an architect speaking at a conference on defects in buildings
organised by the Building Science Forum (New South Wales Division).
(n) B Freedman was a consulting engineer at the same conferences as
D Littlemore.
(o) A Mclnnes was a Sydney barrister speaking at the same conference.
(p) H W Harrison was a researcher at BRE, speaking at CIB Symposium at the
University of Strathclyde.
3.3 USERS' DEFINITION
3.3.1 Obtaining the users' delinition
While the literature is rich in definitions of building failure from the view-point
of industry-related professionals (ie from the producers'viewpoint) a search
for definitions from the user view-point proved fruitless. In the absence of
a user definition there was little option but to resort to that expression of
society's expectations in so many fields, statute law, for whatever help it
might offer.
0)
(k)
0)
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The only statute law which might be considered to be written with the user
of a defective building in mind was found to be a New Zealand Act, the
Building Performance Guarantee Corporation Act 1977, which empowered
the Corporation, inter alia, to issue an Indemnity Agreement to its clients.
The Act and Agreement are of interest here because they are the
documents which declare that the Building Performance Guarantee
Corporation of NewZealand (BPGC) offers a system of indemnityto building
owners designed to indemnify the owner (subject to various conditions,
exclusions, modification and inclusions) against any loss or damage sutfered
by the owner out of:
(a) Any failure by the building contractor to erect or construct the building
or to carry out any works in connection with the erection or
construction of the building in accordance with the building contract.
(b) Any failure by a builder to erect or construct any works in accordance
with the standards to be expected of a competent and diligent builder.
(c) Any significant inherent defect in any materials that are incorporated in
the building in the course of erection or construction of the building.
Unfortunately neither the Indemnity Agreement published in 1980, nor the
empowering Act (Building Performance Guarantee Corporation Act 1977)
attempts to define 'the standards to be expected of a competent and
diligent builder' or meaning of the words 'significant inherent defect'.
The First Schedule to the Building Performance Guarantee Corporation
lndemnity Agreement contains a definition of a 'minor defect':
"'Minor construction defect' means any defect in the building arising
from poor workmanship or from defective materials used in the erection
or construction of the building but which does not render the buiHhg
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unsafe, uninhabitable or unusable for the purposes for which the
building was designed or intended."
but only because the General Exclusions section of the Indemnity
Agreement includes a paragraph (para. 4.4) which reads:
"Cfhe Corporation shall not be liable under this indemnity for or in
respect of any loss or damage arising out of) any minor construction
defect in the building, unless the defect arises within a period of 12
months from the date upon which the building is completed or the date
upon which the building is first occupied...".
It could be deduced from the BPGC definition of a 'minor construction
defect' that an average or major defect means 'any defect in the buiHhg
arising from poor workmanship or from defective materials used in the
erection or construction of the building which does render the building
unsafe, uninhabitable or unusable for the purposes for which the building
was designed or intended', but the BPGC itself acting with the authority
given by the New Zealand Parliament, and no doubt conscious of the
difficulties of interpretation, avoids making any such definition in its
published documents.
3.3.2 Necessary stages in definitlon
It is obvious that if a user lodges a claim with BPGC for reasons other than
non-completion, then the claimant perceives a building failure to exist. That
is after all what (b) and (c) (above) attempt to describe.
lf the first stage of the test for user perception of building failure is the
lodging of a claim, then the second stage must be the acceptance by the
BPGC that the claim is valid, since acceptance of the claim signifies that it
falls inside the statute-based definition of failure. lt should be noted that the
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BPGC is neither a producer nor a user but is obliged to interpret its contract
with the client (user) claimant in an impartial way. (An examination of all
claims over a 6 year period revealed a sustained high degree of impartiality).
3.3.3 Users' deflnition etated
For the purposes of evaluating the sample of dwellings described in 2.4.1
it can be argued that the users' definition of a building failure is a shortfall
in performance which motivates the user to lodge with the BPGC a claim
which is subsequently accepted by the Corporation.
In the case of dwellings not indemnified by the BPGC, and of other classes
of buildings, the users' definition of a building failure cannot, of course, be
verffied by acceptance by the BPGC. Instead verification could be carried
out by the objective expert evaluator (described in 2.5.2) who, by definition
would be familiar with "the standards to be expected of a competent and
diligent builder" and to know what the words "significant inherent defect"
mean.
3.4 COINCIDENCE OF DEFINITIONS
3.4.1 Comparison of perceived characteristics of building lailure
The comparison can be made by examining Table 3.2, which reproduces
all the contents of Table 3.1 and includes, in addition, the charac'teristics of
building failure as the BPGC (and therefore the New Zealand legislature)
appears to perceive them. ('q' denotes a BPGC perceived characteristic).
It is immediately apparent (see characteristics 1,2,10,11, and 13) that 5 out
of the 13 characteristics of building failure identified by a cross section of
expert persons professionally associated with the building industry are
clearly identified in the BPGC's own view of building failure. CI the other I
characteristics, none are contradicted by the BPGC Indemnity Agreement
or by the empowering Act while most if not all are implicit in the Indemnity
Agreement.
Table 3.2 Gharacteristics of fallure by source of opinion (lncluding the
BPGC opinion expressed under statutory authority).
CHARACTERISTICS
OF FAILURE
YEAR (FROM 1e70-1e82) AND SOURCE OF OPINION
1e7o /71 /72 /73 /7 4 /7s /76 /77 /78 /7e / n /$ /82
1. Liveability reduced
Safety reduced
Maintenance requlred
increased
Components adversdy
affected
Assembly of components
adversely affected
Performance of materials
adversely affected
Appearance of materials
adversely affected
Balance between running
and capital costs
adversely affected
Not always noticeable
at time of defect
Expected performance of
building reduced
Agreed terms departed from
Governmental or semi-
governmental requirements
not observed
Usual satisfactory standard
not attained
2.
4.
7.
10.
11.
12.
13.
a
a
b
d e ghijl
e ghl
f
kl
e ghk
egh
df g
fg lm
lnoqp
oq
q
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Consider these 8 characteristics in order:
Characteristic No
3 Maintenance required
increased.
Components adversely
atfected.
Assembly of components
adversely affected.
6. Performance of materials
adversely affected.
7. Appearance of materials
adversely affected.
Comments
This characteristic is implicit in the
BPGC Indemnity Agreement reference
to "any significant inherent defect in
any materials."
This characteristic is implicit in the
BPGC Indemnity Agreement reference
to "any significant inherent defect in
any materials" - it is evident from the
claim files that BPGC does not
distinguish between materials and
components.
This characteristic is implicit in the
BPGC Indemnity Agreement reference
to "any significant inherent defect in
any materials."
This charasteristic is implicit in the
BPGC Indemnity Agreement reference
to "any significant inherent defect in
any materials."
Not excluded by the wording of the
indemnity agreement but not
specifically included either.
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12. Governmental or
governmental
requirements not
observed.
Balance between running
and capital costs
adversely affected.
Not always noticeable at
time of defect.
Not excluded by the wording of the
indemnity agreement but not
specifically included either.
The Indemnity Agreement specifies a
period of 12 months from data
completion (or first occupation) in
which the defect may arise, clearly
recognising this characteristic by
implication.
The Indemnity Agreement refers to
failure to erect or construct the building
"in accordance with the building
contract". As a matter of course the
BPGC (and any mortgagee) would
insist that the dwelling complies with
local authority permit requirements and
therefore with the requirements of
characteristic 12.
3.4.2 Degree ol coincidence ol perceived characteristlcs
The conclusion to be drawn from this comparison of charac'teristics is that
the BPGC's stated perception of building failure is quite comparable with
that of a qualified cross-section of professional people associated with the
building industry. In 5 out of 13 characteristics of building failure the
coincidence is explicit, while in another 7 (viz. characteristics 3,4,5,6,8,9, and
12) it is implicit. Only in the case of the appearance of materials
(charac'teristic 7) is the coincidence not apparent.
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3.4.3 Coincident perceptions and coincident definitions
The high level of coincidence between the BPGC's perception of
characteristics of building failure and those of the industry experts in general
is strong evidence that their definitions of building failure are also
coincidental. That this should be the case is not surprising. The BPGC was
established to operate effectively with the building industry and with the
industry's consumers (the users). lt would, at the very least, be difficult for
the BPGC to indemnify house-owners against a shortfall in standards
ditferent from those which the building industry itself considered fair and
appropriate.
It, was argued in 3.3.3 that the users' definition of a building failure is a
shortfall in performance which motivates the user to lodge a claim with the
BPGC which is subsequently accepted by the Gorporation. In such a claim
the BPGC definition of a building failure is coincident with that of the
claimant user. lf, as has now been argued, the BPGC definition of building
failure is coincident with that of industry experts, then it can be asserted that
for the dwelling sample under examination the users' definition of building
failure and that of the producers coincides.
3.4.4 Signiflcance of the coincident definitions
fn Chapter 2 a method of evaluation of a sample of dwellings "at arms
length" using written records was suggested (2.5.5). The evaluation process
was carried out remotely from the dwellings concerned and relied on the
written record of the users' complaint and the expert evaluator's report
following investigation of the complaint. The 'objective expert evaluator'
(2.5.2) was defined as someone competent to represent the house-building
industry's normally acceptable standards and therefore to be representative
of the producers of dwellings.
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3.5
The apparent coincidence of the users' and producers' definition of building
failure greatly strengthens the argument that an 'at arms length' evaluation
is likely to have validity. lf both user and provider are looking through the
same eyes at a building problem their collective evaluation must be better
based than if each is measuring the problem against a different standard.
lf an 'at arm's length' evaluation is likely to have validity, then an evaluation
carried out on site and involving users' and producers' evaluators together
must have an even greater prospect of validity and potential benefit.
SUMMARY
This chapter examined how users and producers of buildings tend to define
building failure. lt showed how the definitions tended to coincide to a very
large extent and pointed out that this coincidence of definitions gives
considerable assurance that the proposed definition of building failure would
have credibility with everyone concerned with buildings.
Equipped with a workable definition of building failure it is now possible to
identify building failures consistently. Before these failures can be evaluated
in a way which might ultimately lead to a reduction in their incidence, the
causes of building failures must be identified in an equally consistent way.
Chapter 4 sets out to achieve that.
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CHAPTER 4
CAUSES OF BUILDING FAILURE
INTRODUCTION
ln Chapter 1 the task of establishing the causes of building failure was noted
as being essential to the productive study of building failure events. Other
tasks included deciding on a basis for evaluation of such events, and
defining a building failure. These latter tasks were carried out in Chapter 2
and 3. Prepared by the completion of those two tasks this chapter sets out
to describe the causes of building failures in a way which will permit any
failure event to be classified by cause. This is important because unless
such a system of classification of building failures is available to be used by
investigators of such failures, the detection of trends or patterns in building
failure causes would be impossible, except possibly on a subjective 'gut
feeling' level. lt is by discovering the cause(s) of failure that progress may
be made in reducing or controlling the incidence of building failures in the
future.
4.1 TWO GENERIC CAUSES
4.1.1 The case founded on empirical evidence
In the previous chapter building failure was defined as a shortfall in the
technical performance of the building, sutficient to convince both the user
and an objective expert evaluator that the building is defective.
Empirical evidence alone makes it obvious to any perceptive observer that
all buildings develop building failures eventually if they are left standing long
enough. The development of failure may be delayed by processes of
maintenance, or forestalled by demolition, but if the building is simply left
alone without attention it will fail. Further, this failure is inevitable even if the
building remains unoccupied from the date of completion. Clearly this
phenomenon is not a consequence of human behaviour but is the result of
natural influences which continually operate to degrade and disorganise the
universe. These influences, operating independently of any human agency,
may be given a generic title 'natural causes'. In passing it must be
observed that'natural causes'generally tend to support the cycle of life on
this planet. They are less benevolent to inanimate objects such as
buildings.
Different empirical evidence tells the observer that on occasions buiHing
failures occur not because of 'natural causes' but because a human being
made a mistake. ln such cases the term 'human error' describes the
generic cause.
As might be expected there are also occasions when the empiricalevidence
is that the cause of the failure is a combination of the 'natural causes' and
'human error'. The two generic causes are now discussed in more detail.
NATURE'S APPARENT MALEVOLENCE TOWARDS BUILDINGS
4.2.1 Ashes to ashes, dust to dust
The fact of continual renewal of life on earth requires no proof. Every day
brings birth, death, ageing and decay to every living species on earth. This
continual cycle is now known to occur in the inanimate parts of creation as
well. Mountains are thrust up by geological mechanisms and worn down
by erosion, continents are slowly washed into the oceans while new land is
formed by volcanic eruption. lf all this can happen to mountains and
continents, it is hardly surprising that it happens to buildings too. The only
4.2
difference is that nature does not arrange for the replacement of buildings
it wears away. The Pyramids are worn away by the eroding power of wind-
blown sand, limestone buildings are slowly dissolved by rain and
atmospheric carbon dioxide, but nature does not push up replacement
construction.
As a consequence people study building science and attempt to construct
buildings which will resist the effects of the 'natural causes'. To design and
construct such buildings it is necessary to identify and describe the causes
and understand how they exert their sometimes malign influence on
buildings.
4.2.2 Tabulating natural causes
Addleson (March 1977) published a most useful tabulation of 'natural
causes'. A distinction is made between 'cause'and 'source' (see Table 4.1)
which enables the 3 'causes' (dampness, movements, chemical/biological
change) to be listed alongside the much larger number of possible 'sources'
of each cause. This distinction is useful because, as will become clear later
in this chapter, some building failures can be prevented by removing the
'source' so that the 'cause' cannot operate. lt is also useful because
awareness that a 'cause' may have several possible 'sources' encourages
systematic investigation of a 'cause'.
Addleson's Table is faithfully reproduced, but with the addition of insect
attack' under the 'sources' of chemical/biological changes, since attack by
insects is a significant contributor to building failure in some parts of the
world.
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SOURCES
rain
ground
constructlon proce$s
atmosphere (condensatlon notable)
water supply
faulty servlces
rnaintenance and general usage
external applied loads (structural loading
and movements In sof,s)
changes In temperature
changes In moisture (some of the
sources for dampness relevant, but the
atmosphere notably)
vibratlons
physlcal changes (lce or crystalline salt
fonnatlon; loss of volatlles, as in asphalt
and rnastlcs)
chemlcal changes (most of the sources
for dampness arc relewnt; conoslon,
sulphate attack and carbonatlon most
lmportant changes)
dampness (conosion, sulphate attack,
wood decay)
temperature (wood buming)
sof ar radiatlon (fadlng and/or
decomposftlon of palnts, plastics
mastics)
presence of IncompatlUe substances
(settings of oement, adhesfues and
mastics)
insect attack
CAUSES (NATURAL CAUSES')
DAMPNESS
MOVEMENTS
)
)
oHEMTCAL/
BIOLOGICAL
CHANGES
Table 4.1 Sources and Gauses ('Natunl Causes') of buiHlng fallure (rfier Addleron,
1977,
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As Addleson points out, building defects may have up to three natural
causes, and there may be multiple sources of causes.
ln 2.2.1an initial model of building failure was proposed. lt was graphically
represented thus:
lncorporating Addleson's 'sources' and 'causes'the model can be modified
and represented as in Fig 4.1.
4.3 MISTAKES PEOPLE MAKE
4.3.1 Errors and negligence
It was asserted in 4.1.1 that there is empirical evidence to show that some
building failures result solely from human error and others from a
combination of natural causes and human error. This phenomenon is
illustrated in Fig 4.1, which models graphically the sequence of events or
accidents which must occur before a building failure can be said to have
happened.
real or perceived
building defest
indisputable
building failure
of building failureand 
perception of
building quality
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individual
and perception ividual 
perception
building failure
Fig 4.1 Model of building failure perception, incorporating the
'sources' of natural causes (after Atldleson) and human
error.
The model shows how the natural causes may sometimes be exacerbated
in their effect by a human eror. For example rain (a source) may gain
entry to a building and give rise to dampness (a natural cause of building
failure) only because, as a resuh of human error, an important roof flashing
has not been fitted. Without that error rain might have to await the gradual
decay of the roof, possibly for decades, before entry became possible.
Legal processes can do little about the natural causes (dampness,
movement and chemical/biological change) in Table 4.1. When failures
arise in buildings and the owner or user is seeking compensation for the
cost of remedial work and losses suffered, the natural causes are difficult
to engage in litigation. That is why the processes of the law concentrate so
much on the human error aspect of building failure. There is a well
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established line of precedent in the law of negligence, which is generally the
law applied to error, so that the legal avenue is the one most commonly
entered by seekers of compensation.
4.3.2 Limltatlons ol the word 'negligence'
Negligence is defined as 'lack of proper care or attention, carelessness'
(Concise Oxford Dictionary) and is a handy general description for a whole
range of human errors. Like most general descriptors it is convenient to
use when a more specific or detailed description is not considered
necessary, but much detail may be lost when such words are used. For
example the descriptor 'crime' embraces armed robbery and murder but
does little to describe these two totally different activities. So it is with
'negligence', a word which embraces a variety of human errors.
4.3.3 Investigatlng human errors in building failures
ln Chapter 3 is described a survey of the literature carried out to obtain
informed opinions on the definition of building failure. A preliminary search
of the literature (Porteous, 1982) revealed considerable diversity in the
"human error" causes of building failure as perceived by the various
commentators. This indicated the necessity for a more comprehensive
literature survey which was undertaken to shed light on the extent to which
the commentators agreed or disagreed about the causes of building failure
(Porteous, 1984 - an unpublished paper incorporated in this thesis as
Appendix A). From the survey was derived a list of ditferent types of human
error based as closely as possible on a literal interpretation of the words
actually used by the various authorities in the literature. As anticipated the
word 'negligence' was found to be used quite frequently, in which case that
was the word recorded in the survey. CIher types of human error were also
mentioned and recorded in the list which is reproduced in Table 4.2. Also
shown are the number of references to each type of error found in the
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literature in a given year. The table thus also gives some impression of the
frequency with which the various types of error were mentioned in the
literature over a period of years.
The absence of literature references from the USA in the list assembled
during the lit6rature survey is not the result of any deliberate policy. The
survey attempted to cast a wide net, but the USA references caught by that
net, such as Di Pasquale (1982), Feld (1968), Janney (1979), Kaminetzky
(1981), McKaig (1962), and Richardson (1980) tended to concentrate on
structural failure, often of the catastrophic type mentioned in 3.2.3, rather
than on the range of failures considered by this study.
HUMAN ERROR
Defective materhls
Overlooked site condition
lgnorance
Over-emphasis on first cost
Defective documentation
Unanticipated conseguence of change
Speciallst contractor's lack of knowledge
Design too difficult to build well
Dereliction or negligence
Poor communication
YEAR: '69-73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 8i| Total
'1 2
3
3'l
2
4
12
51
36
36
41
1
2
5
3
31
4',l
71
31
42
63
1
1
1
24
2
33
23
14
21
2
21
31
12
32
41
9
I
10
10
11
17
20
?2
25
125
2 12
111
Table 4.2 Number of references to various human errols as causea
of failure, by year of publication of the reference, and the totals lor
each type of human error.
It is quite possible that when the various commentators used the word
'negligence' they were using it in a generic sense to describe a variety of
carelessness or lack of proper care or attention (see 4.3.2) which would
embrace all the other types of error listed in Table 4.2 but it remains
unproven. The author argues that 'negligence' is a handy general
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description for a whole rage of human errors but that it does little to assist
understanding of the type of mistake made. From that point of view it is
argued that many references to negligence in the literature are really
references to the commentator's familiarity with a variety of human errors
including all those listed in Table 4.2.
4.3.4 lmportance of the survey
The importance of the survey is that it penetrated beyond the generalterms
'human error' and 'negligence' to expose some details about the sorts of
mistakes people make when designing and construcling buildings. By
focusing attention on the notion of human errors as mistakes which
contribute to building failures rather than on the legal concept of negligence,
two benefits are gained.
The first benefit is that once the emphasis on blame is removed the maker
of the mistake, along with any other witnesses or evaluators, is much more
likely to acknowledge the mistake and to discuss it frankly.
The second benefit is that a list of types of human error is a useful reminder
to building evaluators that human error takes many forms and should not
be summarily dismissed as 'negligence' every time it is uncovered.
Table 4.2 is not proposed as an immutable list of all possible human errors,
but as a useful working instrument which may well be refined and
augmented as further knowledge is gained. lt accords with the observations
of commentators in the literature surveyed.
4.3.5 Who makes the errors?
It is important to realise that the various types of human error may be made
by any or all members of the building production team. Poor
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communication may occur between any or all of them on site and in the
associated offices. Defective documentation may not be the resuh of an
error by the architect but by the contractor who produced them for an off-
site fabricator. Site conditions can just as easily be overlooked by an
engineer new to the area as by a contractor who has worked in the locality
for years but has never built a particular form of foundation before.
An illustration of this latter was provided in the course of an interview with
a technical field advisor from BRANZ. He told the author about a well-
regarded builder whom he happened to meet on site iust prior to the
pouring of a reinforced concrete floor slab to be cast on prepared ground.
The BRANZ advisor queried the absence of a water proof membrane
between the hard-fill base and the slab. The builder was totally non-
plussed, and it transpired that he had never used such a membrane in
twenty years of on-ground slab construction and did not know he had been
ignoring an important, even elementary, principle of construction.
Fortunately allthe sites he has built on were raised above surrounding land
so that the water table was always well below the unprotected concrete
slab. That explained the absence of any reports of dampness from his
many clients.
The circumstances which led to some of the building failures investigated in
the course of research suggest that it may be fairer to refer to 'accident'
rather that 'negligence' when ascribing cause to some failures. Where
omissions are made by a contractor whose workmanship and attention to
detail are otherwise exemplary, but who was interrupted in the work by an
urgent callto another site, it seems unnecessarily pejorative to use the word
'negligence'.
A case typical of the 'accidental' class of building failure was one in which
a bath was installed complete with chromium-plated waste outlet butwith no
waste pipe connected. For some months of daily use the bath water was
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4,4
discharged partly down through the hole in the floor through which the non-
existent pipe should have run, and partly over the surface of the floor.
Visible water damage to the floor coverings adjacent to the boxed-in bath
finally alerted the owners to the problem. The fast that a hole in the floor
had been prepared for the waste pipe suggests that the plumber had every
intention of connecting a waste-pipe, knew the necessity for doing so, but
was so distracted by some event that completion of the job was forgotten.
AMPLIFICATION OF THE TYPES OF HUMAN ERROR
4.4.1 Delectivematerlals
Materials may be defective when used in one circumstance but adequate in
another. When a building failure is attributed to defective materials there is
an implication that the material or the choice ol that material was defective
in the circumstances in which the material was to be used.
Modern sealants can illustrate the point. A silicone sealant containing acetic
acid may be an excellent product for many jobs but if used in contact with
galvanised steel roofing in which it may induce corrosion it becomes a
defective material. Of course it is possible for a material to be defective for
all or any purposes. Poorly stored paint, partially hydrated cement and
untreated timber all come into that category.
In the literature survey (Porteous, 1984) references to defective materials as
a cause of building failure made by Kimber (1973), Eldridge (1974), Freeman
(1974), The Architects Journal (May 1977), Marsh (1979), a report in
Building Design (1979), Drury (1981), Roberts (1982) and Harrison (1982)
were found.
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4.4.2 Overlooked site conditions
fn New Zealand, site conditions may be taken to include not only the
bearing capacity and other soil conditions but also such factors as wind
exposure, earthquake risk and rainfall, since these may vary with distance
from the coast, altitude, proximity to earthquake fauhs and position relative
to mountain ranges. A builder accustomed to building in sheltered inland
locations may find that good building practices found to be reliable there are
quite inadequate when building on a ridge-top high above Wellington and
on the edge of the Cook Strait weather zone.
Anyone can overlook site conditions through carelessness or inexperience,
or because the conditions are deceptive, fluctuating or even concealed.
There is another category of site conditions, also easily overlooked, and that
is the category of site conditions which exists during and/or after
construction. Such site conditions may include congestion, shortage of flat
ground, or lack of covered storage, for example, so that it proves impossible
to store aluminium joinery in conditions in which it is supported against
distortion and protected from concrete spatter which could damage both
glass and aluminium.
ln the course of the literature survey (Porteous, 1984) references to
overlooked site conditions made by Stringer (1970), O'Brien (1970),
Gheetham (1973), Wigglesworth (1976), Nelson (1977), Bessey (1977),
Marsh (1979), Rabeneck (1981) and Harrison (1982) were found.
4.4.3 lgnorance
At first glance 'ignorance' is a highly pejorative term, yet everyone is
ignorant of something and the rapid growth of applied technology and
complexity in building makes participants in the industry likely sufferers from
some sort of knowledge-gap. lt is therefore with a degree of humility that
the word ignorance is used. In itself ignorance is not a vice, and the only
harm ignorance can cause arises when the ignorance is of some matter vital
to the success of human enterprise and is resident in a person crucial to
that success. Thus ignorance of the significance of concrete shrinkage
causes no harm if that ignorance resides in a glazier, but a glazier ignorant
of the effests of thermal expansion on large sheets of glass may be a liability
if employed to glaze a building with large sheets of glass.
The extent to which reliance is placed on the absence of ignorance is
evident in the frequent use of the phrase 'in accordance with good trade
practice' as the indicator of the standard of work expected. Such a phrase
presupposes that all the work will be done by people fully trained in 'trade
practice' and flies in the face of common knowledge that much building
work is carried out by apprentices and casual labour with varying degrees
and standards of skill, experience and supervision.
lgnorance in the building industry, as elsewhere, may exist as two types.
The first is ignorance of what to do, and the second is ignorance of why a
particular practice is normally carried out in certain way. CI the two the
second may be the more potentially harmful.
An example to illustrate this point concerns the case of a stainless steel
shower base installed on the floor directly over a basement garage. The
installer knew that the shower waste fitting must be fitted with a large brass
back-nut which is threaded on to the shaft of the waste-fitting and tightened
with a wrench. Knowing this, the installer cut a hole on the particle-board
floor through which the shower-waste fitted snugly, protruding into the
basement. The installer went down to the basement and fitted the backnut,
tightening it with a wrench. The waste pipe was then fitted.
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What the installer had not understood was that the function of the backnut
is to squeeze the waste-fitting down tightly over a bead of waterproof
bedding compound so that the junction of the waste-fitting to the shower
base is permanently water-tight. The procedure followed by the installer did
not achieve this purpose. When the back-nut was tightened against the
under-side of the floor it was not securing a water tight joint but merely
pulling the centre of the shower-base down towards the floor a little. When
the shower came to be used the weight of the person showering caused the
shower-base to sag a little further towards the floor at which point the
shower-waste was no longer bedded tightly into place, and leaking through
the shower-waste to shower-base junction began. Had the installer known
why the back-nut is used the mistake would not have been made. This
easily understood domestic-scale error has its many equivalents in
commercial-scale building.
In the course of the literature survey (Porteous, 1984) ignorance was found
to be cited as a cause of building failure by O'Brien (1970), a report in The
Architect and Surveyor (1973), Gheetham (1973), Eldridge (1974), Addleson
(1977), Nelson (1977), McDonald (1977), Littlemore (1977), Smith (1977\
and Croome (1980).
4.4.4 Over-emphasis on first cost
When the post-completion period during which the contractor is required to
make good any short-comings is as short as the very common 30 days,
there must be little incentive to use materials and techniques which will last
much longer. In practice, of course, considerations of personal reputation,
honesty, and professional integrity tend to make designers, builders, and
suppliers aim for greater longevity.
Real pressure to limit the first cost may come as much from the actual or
potential owner as from those who design, supply, and build. lt is not
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necessarily wrong to attempt to lower the first cost. Lower cost building
may perform quite satisfactorily over the years using less expensive but still
durable materials and undoubtedly meets a crucial need. There is an
important distinction to be made between lowering the first cost by using
cheaper, equally durable, but perhaps less attractive orfashionable material,
and lowering first cost by using a second-grade material which appears to
be what it is not. The'specials'offered by some timber suppliers can come
into this latter category. The timber may be offered for sale at a lower price
because it is poorly graded and prone to warping and cupping. Such
material may be fairly priced for what it is and well suited to some temporary
or rustic forms of construction but h is bound to show poorer appearance
and earlier degradation than a more appropriate quality of material. In such
cases the lower first cost may be heavily out-weighed by the cost and worry
of premature re-cladding made necessary not by aesthetic considerations
but by the need to maintain a building in a basic watertight condition.
In the course of the literature survey (Porteous, 1984) references to the
phenomenon of over-emphasis on first cost made by CIRIA (1973), the
Architect and Surveyor (1973), Wigglesworth (1976), Addleson (1977),
Graham (1977), Bessey (1977), Holland (1980), the Chartered Surveyor
(1981), Rabeneck (1981) and Harrison (1982) were found.
4.4.5 Defec'tive documentation
Documentation may be defective by reason of the inaccuracy of the
information it contains or because information essential to the building
process is not included. Where the information is inaccurate the building
may be constructed incorrectly, especially if no-one suspects the inaccuracy
of the information.
In the case where the information is inadequate or missing, the way is left
clear for the contractor to follow, for better or for worse, the course of action
dictated by whatever previous experience has been had. In some cases no
harm will be done because the necessary information has, as it were, been
provided by the contrac'tor sufficiently and correctly enough for the job to
be done well.
Other cases may not turn out so well. lf the construction involves unusual
processes, materials or components, the well of contrac'tor experience may
not be deep enough to supply missing information with enough accuracy
and completeness to enable the work to be done properly. Material
requiring special surface preparation or special temperature conditions
before application are a case in point. There is, as another example, no
point in a cryptic note in a specification stating 'all external walls to be foil
insulated' unless the location of the foil in the wall cavity is also specified.
No benefit is gained and much harm may be done if the foil is put in the
wrong place in the cavity.
In the course of the literature survey (Porteous, 1984) reference to defective
documentation as a cause of building failure made by O'Brien (1970), the
Architect and Surveyor (1973), Kimber (1973), Cheetham (1973), Addleson
(1977), Abbott (1977\, Smith (1977), Bampton (1978), Croome (1980),
Rabeneck (1981) and Bentley (1981) were found.
4.4.6 Unanticlpated Consequences of change
Changes may be made to building materials, components, fittings, fixtures,
assembly techniques and processes, as well as to the size, cost or other
characteristics of the finished building. The number of variation orders
issued in the building industry bears testimony to the many changes that are
an inevitable part of the process of designing and constructing a building.
The interdependence, apparent or otherwise, of so many aspects of building
is what can make changes so fraught with risk. lt is in the nature of the
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business that changes are often made quickly in order not to delay the work
or to reduce the amount of work which must be redone. lt is that very haste
that can lead to the making of changes which have undesirable and
unanticipated 'knock-on' effects. A good example of this etfect may happen
when the decision is made, after the wall-frames are up, to change from a
light steel roof, to a heavy concrete tile roof. The increased weight will have
consequences for the strength of the existing frames in walls and roof
(which will require retro-fitted strengthening) and for the construction details
at roof penetrations, eaves, and gutters. lf those consequences are not
foreseen a sagging ridge line is going to be but one of the most obvious
consequences.
Changes may, of course, by made at a much more detailed level. A
decision to change the exterior cladding of a building from glass-reinforced
concrete (GRC) panels to pressed steel ones will require a complete revision
of the wall penetration and jointing details to maintain weather-tightness, and
careful selection of fastening systems to avoid electro-chemical corrosion
effects. The relationship of the modular spacing of the steel panels to the
GRC ones has to be considered in the midst of these other consequences.
In the course of the literature survey (Porteous, 1984) references to the
etfect of unanticipated consequences of change by the Architects Journal
(1971), Hardy (1974), the Development and Material Bulletin of GLG (1974),
Addleson (1977), Nelson (1977), Bessey (1977), Newlove (1978), Beck
(1979), Marsh (1979), Roxburgh (1980), Palmer (1980), Downey (1980), Nice
(1980), Ransom (1981), Rabeneck (1981), Building Technology and
Management (1982), and Mclnnes (1977) were found.
4.4.7 Specialist contractors' lack of knowledge
The increasing complexity of building has given rise, as it has in other
occupations such as electronics or mechanics, to the tendency for some
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aspects of construction to divide into the province of specialists. Well
established are specialist applicators of roofing membrane materials, but
more recently the market has seen the arrival of specialist contractors
otfering to install security systems, specialised coatings for walls, roofs, and
ceilings, vacuum cleaning systems, telephones and intercoms and satellite
W aerial dishes. The burgeoning range of floor finishes is also fertile
ground for the specialist contractor.
There is much to be said for the specialist contractor who knows the
product well and has been expertly trained in the best techniques of
preparation, installation, finishing and testing of the product. Reputable
specialists can offer a warranty backed by the specialist installer and often
by the maker of the product itself. Where the advantage of the specialist
contractor becomes lost is where that contractor is represented on site by
a poorly trained employee unfamiliar with the special requirements of the
makers' installation advice. The warranty may offer some protection against
the consequences of the specialist contractor's lack of knowledge but if the
job has been botched from the start no amount of remedial work (which
may be all the warranty, or the manufacturer is prepared to cover) is going
to produce a satisfactory job with the life-expectancy normalty to be
expected.
In the course of the literature survey (Porteous, 1984) references to this
cause of building failure by O'Brien (1970), Powell (1971), CIRIA (1973), the
Architect and Surveyor (1973), Cheetham (1973), Development Material
Bulletin of the GLC (1975), Allen (1977), Addleson (1977), the Architects
Journal (May 1977), Nelson (1977), Abbott (1977), Smith (1977), Bessey
(1977), Bampton (1978), Beck (1979), NHBC (1979), Ransom (1981), the
Chartered Surveyor (1981), Rabeneck (1981) and Donaldson (1982) were
found.
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4.4.8 Design too diflicult to build well
Architects and other building designers are sometimes accused by builders
of designing with insufficient regard to the prac'ticalities of construction. Like
some accusations it presupposes a degree of absolute certainty which may
not be supportable by the facts. lt is certainly true that some construclion
details are more dfficult to build well than others, but the extent to which
that is so will depend on the experience of the builder, the quality and extent
of the plant available, and possibly on the availability of appropriate
materials. lf every building site had the facilities of a modern metal and
wood-working shop and skilled operators to work it, then construstion
drawings could call for details of almost Swiss precision and they could be
built. The reality of life is that few sites for any building other than
extraordinary national or corporate symbols like the Hong Kong and
Shanghai Bank in Hong Kong, with virtually unlimited budgets, have such
resources.
The solution is therefore to design construction details which are buildable
given the likely level of workshop facilities and personal skills to be found on
the site (or in the supplier's fabrication plants). Failure to design with regard
to those constraints leaves the way open not only for bitter arguments
surrounding the cost for re-doing non-complying work but also for
expensive delays.
In the course of the literature survey (Porteous, 1984) difficult design was
found to have been mentioned in the following references: O'Brien (1970),
Powell (1971), Kimber (1973), Fantl (1974), Higby (1974), Hardy (1974),
Eldridge (1974), Freeman (1974), Development and Material Bulletin of GLC
(1974), The Architects Journal (May 1977), Graham (1977), Downey (1977),
Bampton (1978), Beck (1979), Marsh (1979), Building Design (1979),
Bonshor (1980), Palmer (1980), Downey (1980), Drury (1981), Roberts
(1982) and Harrison (1982).
4.4.9 Derellction or negligence
This is the most frequently used labelto describe human error and also the
least informative to an investigator of building failures. As a description it
carries heavy connotations of fault and especially of blameworthy
carelessness, yet ascribing a building failure to negligence provides no
information about the detail of the mistake that caused the failure.
Experience gained in the investigation of the results of many failures,
suggests that the use of the term negligence in connection with building
failure is unhelpful to the objective observation of human error and the
development of preventative measures. lf, on the other hand, there is no
interest in understanding how failures occur, but a strong interest in
attaching blame, then 'negligence' is the ideal epithet.
In the course of the literature survey (Porteous, 1984) references to
negligence as a cause of building failures made by O'Brien (1970), Powell
(1971), Cheetham (1973), Fantl(1974), Higby (1974), Hardy (1974), Eldridge
(1974), Freeman (1974), Development and Material Bulletin of GLG (1974),
the Architests Journat (May 1977\, Nelson (1977), Graham (1977), Mclnnes
(1977), Newlove (1978), Bampton (1978), Marsh (1979), Building Design
(1979), Croome (1980), Bonshor (1980), Nice (1980)' Drury (1981)'
Rabeneck (1981), Bentley (1981), Roberts (1982), and Donaldson (1982)
were found.
4.4.10 Poor communication
Poor communication may occur in various relationships in the design and
building process. For example the failure of site operatives to communicate
to the designer the difficulties they are having in making the designed detail
'work' easily leads to the same imprac'ticable design being used again in the
future, possibly on a building where it cannot be made to work at all.
Commonly, poor communication happens simply because one party
assumes knowledge or experience in the other party and therefore fails to
draw the necessary detail or to specify the material in writing. Another
cause of poor communication occurs when the information is written down
or drawn, but is incomplete. A window specification, for example, may
appear to the contractor to be complete but still fail to communicate fully
because it lacks a warning that the window installation is to be exposed to
exceptionally high winds and rain. The incomplete communication may
result in a competent contractor seleding a window system that is entirely
satisfactory for most sites, but fails on the exposed one.
In the course of the literature survey (Porteous, 1984) references to poor
communication as a cause of building failure made by the Architects Journal
(1971), CIRIA (1973), the Architect and Surveyor (1973), Kimber (1973),
Harper (1974),Addleson (1977), Nelson (1977\, Downey (1977), McDonald
(1977), Smith (1977'), McDowdl (1977), Hughes (1978), Bampton (1978),
Marsh (1978, Beck (1979), Croome (1980), Bonshor (1980), Holland (1980),
Roxburgh (1980), Ransom (1981), Rabeneck (1981), Atkinson (1981),
Bentley (1981), Building Technology and Management (1982) and Duell
(1983) were found.
GLASSTFYTNG FATLURES BY CAUSE(S)
4.5.1 Applying knowledge of the two generic causes
Using the knowledge drawn from the tabulation of natural causes in Table
4.1 and from the literature survey findings about human error in Table 4.2
it is possible to systematically classify a building failure according to:
(a) which of the 3 natural causes' (if any) contributed to the
failure, and what the sources of those causes were in each
case, and
(b) which of the list of 10 types of human error (if any) contributed
to the failure.
4.5.2 Benefits lrom using the classification system
Application of the classification system to one or more building failures
enables the failure(s) to be evaluated in a way which may yield an
immediate short-term benefit by encouraging objective analysis of the
evidence to determine cause, not blame. Remedying the cause willcertainly
prevent repetition of the failure, even if it does not make good the damago
already caused. Attributing blame does not, by itself, remedy anything.
The classification system also enables the evaluation to feed-back single
case or aggregated data to produce medium and long-term benefits to
builders, and designers and ultimately to the users of buildings. lt does this
by encouraging a methodical diagnosis of the underlying causes of failure
in a way which allows for consistent written records to be made and
manipulated for research purposes. From the research will flow findings
about those aspects of the process of designing and constructing buildings
which give rise to building failures. lt is in concentrating efforts for
improvements on the weaknesses exposed by such research that the best
prospect for containing and minimising the incidence of building failures lies.
Just as branches of science such as chemistry and zoology trace their most
dramatic progress from the development of systems of classification of their
subject matter, so may the study of the causes of building failures be
advanced by the development of a classification system.
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SUMMARY
This chapter presented a new approach to identifying the cause(s) of
building failure. lt did that firstly by considering the often over-looked
contribution to failures made by natural causes and secondly by
considering, in tandem with those natural causes, the many forms of human
error which occur in the production of buildings. This new approach avoids
involvement with issues of blame by eschewing the term 'negligence' in
favour of 'human error' or 'mistake'.
The extent to which this system of classification is helpful in understanding
and learning from building failures is demonstrated in the nexttwo chapters.
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CHAPTER 5
NEW ZEAIAND BUILDING FAILURES DATA
5.0 INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter the causes of building failures including the
two generic causes 'natural causes'and 'human error'were explained
and amplified as necessary. The chapter concluded by suggesting
the benefits that would result from the ability to classify building
failures by their cause or combination of causes.
This chapter begins by discussing the features of an ideal data source
for the investigator of building failures, and by pointing out that,
despite an extensive search, no such ideal data source was located
for the study.
The chapter then goes on to report the results of an analysis of those
data sources which were located and found to be useful to varying
degrees. Closest to the ideal was the data in the claim files of the
Building Performance Guarantee Corporation (BPGC), but two other
sources, which provided less detail, are reported.
These two sources are the New Zealand Architects Co-operative
Society Ltd (NZACS) and the MBS (NZ) Ltd firm of insurance loss-
adjusters.
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5.1
5.1.1
SELECTING DATA
ldeal data source
In earlier chapters the meaning of the term 'building failure' was
defined, and the causes of building failures were set out.
With the benefit of that preparatory work a systematic examination of
reported building failures in New Zealand became possible. Building
failures could be identified and classified as to source and cause and
the extent to which human error had contributed to the failure.
The major difficulty still remaining was to find some reports of building
failures containing sufficient detail recorded systematically enough to
make identification and classification both possible and useful. lt was
not enough that the reports, once located, should contain sufficient
information to enable the building failure to be identified and classified;
it was also important that the credentials and the legal position of the
recorder should be known. For accurate and objective findings to flow
from an analysis of building failure reports it was essential that the
reports themselves should be as accurate and objective as possible.
This combined requirement of accuracy and objectivity narrowed the
range of sources of useful failure reports. For example, it precluded
consideration of reports written by the builders who erected the
affected buildings, not because the builders were not expert in
describing the failure, but because economic and legal considerations
might have affec'ted their objectivity. Similarly, reports written by lay
people without experience of building technology are precluded on the
grounds that the accuracy of the information must be suspect.
The ideal source of building failure reports for this research could
therefore be defined as one where people with the necessary
knowledge of building technology were engaged to write objective
reports containing enough detail to enable the nature of the failure to
be identified and understood, and the cause to be made clear. An
ideal source would contain records written with the needs of the
building failures researcher in mind.
Such ideal sources do not exist. Sources which provided accurate
and objective reports were found, but none of those sources was
written with the researcher in mind. As a consequence the details
were not always complete or clear, and some qualified interpretation
of the reports was sometimes necessary.
The sources of building failure data discovered in the course of the
research are discussed in the following pages.
5.2 BUILDING PERFORMANCE GUARANTEE CORPORATION OF NEW
ZEALAND (BPGC)
5.2.1 Functions of the Corporation
Of the various sources of records of building failures investigated in the
study, the source which most closely approximated the ideal described in
5.1.1 was the Building Performance Guarantee Corporation of New Zealand
which since April 1st 1978 had been issuing indemnities protecting and
indemnifying the owners of residential buildings against loss or damage to,
defects in, or deterioration of those residential buildings. The Corporation
has also been involved in the making good of such damage, defects and
deterioration.
Otfices of the Housing Corporation of New Zealand (HCNZ) acted as agents
for the Building Performance Guarantee Corporation (BPGC), issuing
lndemnity Application forms to would-be home-owners wishing to indemnify
themselves against the risks previously described, as work commenced on
their new houses.
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5.2.2 BPGC claim procedure
Interest in the BPGC scheme was aroused by awareness of the claim
process which occurs when the house-owner detects something going
wrong. In such a case officers of the HGNZ inspect the defect and, using a
specially designed form, produce an impartial report on the nature of the
defect and the apparent reason for it, together with an estimate of the cost
of the remedy and the actions to be taken to affect the remedy. lt will be
seen at once that this reporting procedure by people acting neutrally between
the client and the builder was likely to produce a gradually increasing supply
of data about building failure in newly built dwellings in New Zealand. The
indemnity provided protection against faulty workmanship and materials for
up to 6 years for the starting date of the Indemnity (which was the date on
which the BPGC executed the indemnity, orthe subsequent construction start
date). Although a distinction was made between "minor defects" (for which
the indemnity period was limited to 18 months) and "major" and material
defects, in practice the corporation, exercising something of a consumer
protection function, tended not to invoke the "minor defect" definition rigidly
in cases where the claimant could reasonably be given the benefit of the
doubt as to the timing of the defect or the extent to which it had become
obvious to a lay person. This reasonable approach to claims in no way
reduced the objectivity of the claim data recorded by the HCNZ inspector
since all claims are investigated on notification unless obviously well out of
time. With these few exceptions, decisions to admit or refuse a claim were
made after the inspector's report had been made.
From the BPGC claim files it was possible to glean, inter alia, the location of
the dwelling, the year of the claim, the date of completion, the class of human
error (using Table 4.2) and the natural source and cause of failure (using
Table 4.1). The files from which data was extracted included allthose claims
in which building failure was evident and which were lodged after the
inception of the scheme on 1st April 1978 and before 31 December 1984.
A total of 198 of the claims made to the BPGC in that period were identified
as claims relating to building failures as defined in Chapter 3.
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5.2.3 Analysis of BPGC claims data
Analysis of all BPGG claims received over the period 1st April 1978 (when the
BPGC first issued indemnities) until 31 December 1984 revealed that of 446
claims received 198 involved building failure as defined in this report. (fhe
bulk of the 'non-failure' claims were for non-completion of contract.)
The total number of building failure claims (198) should be seen in the
conte)ft of the 25,000 indemnities issued by the Corporation over that period.
It must also be appreciated that the Corporation indemnified only a small
proportion of all the new dwellings erected in that time. The Corporation's
own figures (BPGC Annual Reports) show a varying penetration of the
potential market for indemnities, as shown in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: BPGC Indemnities issued as a percentage of new permlts.
Source : Building Performance Guarantee Gorporation
5.2.3.1 Distribution by tocatity
The indemnity scheme was open to all-comers and there was no policy of
selection against particular builders so it may be assumed that the houses
indemnified by the Corporation represented a fair sample of new housing of
the period. As will be demonstrated later in this chapter, the dwellings which
became the subject of claims were not only distributed all over the country
(see Fig 5.1) but were also distributed both above and below the average
dwelling construction cost for the time and location.
NZ New House
Permit Numbers
1985
21761
1984
20266
1983
15999
1982
19006
1981
14442
BPGC Share
of Market
21.8o/o 17.5o/o 15.5o/o 18.9Yo 27.8o/o
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Christchurch
Invercargill
DunediD
Lorer Hut[
Palnrerston North
Analysis of the 198 building failure claims to identify the cause or causes was
carried out using the list of causes identified in Chapter 4 in Tables 4.1 and
4.2.
Flg 5.1
5.2.3.2
dampness
movements
chemical/biological change
and
human error (fabb 4.2)
BPGC Glaims by locatlon.
Examlnatlon of claims to identify cause(s)
)
) natural causes ffable 4.1)
)
It must be remembered that more than one cause may operate to create a
building failure. Fig 5.2 shows the relative frequency with which the given
cause was found to have been a factor.
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dampness
chem/biol change
human error alone
movement
Fig 5.2 BPGC. Gauses of tailure
It should be noted that human error alone makes a significant contribution to
the number of building failures, as does the cause 'dampness'. of course
it is common for a building failure to result from the effects of more than one
cause.
Further analysis of the cause 'human error', using the list of types of human
error discussed in Chapter 4 and reproduced below, reveals that the relative
incidence of the various types of human error is as illustrated in Fig s.3.
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t0
I
5
1
2
3
4
5
6
Key to type of human error:
Defective materials
Overlooked site
conditions
lgnorance
Overemphasis
on first cost
Defective
documentation
Unanticipated
consequence of change
Specialist contractors
lack of knowledge
Design too difficult
to build wellI Dereliction or negligence10 Poor communication
Fig 5.3 BPGC Incidence ot types of human error.
The preponderance of the human error type 'negrigence" (type No. 9) is
obvious and is discussed in Chapter 6. Suffice to say at this point that the
word 'negligence' is used liberally if not intelligently in building failure reports.
Figure 5.2 illustrates the relative incidence of failure causes including both
'natural causes' and 'human error'. Fig 5.4 shows the relative incidence of
'natural causes' only.
dampness
chem/biol change
ement
Fig 5.4 BPGC. Natural Causes
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When each of the three 'natural causes'
that cause, the results are as shown in
is analysed to reveal
Figs 5.5 and 5.6 and
the sources of
5.7 following:
faulty scrviccs
aLmosphcre
Sround
raler supply
movement
dampnesg
chcm,/biol
Dampness Sources of dampness
Fig 5.5 BPGC. Cause 'dampness' analysed by source.
change
dampnegs
solar radiation
incompat matrls
decomp ol paints
movement
Chem/biol change Sources chem/biol chan
Fig 5.6 BPGC. cause'Ghemicat/Biologlcal change'anatysed by source
chern/biol change3 in temp
physical changee
erteru appl load
movement
dampness
changes in moislur€
Movement Sources of movement
'movement' analysed by source.Fig 5.7 BPGC. Cause
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5.2.3.3 Time Interval frorn complefion to claim
Examination of the BPGC claim fites revealed information about the time
interval between the completion of the dwelling and the lodging of the claim
with the Corporation. For many house-owners the completion date is virtually
the same as the occupancy date and gives an indication of the date after
which the owner might first become aware of any building failures. Fig 5.9
indicates the number of claims made within 1, z, g, 4, or 5 years of
completion of the dwelling. (Fhe negative time span (-1{) allows for claims
which were lodged before the dwelling was completed).
Number of claims
Fig
- 
l-0 0- r r-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-? 7-8 8-9 9- 10
Period from completion to claim (years)
IIIi[Til]l Ht narural causes
5.8 BPGG. comptetion to ctaim time (years) (all naturat
causes).
96
Number of claims
Analysis of the claims by natural causes reveals the early dominance of
dampness as the most common natural cause. See Fig 5.9.
-l-o 0- I r-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 ?_8 8_9 9_10
Period from completion to claim (years)
Eliinil D.*pou"" E chem,/biological Effi MovemenLs
Flg 5.9 BPGC. Completion to clalm time (years) (naturat causes
separately).
It is evident that by far the largest number or claims made in a 12 month
period were made within the first 12 months after completion. As Fig s.10
shows, the majorrty of these claims were made early in that first 12 month
period.
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-r-00-l t 2 3 4 5 6 ? I I 10 tr r2
Period from completion to claim (months)
NNN N"Lr""l causes only
Fig 5.10 BPGG. comptetion to ctaim time (months) (natural causes
only).
Further analysis to investigate the relative frequency of the three natural
causes as contributorsi to the claims made in the first 12 months is illustrated
in Fig 5.11 in which dampness continues to be an influence in early claims.
-l-00-l | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 I lO ll t2
Period from completion to claim (months)
E Dampness W chem,/biotogicat Eiiiiliil uo.,ements
(BPGC). Completlon to clalm tlme (months) (natural causes
separately).
Number of claims
Fig 5.11
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As Fig 5.2 shows a significant number of claims to the BPGC were the result
of human error alone (ie there were none of the 3 natural causes present and
contributing to the failure). Fig 5.12 shows the completion to claim time for
BPGC claims due to human error only as compared with the times for claims
caused by naturalcauses. (lt must be remembered that of 198 BPGC claims
only 6 (approximately 3%) contained no element of human error while 8
claims (approximately) 4oA) revealed the presence of 3 types of human error.
78 claims (39.5olo) revealed the presence of 2 types of human error while the
remaining 106 claims (53.57") reveal only 1 type of human error). See Fig s.3
for illustration.
-1-0 0-t t-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-? ?-8 8-9 9-lO lO_ll
Period from completion to claim (months)
I Human error atone N\N p.1,r..1 causes
Fig 5.12 BPGC. Completion to claim time (human error alone and
natural causes separately)
Again the preponderance of claims in the first year makes analysis of the first
year necessary. Fig 5.13 provides this analysis and shows clearly that there
is a difference between the patterns of claims arising from human error alone
on the one hand and natural causes on the other.
Number of claims
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-1-O0-l 1 2 3 4 5 6 ? I I tO ll
Period from completion to claim (months)
I Human error alone N\Nl p"g.r""l causes
Flg 5.13 BPGC. Completlon to clalm ilme (months) (human error
alone and natural causes separately).
The sum of claims arising from human error alone and from naturat causes
reveals a pattern in the completion to claim time which is shown, firstly, as
the yearly pattern in Fig s.14 and then, secondly, as the pattern over the first
year after completion in Fig 5.15.
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Fig 5.15 BPGC. Gompletlon to clalm Ume (months) (human error
alona and natural causes summed).
N{rrrber of ctalrns
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5.2.3.4 Clalm cost as o/o ol contract price
Considering now the cost of the claims to the various claimants, there are
two obvious ways to measure these. One is to measure the dollar cost of
the claim. This method has only been used when a comparison between,
say, the value of claims caused by dampness and those caused by
movement is being made. other than as a comparative measure the dollar
values are of little use unless adjusted for inflation and adjusted to 1992
values. Even then the values would be subject to the criticism that they took
no account of the variation in the cost of building materials and componentry
over that period of time, a variation which owes as much to the deregulation
of the NewZealand economy, closer economic relations (CER) with Australia,
and alterations to import duty and tariff controls, as it does to inflation.
One useful measure of the cost of claims is a measurement of the claim sum
as a percentage of the original contract price of the house. In all the BPGC
claims considered in this report the period of time from completion until the
claim was lodged was no more than 5 years, and the bulk of the claims were
lodged within 1 year, so the effects of inflation on the claim cost to contract
price ratio could be expected to be minimal. Fig 5.16 shows the pattern of
claims arising form all natural causes when analysed by the claim
sum/contract price ratio expressed as a percentage.
t-2 2-3 3-{ ,l-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-30 30-,10 40-50 50-100
Claim/contract price %
BPGC. Claim as 7o of contract price. (att natural causes).
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Fig 5.16
The pattern of the claim/contract price ratio broken down by each of the
three natural causes is illustrated in Fig. S.17.
30
25
20
l5
l0
5
0
Flg 5.17
r-z 2-3 3-4 {-6 5-r0 t0-15 t5-20 20-30 30-fO ,tO-50 60-100
Claim/contract price %
Ei!-!iEl Movernent [--l crrem/biologicat W Dampness
BPGC. Clalm as % of contract prlce (for each .natural
cause').
Number of claims
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The relative impact of human error alone as compared with that of all the
natural causes is shown in Fig 5.18.
0-l L-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 b-l0 lo-r5 tO-20 Z0-SO gO_.10 40_60 i0_r00
Clairn/contract price %
I lluman error alone N\Nl N.tr."l causes
Fig 5.18 BPGC. Glalm as % ol contract prlce. (human error alone
and'natural causes'.)
The three natural causes' contribution to the cost of building failures was
shown in Fig 5.17. In the following figures these three natural causes are
shown analysed bythe source of the dampness, chemical/biologicalchange,
or movement in each case.
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Thus Fig 5.19 shows the distribution of the cost of the ctaims caused by
dampness while the accompanying Fig 5.20 shows the same distribution
broken down by the various sources of the dampness. This latter Figure
makes apparent the significant contribution of rain as a source of dampness
as compared with the other sources such as ground atmosphere and faulty
services.
0-l l-? 2-3 3-.1 4-5 5-lO to-15 r5-?0 20-30 30-40 ,10_50 50_too
Claim/contract price %
Flg 5.19 BPGG. clalm as % ol contract price. (cause'dampness'.)
t-2 2-3 3-,1 4-5 5-10 l0-15 l5-?0 20-30 30-40 40-b0 50-too
Claim/contract price %
N Ground rater l---l constn process @ Aurrospnerc
fJ Faulty seraices ffi u"int"noo""
BPGC. Clalm as % of contract price. (Gause.dampness,
analysed by source.)
I R",r,
ll!':!iiil rarer suppry
Number of claims
Number of claims
Fig s.20
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The corresponding illustrations for chemical/biological change and
Movement now follow:
Number of claims
l-? 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-r0 10-15 t5-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 5o_l0o
Claim/contract price %
Flg 5.21 BPGC. Claim as % of contract prlce.
'chemlcal/blological'.)
(Cause
0-1 l-2 2-3 3-,1 ,l-5 5-10 l0-15 t5-20 20-30 30-,10 ,t0-50 50-100
Claim/contract price %
I Corrosion/decay N Solar radiatior, [---l tncornpatible substce
Fig 5.22 BPGC. Gtaim as % ot contract prtce. (Cause
'chemlcal/blologlcal analysed by source.)
0-l
Number of claims
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r-2 2-3 3-a {-5 5-t0 t0-15 15-20 20-30 30-,to ,to-50 5o_too
Claim/contract price %
Flg 5.23 BPGC. Claim as yo of contract prlce. (Cause .movement,.)
0-t l-2 2-3 3-,t ,r-5 6-10 r0-t5 t5-AO 20-30 gO-4O aO-50 OO-IOO
Claim/contract price %
I ert appl loads NN\t ch"ng"",/rcmp. l-l chaages/moirt @ eny, cbanSc,
Fig 5.24 BPGC. Clalm as o/o of contract prlce, (Gause .movement,
analysed by source.)
Glalm sums
0-l
5.2.3.5
When the claim sums are considered in dollar terms atone, with the cost of
the claim stated in the dollar value at the time of cfaim, the pattern of claim
Number ol claims
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value is as shown in Figs 5.25 and 5.26. The former shows the distribution
of dollar value for claims caused by human error alone, while Fig 5.26 shows
the distribution for claims caused by natural causes (with an element of
human error present in most cases as previously discussed).
Number of claims
0- _5 .5- t t-1.5 t.6-2 2-3 3-4 ,t-5 5_to lo_20 20_40 ,00_50 50_roo
Claim value ($tOOOs;
BPGC. Clalm sums ($1OOOs) ftuman error atone.)Fig 5.25
0-.5 .5-l l-1.5 1.5-A 2-g g-{ 1-S S-to t0_a0 Ao_tO 40_00 bo_rOO
Claim value ($tOOOs;
Flg 5.26 BPGC. Claim sums ($1000s) BPGC naturat causes
summed.)
Number of claims
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The breakdown
value distribution
Number of claims
of 'natural causes' claims by cause to indicate
of claims is shown in Fig 5.27.
the dollar
o-.5 .5-l l-t_5 t.5-2 Z-i 3-{ ,t-S 5-lO IO-AO A0-40 ,t0_50 50_too
Claim value ($tOOOs;
f Dampness N chem,/biological l--_l Mo""ments
Fig 5.27 BPGC Ctaim sums ($1OOOs; (by naturat cause.)
The distribution of claims analysed by natural cause and then by the sources
of those natural causes now follows, providing an alternative indication of the
relative costs of claims to that provided by Figs s.1g - 5.24 which expressed
the claim cost as a percentage of the contract price.
0-.5 .5-r r-1.5 r.5-2 2-3 3-{ .t_5 5_lo ro_?o 2o_.t0 40_50 50_1oo
Claim value ($tOOOs;
Fig 5.28 BPGC Ctaim sums ($1000s) (Cause .dampness'.)
Number of claims
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Flg 5.29
0-.5 .5-t t-1.5 1.5-2 2-3 3-{ 4_5 5_10 10_20 20_{o {0_50 5o_lo0
Claim value ($tOOOs;
1.5-2 2-3 3-{ .-5 5-t0 l0-e0 ?0-{0 ,t0-50 50-100
Claim value ($tOOOs;
Nl Ground rater l---l constn proccsc @ Ar*otprr"r.
f---l Fautty serYices @ |d"int.o.n""
BPGC Claim sums ($1000s) (Cause .dampness'anatysed
by source.)
BPGC Clalm sums ($lOOOsy (Cause .chemtcal/btologtcal
change'.)
Number of claims
Fig 5.30
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0--5 .6-l t-1.5 1.5-e Z-3 3-{ ,a-S S-r0 rO-?0 Z0-{0 aO-SO OO-IOO
Claim value ($tOOOs;
I Conosion/decay NN\\ Sot.. radiation E lncompatible substce
Flg 5.31 BPGG Gtatm sums ($1000s) (cause .chemfcat/btotogtcal
change analysed by source)
0-.5 .5-r l-r.5 1.5-? 2-3 3_{ a_5 5_lo lo_20 eo_,00 ,10__5 50_roo
Claim value ($tOOOs;
Fig 5.32 BPGG. clalm sums ($1000s). (Gause .movement'.)
Number of claims
1Jt
Number of claims
0-.5 .5-t l-1.5 r.5-e 2-3 3-{ 4-5 5_tO t0_20 20_40,r0__5050_100
Claim value ($tOOOs;
I nrt appl loads Nl changes/temp [-_l chongu, /mot* VT phys changeg
Fig 5.33 BPGC. Claim sums ($1000s). (Cause,movement' analysed
by source.)
5.2.4 Contract prlces of BPGC sampte houses
To determine whether claims arose from any particular range of dwelling
contract prices, the contract prices of the dwellings which gave rise to claims
were compared with the average price of dwellings admitted to the BpGC
scheme in a particular year. For example Fig 5.34 shows the average price
of houses admitted to the BpGc scheme through the wellingrton office (a
curved line connects the average values shown in the middle of each yearly
intervaf) together with the contract price of all the dwellings which gave 6se
to claims, shown in the year of completion. (each dot indicates the
completion date and contract price of one dwelling.
Comparable data for Auckland, Hamilton, Christchurch and Dunedin are
shown in Figs S.g4 - 5.38 which follow.
The data for Auckland and Christchurch (respectively the most populous
cities in the North and South lsland of New Zealand) have had added to them
a line showing the average new dwelling price each year for the region as
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supplied by the Department of Statistics. Note that this average price is
based on A!! new dwellings whether or not they were admitted to the BpGC
scheme. As Fig s.35 and Fig s.B7 show, there is a tendency for dwellings
indemnified by BPGC to have a lower average price than the average of all
houses in the region. This tendency cannot be explained by any BpGc
policy.
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5.3 NEW ZEALAND ARCHITECTS CO.OPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD
(NzACS)
Access to the NZACS claim files5.3.1
The Claim Files of the New Zealand Architects Co-operative Society
Ltd (NZACS) concern architects' claims under their professional
Indemnity insurance contracts.
With the approvaland assistance of the Claims Director of NZACS and
of the NZACS Board, access to files concerning claims notified to
NZACS since it inception in 1972 was obtained. The files relating to
claims concerning dwellings were extracted from the records system
by the Claims Director and made available for scrutiny. An
undertaking was given to the NZACS Board that no information
obtained from NZACS which might identify any architect or client
would be published. lt was also agreed that no files would be
removed from the custody of the NZACS Glaims Director and that no
photocopying of any part of the files would be done.
5.3.2 NZACS claim procedure
Each of the claims files held by the Director is given a Claim number.
The Glaim Numbers are issued consecutively so that were it not for a
very few numbers which have never been allocated the latest number
corresponds closely to the running total of claims notified to the
Director. lt is important to understand that not all "possible claims',
notified to the Director become actual claims against the professional
indemnity policy. lt is required of all architects who belong to the
Society that they notify the Claims Director immediately the possibility
of a claim arises. This requirement exists so that the Director and the
insurers can give advice to the architect as to the steps to be taken
in dealing with the problem in a way designed to contain or minimise
the claim.
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5.3.3
Fundamental to the process of handling a possible claim is the
insurer's requirement that the architect must never under any
circumstances admit liability, because to do so may immediately
render impossible a negotiated out-of-court settlement whether by
arbitration or otherwise.
As a consequence of this requirement to deny liability, there is rarely
any correspondence on the Director's Claim file which directly imputes
legal liability. As this research was concerned with the reasons for
building failures, their causes and characteristics, the absence of
evidence concerning legal fault was of no consequence.
NZACS claim data categories
By reading the claim notification papers and other correspondence
between the architect and the claims Director and from examination
of claims analyses carried out by the Director, the following data
relative to each claim was amassed:-
From the Director's analyses:
NZACS Claim Number.
The area in New Zealand in which the architect was domiciled.
The period during which the possible claim was notified. The Director used
the following key for recording the period:-
PERIODS Sketch stage of productionWD Working Drawing stage of productionC Construction stageR Retro-active stage (ie where the claim arises after the bui6ing was
completed).
Whether the file was closed or open.
The Director's own view as to the fault lying behind the claim. For thispurpose the Director used the following alpha-numeric coding system:-
MEMBER FAULT INDEXA TECHNICAL FAILURE1 Poor detailing2 Lack of understanding of material3 Lack of understanding of method4 Inadequate supervision5 No supervision
A.
1
2
3
4
5
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B CONSULTANT ERROR1 Mechanical2 Structural3 Surveying4 OtherC PROCEDURAL CAUSES1 Exceeding authority2 Departure from brief3 Defective brief4 Failure to perform5 Negligent certification6 Administration defects7 Inadequate survey or site informationI Negligent adviceI Negligent estimating10 Incomplete or ambiguous documentation11 Failure to comply with regulations or acts12 Failure to co-ordinate consultantsD LACK OF COMMUNICATION1 Client2 Contractor3 Consultants4 Architect's staffE TRY ON (Author's note: This term describes those cases where no
basis for a claim exists, but the pretence is being maintained by one
party that a well-founded claim can be made).1 Owner2 Contractor3 Consultant4 Insurance companyF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE1 Contractor2 Sub contractorG FEE PROBLEMH LOSS OF DOCUMENTSI LIBEL AND SI.ANDER
5.3.4 Anatysis of NZACS ctaims data
Analysis of the NZACS claim files from 1972 (when the NZ Architects
co-operative society Ltd was established) until the end of 19g4
revealed the following facts:
1 Total number of claims (of afl varieties A-l above) related to completed
dwellings notified to NZACS as at end December 1gg4
=52
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2 Total number of claims (of allvarieties A-l above) related to completed
NZ dwellings notified to NZACS as at end December 1994 and
classifiable (as a building fairure or otherwise) as at February 19g5
=45
3 Total number of claims related to NZ dwellings notified to NZACS as
at end December 1984, classifiable as at February 1985 and indicating
building failure
=19
Distribution by localtty
The 19 building failure claims originated from centres all over New
Zealand. Figure s.39 shows the distribution of claims by locality.
Auckland
Wellington
Christchurch
Dunedin
Naprer
Lower Hutt Hamilton
Manakau Palmerston north
Flg 5.39 NZACS. Ctatms by tocailon.
5.3.4.1
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Each claim is given a code number by NZACS and this is used in the
following list showing the number of building failure claims in each
centre. The code numbers are shown in parenthesis and have been
used to preserve the confidentiality of the claimants in each case.
AK
Manakau
Hm
Napier
Pn
Lh
Wn
ch
Dn
(1) (16) (23) (24)
(36) (3)
(12)
(3e)
(8)
(e) (15)
(14) (25) (26) (30)
(4) (2s) (41)
(33)
4
2
1
1
1
2
4
3
1
19
Table 5.2 NZACS. Anatysis of claims by tocatity
It is apparent that building failure claims are not confined to one or
more geographical zones, and that, not surprisingly the larger
population centres produce a greater number of claims. Given that
the number of claims investigated was the total for about 12 years
during which time building activity would have flowed and ebbed in all
the centres it is reasonabre to suppose that the number of claims is
proportional to the number of new houses being designed and built
in each centre over that time-span. After all, if there was no design or
building going on in a particular centre there would be no building
failure claims emanating from that centre.
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5.3.4.2 Examlnatlon of claims to ldentify cause(s)
Examination of the 19 building failure claims to identify the cause or
causes was carried out using the list of causes identified in Chapter 4:
dampness
movement
chemical/biological change
and
human error (l'able 4.2)
natural causes (Iable 4.1)
It must be remembered that more than one cause may operate to
create a building failure. Fig 5.210 shows the relative frequency with
which a given cause was found to have been a factor.
movement
human error alone
chem/biol change
Fig 5.40 NZACS Causes of lallure
The predominance of the cause 'dampness' is immediately obvious.
The cause "human error alone' is obviously also a prominent
contributor to building failures in NZACS claims. ln fact, as the Table
5.3 shows, human error of one of more varieties was present in every
one of the 19 claims.
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Clalm No.
(1)
(3)
(4)
(8)
(s)
(12)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(23)
(241
(25)
(26)
(2s)
(30)
(33)
(36)
(3e)
Sources
dampness
ground
dampness
externally
applied loads
externally
applied loads
rain
dampness
pure human enor
pure hurnan error
sxternally
applied loads
constructlon
process +
atmosphere
rain
atmosphere
pure human enor
rain, also
human eror
rain, faulty
services
pure human error
faulty
services
changes in
moisture
dampness
extemally
applied loads
'Natural CauSe'
chemical/
biologlcal change
dampness
chemical/
biologlcal change
movement
movement
dampness
chemical/
blological change
movements
dampness
dampness
dampness
dampness
dampness
movement
chemical/biologlcal
change
movements
Classiticatlon
human error
1,9
2,9
6,9
2
4,8
I
3,9
9
6, 10
I
3,9
2, 3, g, 10
6, 10
9, 10
5,9
5,9
I
1,6,9, 10
(41)
Table 5.3 NZACS. Llst of clalms
classification of human error.
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showlng 'natural' cause and
The contents of Table 5.3 is displayed in Table 5.4 in a format which
indicates the frequency of occurrence of human error types.
Glass of human error Total Glalm File code no.
1 Defective materials 2 (1) (39)
2 Overlooked site
conditions
4 (3) (8) (25) (41)
3 lgnorance 3 (14X24) (25)
4 Overemphasis on 1 (9)
first cost
5 Defective documentation 2 (30) (33)
6 Unanticipated
consequences of change
4 (4) (16) (26) (3s)
7 Specialist contractor's 0
lack of knowledge
8 Design too difficult 2 (9) (25)
to build well
e Dereliction or negligence 13 (1) (3) (4) (12) (14\ (15) (23)
(24) (2s) (30) (33) (36) (3e)
10 Poor communication 5 (16) (25) (26) (29) (39)
;
Table 5.4 NZACS. Analysis of claims by class of human error.
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The relative incidence of the different classes or types of human error
is illustrated in Fig 5.42.
Some claim files revealed that more that one Wpe cf human error had
occurred to contribute in the building failure.
No. of claim files revealing 1 Class of error = 6
l(8) (12) (1s) (23) (36) (41)l
No. of claim files revealing 2 Classes of error = 11
t(1) (3) (4) (e) (14) (16) (24) (26) (2e) (30) (33)l
No. of claim files revealing 3 Classes of error = 0
No. of claims revealing 4 Classes ol error = 2
t(25) (3e)l
The proportions of the number of claims revealing more than one
class of human error as compared with those revealing only one are
illustrated on Fig 5.41.
2 classes of error
Flg 5.41 NZACS. Analysls of clalms by number of classes ol
human error per claim.
2
3
4
..1
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Key to type of human error:1 Defective materials2 Overlooked site
3
4
5
6
I
I
10
conditions
lgnorance
Overemphasis
on first cost
Defective
documentation
Unanticipated
consequence of change
Specialist contractors
lack of knowledge
Design too difficult
to build well
Dereliction or negligence
Poor communication
Fig 5.42 NZACS. Incidence of types of human error.
Table 5.5 displays 'natural causes'and the relevant 'source' in each
case. Table 5.5 tabulates these arcording to the operating 'natural
cause' in the NZACS claims. The 'sources' and 'natural causes' are
taken, as explained in Chapter 4, from a modified form of a table
developed by Lyall Addleson (Addleson, L 1977).
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Natural Cause
dampness
movements
Glaim No.
chemical/biological change 1
4
14
39
3
12
24
Table 5.5 NZACS. Analysls of causes by sources
25
Sources
dampness
dampness
dampness
dampness
ground
rain
(a) construction
process
(b) atmosphere
(a) rain
(b) faulty services
rain
(a) rain
(b) faulty services
faulty services
externally applied
loads
externally applied
loads
externally applied
loads
changes in moisture
content
externally applied
loads
n
30
36
I
I
23
39
41
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The analysis of the sources of the three natural causes is illustrated in
Figure 5,44,5.45, and 5.46, which follow. Figure 5.43 shows the
relative incidence of the three natural causes in the claims.
chem/biol change
dampness
Fig 5.43 NZACS. Natural Causes
movcment
constrn procesg
ground
laulty rervicar
al,mosphere
Fio
chem/biol
Dampness Sources of damPness
NZACS. Natural cause'dampness' analysed by source.
chem/biol chaojc dampncss
movem ent
Clnern/biologic al Sources of chem/biological
Fig 5.45 NZACS. Natural cause'chem-blol' analysed by source.
ampness
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che]!/blol changc
Movements
changes in moisturc
movemcnt
crtcrn appl load
ovements Sources of movements
Flg 5.46 NZACS. Natural cause'movement' analysed by source.
5.3.4.3 Tlme Interval from completlon to clalm
A further piece of information obtained form the NZAGS claims
date was the time interval between the completion of the
dwelling and the lodging of the claim with the insurers. Fig 5.47
shows the relative number of claims lodged at various time
intervals, measured in years, after the dwellings wer€
completed.
-l-o o-t t-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-? ?-8 8-9 9-10
Period from completion to claim (years)
Fig 5.47 NZACS. Gompletlon to clalm time (years) (all causes.)
Number of claims
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It is apparent from Fig 5.47 that the largest number of claims in
a given 12 month period occur within the first year after
completion. Further analysis of this first 12 months post-
completion is shown in Fig 5.48 in which it is evident that as
many claims were lodged within the first month post-completion
as were lodged in the seventh month post-completion.
-1-00-l l 2 3 4 5 6 7 I I l0 lr
Period from completion to claim (months)
Fig 5.48 NZACS. Completlon to clalm (months) (all causes.)
The relative significance of the three 'natural causes' in the
analysis of the completion to claim date interval is shown in Fig
5.49 which breaks down Fig 5.47 by natural cause.
Number ol claims
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Fig 5.49 NZACS. Completion to claim time (years). (naturalcauses.)
Further analysis of the first 12 month period in Fig 5.€ is
shown in Fig 5.50 in which the signfficance of the natural cause
'dampness' is evident.
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NZACS. Completlon to claim time (months). (natural
causes.)
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Nurnber of claims
Analysis of the 4 'human error only' cases in the NZACS claim
record reveals a spread of completion to claim periods as
shown in Fig 5.51.
0- l r-2 2-3 3-4 4-5
Period from completion to claim (years)
Fig 5.51 NZACS. (Completion to claim time (years). (human error
only.)
Again the predominance of claims in the first 12 months is
evident and has been further analysed in Fig 5.52.
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Number of claims
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5.3.4.4 Claim sums
It is not possible to show the relationship of the claim sum to
the original contract price of each dwelling involved in a NZAC's
claim because the claim files did not indicate the contract price
in each case.
It is possible to illustrate the number of claims made within a
range of claim values. Fig 5.53 shows the distribution of claim
values for all NZAC's claims (except those 6 out of the 19
claims for which no claim value was discoverable from the
claim file) across a value range from $0-40,000.
0-.5 .5- I t- 1.5 1.5-2 2-3 3-,[ d-5 5- l0 10-20 20-'10 {0-50 50- 100
Claim value ($tOOOs;
Flg s.53 NZACS. Clalm sums ($1000s) (all causes.)
When the claims are separated into the two categories of
'natural causes' and 'human error alone', the distribution of
claim values is as shown in Fig 5.34
Number of claims
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Fig 5.54
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NZACS. Claim sums ($1000s) (human error alone and
natural causes.)
5.4 INSURANCE LOSS.ADJUSTERS
5.4.1 Function of loss-adfusters
The function of insurance loss-adjustors is to act as the impartial investigator
of insurance claims made by a policy-holder under the terms of an insurance
contract intended to compensate the policy holder for certain types of loss.
Generally loss-adjusters work independently of any particular insurance
company but take their instructions to investigate a claim from the company
which issued the policy to the claimant. Because loss-adjusters have a
professional knowledge of insurance contracts and specialised expertise in
claims settlement their engagement by an insurance company is intended to
reassure the claimant that the claim is being objec-tively and impartially
investigated. The loss-adjusters report their findings to the client insurers
together with a recommendation for a basis of settlement.
A typical example of the loss-adjustor's work in a dwelling-related claim is the
adjustment of a claim resulting from carpet damage following a washing-
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machine overflow. The options available to compensate the poliry holder
include:
lifting, drying and re-laying the carpet
drying and shampooing the carpet to remove water stains
a lump sum payment to the policy-holder amounting to the
value of the carpet as at the date of the claim, allowing for
depreciation of value due to age and wear. (Assuming the
policy provides for compensation for the value of the asset at
the time of loss)
a lump-sum payment to the policy-holder amounting to the
value of a new replacement carpet (assuming the policy
provides for replacement of an asset which is ruined).
The loss adjuster's experience ideally ensures a fair balance between the
natural wish of the insurers to minimise the cost of the claim and the equally
naturalwish of the claimant to benefit to the maximum permitted by the terms
of the policy.
5.4.2 lmpartiality and skllled judgement
The example of the carpet damage claim is intended to demonstrate that
there is a degree of impartiality and skilled judgement in the work of loss-
adjusters which makes their observations on the cause of the claims worthy
of note. The loss adjusters are not, of course, as well versed in building
matters as the inspectors who investigate BPGC claims, but often the
information recorded in the loss-adjuster's report is sufficient for a confident
identification and classification of a building failure to be made by someone
who is knowledgable about building failures.
It is important to keep it in mind that the loss-adjusters are primarily
interested in investigating and adjusting claims and have no intrinsic interest
in building failures. In that regard they reflect the position of the insurance
industry generally in taking no interest in analysing the causes of the
damages which generate claims on dwelling and dwelling contents policies.
1
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3
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There are severalfirms of loss adjusters operating in New Zealand, of which
some operate under a more or less loose national organization with offices
(which are often autonomous) in several centres throughout the country.
One such organisation to which the writer was referred by sources within the
insurance industry was MBS Loss Adjusters (NZ) Ltd. In return for
assurances that client confidentiality would be preserved the management of
four branches of the MBS organisation generously allowed access to their
claim files.
As the MBS organisation sorts its claim files by an identifying number and a
brief, often cryptic, entry in a log of claims handled, a large number of claim
files had to be examined in the search for building failure claims. The total
number of claims handled by each of four MBS offices in 1982, for example,
was as follows:
Auckland
Wellington
Christchurch
Dunedin
1679 claims
1538 claims
1250 claims
1795 claims
5.4.3 Building failures as a proportion of all clalms
The MBS Loss Adjusting group handle insurance claims of alltypes including
motor vehicle, marine, cargo as well as householder's claims for damage to
houses and contents. The extent to which building failure claims form part
of their workload can be seen in Figures 5.55 and 5.56 which show the
annual total of claims of all sorts handled by the offices in Auckland,
Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin and the relatively small number of
building failure claims made to each office.
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of buildlng fallures, Auckland andMBS Proportlon
Wellington.
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Building lailure
98
MBS Christchurch 19BZ MBS Dunedin 19Bz
Fig 5.56 MBS Proportion of buildlng fallures, Chrlstchurch and
Dunedin.
The householder's insurance policies are not intended to protect their
dwellings against the builders' human error or even against the effects of
natural weathering and aging, but they do provide for compensation for the
consequences of water and fire damage. All the building failure claims
examined related to fire or water damage arising from causes other than
flood, tempest, earthquake or Act of God.
The relative proportion of water to fire claims adjusted by the four otfices are
shown in Figs 5.57 and 5.58.
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Flg 5.57 MBS Fallure by flre and water, Auckland and Welllngton
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Fig 5.58 MBs Fallure by fire and water, chrlstchurch and Dunedln.
Remembering that examination of a fullyear's claims in each otfice amounts
merely to a sampling of the range and number of claims adjusted by MBS
and its competitors during that year throughout New Zealand, no significance
can be attached to the total number of such claims handled by one office as
against another. \r/hat may be significant is a comparison between the
numbers of claims of various types adjusted each year. Figures S.sg and
5.60 illustrate such a comparison by showing the numbers of fire and water
claims arising from building failure alongside the numbers of claims arising
from accidental events. The most common overflow accidents arise from
automatic washing machines discharging into blocked laundry tubs, while
cooking fires frequently originate from an overheated 'fry-up'.
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Auckland 1982
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Fig 5.59 MBS Failures and
(1e82).
Christchurch l9B3
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Dunedin l98?
D xater failurc % o""rllot 
^."
Fig 5.60 MBS Failures and accldents In Christchurch (1983) and
Dunedin (1982).
In the case of the Wellington office it was possible to obtain a full two years
of data (for years 1982 and 1983). The two years are compared in Fig 5.61
Number o[ claims
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to illustrate differences and similarities between the claims adjustment
experience of the two consecutive years.
Number of claims
Wellinglon 1982 lfellington 1983
f coot tire acc N\N I'ire tailure f--| ratcr faiturc V@ oturtto, ac"
Fig 5.61 MBS Failures and accidents In Welllngton in 1982 and
1983.
5.5 SUMMARY
This chapter introduced the data sources which were sought in order to test
the usefulness of the system of classification of building failures proposed in
Chapter 4. The classification system in turn had been developed to facilitate
the practice of identification and technical evaluation of buildings proposed
in Chapters 2 and 3. The resuhs of the analysis of the data are reported and
explained. The patterns of the results are discussed in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 6
PATTERNS FROM THE FAILURE DATA
INTRODUCTION
This chapter draws together the results of the various analyses of data
presented in Chapter 5. lt prefaces its commentary on the patterns which
emerge by drawing attention to the differences between the business
objectives of the various data sources. None of the sources, it is pointed
out, recorded data with the knowledge or intention that it would be
subjected to analysis and classification in the course of research into
building failures. Consequently the nature of the data recorded tended to
reflect the administrative requirements and convenience of the recording
organisation rather than the preferences of a researcher. Nonetheless it
proved possible to extract from the records enough information about cost,
dates, and causes, to allow aggregation of data to be carried out sensibly.
Had the data contained more information, consistently recorded, more
analysis would have been possible.
Some more or less consistent trends or patterns do emerge from the
analysis of the claims files located in the study. These patterns, the results
of aggregating the data from individual claims, provide interesting and
factual insights into the timing of claims, their cost and, of course, their
causes. lt is also possible, from the results of the research, to estimate the
total number of claims in a year in New Zealand.
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6.1 VARIED USEFULNESS OF THE DATA
6.1.1 Variation In data-collection habits
It will be apparent from Chapter 5 that the sources of building failure data
for this research are widely varied in their business objectives and therefore
in their data-collecting habits. Closest to the ideal source was the New
Zealand Building Performance Guarantee Corporation (BPGC), which was
established to indemnify dwelling owners against, inter alia, building failures,
and had a formal independent inspection and reporting system to handle
claims. lt was the use of the independent expert evaluator that made the
BPGC the best source of materialfor the technical evaluation discussed in
Chapter 2. The BPGC was also actively involved in arranging the
rectification of building failures which were reported to it.
The NZ Architects Co-operative Society (NZACS), on the other hand, was
established to ensure that architects who joined the scheme could tell their
clients that they were adequately indemnified professionally. NZACS is not
actively involved in organising the rectification of building failures. lts
function is to be ready to pay for the legal consequences of an architect's
client claiming monetary compensation for the architect's professional
shortcomings. As a consequence some of the NZACS claim files contain
only brief information about a claim which might or might not actually be
pursued by the client. These 'notional' claims arise out of the insurer's
requirement for the earliest possible notification of an impending possible
claim. Few of the claims files contain a formal report by an independent
person qualified in building, but many files contain lawyers' statements of
the legal technicalities. The researcher is forced to apply a higher level of
interpretive judgement and more intuition to NZACS claim files than to
BPGC files.
The loss-adjusters' data is different from both the NZACS and BPGC data.
While it is often recorded by people with some training in the technologies
and arts of building (and is therefore not totally unlike the BPGC data) it is
recorded only for the purpose of determining whether the conditions
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necessary for a valid claim within the relevant policy conditions have been
met. Those policy conditions are more concerned with compensating for
the value of the loss sustained by the claimant than in contributing to the
cost of prevention. Thus, in the event of water damage to wallpapers and
carpets resuhing from a defective ball-valve in a supply tank in the ceiling
the insurance policy will generally provide for some or all of the cost of
repair or replacement of wallpapers and carpets damaged by the water but
not for the cost of repair of the ball-valve. Even if the water damage
occurred because normal trade practice (such as the installation of a 'safe
tray' beneath the tank to catch overflows and drain them clear of the
building) had not been followed, the insurers are not required by the policy
conditions to contribute to bringing the installation up to standard. That is
a fundamental difference between the BPGC and the ordinary insurance
companies. Unlike the NZACS and BPGC data, the loss adjusters' claim
files concerned dwellings of all ages, not merely those up to six years old
(BPGC) or slightly longer for the NZACS cases.
6.1.2 Drawbacks and possible gains from variety of data sources
The fact that all these data sources are different from each other in these
various aspects is not, of course, ideal from the research point of view, in
that the data cannot be manipulated as one homogenous mass of claims
all made according to the same rules. While that is a draw-back,
unavoidable because there are no better data available, it is still possible to
detect common trends in the claims experience of the three different
organisations. lt may even be argued that the very diversity of the three
viewpoints on claims gives these common themes more significance.
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6.2 PATTERN OF CI.AIMS
6.2.1 Tlme lapse between completlon and clalm
The evidence is clear that the bulk of BPGC failure claims are lodged within
the first 12 months after completion and that after the first 24 months pos[-
completion, the incidence of claims in each year remains much lower. This
pattern is illustrated in Fig 6.1 which also shows that the trend is the same
whether the cause of failure was human error alone, or natural causes and
human error combined.
-t-0 0-l l-e 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 ?-B 8-9 9-lO 10-ll
Period from completion to claim (years)
I Human error alone Nl N.t,rt"l eauses
Flg 6.1 Gompletlon to clalm tlme lapse (years) for BPGC clalms
from all causes.
Number of claims
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lf the clalms are analysed by natural cause the resultant pafiern is shown
in Fig 6.2 which makes apparent the predominance of dampness as a
cause of claims within the first 12 months. Dampness is also predominant
in claims lodged before completion and in the 2-5 year period. The cause
'movements' is obviously apparent in the first 2 years as well, rising to a
frequency equal to 'dampness' in the 1-2year period.
- 
l-0 0- I r-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 A-7 7-8 8-9 9- lO
Period from completion to claim (years)
ffi Dampness E chem/biologieal ffi uovements
Fig 6.2 Completion to clalm time lapse (years) for BPGC clalms
from 'natural causes'.
Number ol claims
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When the NZACS claims are considered the same early incidence of claims
is evident, but there is a second bulge in the 2-3 year period, followed by
a quiet period of two years before more claims are lodged in the 5-9 years
period. Fig 6.3 illustrates this pattern in the 20 claims investigated.
Number of claims
-1-O O-r r-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-? 7-8 8-9 9-10
Period from eompletion to claim (years)
Flg 6.3 Comptetlon to clalm time lapse (years) for NZAGS clalms
from all causes.
A comparison of the completion to claim time lapse for BPGC and for
NZACS claims from all causes is shown in Fig 6.4. The tendency for BPGG
claims to be made earlier than NZACS claims is clear.
Number of claims
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Comparlson of completlon to clalm tlme lapse (years) for
BPGC and NZAGS clalms from all causes.
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Analysis of the NZACS claims by natural causes reveals the considerable
contribution of 'dampness'to the claims lodged in the 0-3 year period. The
other natural causes ('chemical/biological' change and 'movement')
became more significant in the 5-9 year interval. The small number of
claims in the sample available make it unwise to read too much significance
into the trends shown in Fig 6.5.
- 
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-0 0- I L-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-B 8-9 9-r0
Period from completion to claim (years)
N\N Dampness
Fig 6.5 Completion to clalm time lapse (years) lor NZACS claims
lrom 'natural causes'.
Gloser examination of the claims lodged with BPGC in the first 12 months
after completion of the dwelling shows that the highest rate of claims per
month occurs within the first month after the stated completion date. This
means, in most cases, that the claim was lodged during the maintenance
period. On the face of it such early lodging of the claim may seem
precipitate but it may be that the early lodgement reflects the lack of
confidence on the owners' part that the identified building failure was going
to be rectified by the builder during the maintenance period.
Number of claims
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The pattern of claims lodged with BPGC within the first 12 months of
completion is shown in Fig 6.6.
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When these first year claims are broken down by naturalcauses the pattern
of early dominance by 'dampness' is apparent as is the persistence of
'dampness' as a significant cause over most of the year - see Fig 6.7.
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Period from completion to claim (months)
n Dampness @ c.n.m/biological !!ii-!!!!ll uovements
Flg 6.7 Completlon to clalm tlme lapse (months) lor BPGC clalme
from'natural causes',
Number of claims
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The admittedly small number of claims made to NZACS and analysed here
provide some similarity with the BPGC claims in that there is a peak of
claims within the first month, but quite dissimilar is the second peak in the
7th month, shown in Fig 6.8.
-l-00-l I ? 3 4 5 6 7 8 I l0 lr 12
Period from completion to claim (months)
Fig 6.8 Completlon to clalm tlme lapse (months) NZACS clalms.
Analysis of the NZACS claims by natural causes again demonstrates clearly
the predominance of cause 'dampness' in the first 2 months. By the 3rd
month the incidence of 'chemical/biological' and movements begins to
match or exceed that of dampness as shown in Fig 6.9. This may be an
indication of a trend for leaks and water damage to became apparent
before a movement or chemical/biological change, but while everyday
experience suggests that leaks do tend to appear before settlement or
premature paint decay becomes apparent, the small number of claims
makes it difficuh to be certain. The BPGC experience (Fig 6.7) is obviously
not the same, with early chemical/biological and movement daims.
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Flg 6.9 Gompletion to claim time lapse (months) NZACS clalms
from 'natural causes'.
A comparison of the claim time lapse, within the first year, for BPGC and for
NZACS claims from all causes is shown in Fig 6.10
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6.2.2 The cost of clalms as a o/o ol the contract price
As discussed in Chapter 5 one basis of comparison of the cost of claims
which minimises the influence of annual inflation is the cost of the claim as
a percentage of the contract price of the dwelling. As the contract prices
were not available for the NZACS claims the claim/contract % figure could
not be calculated, but for the BPGC claims the information was available.
Fig 6.11 illustrates the number of claims which fell into each band of
claim/contract priceo/.
Number of claims
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I Human error alone N Naturat causes
Fig 6.11 Clalm as % of contract price for BPGC clalms lrom all
causes.
From Fig 6.11 it is apparent that building failure claims involving human
error alone tend to fit a pattern very similar to that of failure claims arising
from natural causes. While a small number of claims may cost more than
50o/o of the original dwelling contract price to fix it is unusual for the claims
cost to exceed 15o/o ol the contract price and by far the bulk of claims cost
less than 10%. Of 198 BPGC claims approximately 140 cost no more than
4o/o ol the original contract price.
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The detailed information provided by the BPGC claim files enabled the
'natural causes' claims of building failures to be broken down by the three
natural causes. The resuft of the analysis is shown in Fig 6.12 where the
impact of dampness as a cause of building failures is yet again evident, with
movement in second position well behind. Dampness and movement are
prominent causes over the whole spectrum of claim/contract price
percentages.
0- I l-2 2-3 3-,1 .{-5 5- l0 l0- l5 15-20 20-30 30-,10 ,IO-SO 50- lo0
Claim/contract price %
EEI Morem"nt E chem/biological @ Dampness
Fig 6.12 Clalm 8s o/o of contract price for BPGC claims from 'natural
causes'.
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Analysis of the three natural causes to establish the source of each cause
reveals the patterns which now follow. The first to be considered is the
cause 'movement'. Fig 6.13 shows how externally applied loads and
changes in moisture tend to dominate the pafiern with changes in moisture
contributing heavily to movement claims in the 5% to 1096 range. Externally
applied loads can also cause some of the most expensive claims at the right
hand end of the cost spectrum.
0-l r-2 2-3 3-4 {-5 5-10 t0-15 15-?0 20-30 30-40 {0-50 50-100
Claim/contract price %
I ett appt loadr N\\ g1r.ng."r/tamp. F Chao3ce/moiet WA puy. changcr
Flg 6.13 Gfafms as clc of contrast prlce lor BPGC clalms caused by
movement, showlng sources.
Number of claims
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Analysis of cause 'chemical/biological' makes clear the relatively expensive
impact of corrosion and/or decay as a source of claims used by
chemical/biological change, while the high incidence of solar radiation
across the 1-10o/o band indicates the pervasive influence of solar radiation
in the cause chemical/biological change. Incompatible substances, on the
other hand, appear to be involved in the lower cost end of the failure cost
spectrum. (See Fig 6.14)
0-l l-2 2-3 3-{ {-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-30 30-,10 |0-50 50-100
Claim/contract price %
I Corrosion,/decay Nl 5o1.. radiatron f] tncompatible substce
Fig 6.14 Glalm as % of contract prlce for BPGC clalms caused by
chemlca/biologlcal change, showing sources.
Number of claims
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The cause 'dampness', whert analysed by source, is found to arise
predominantly from rain, with the water supply system as runner-up both in
number of claims affected and in the spread of influence across the cost
spectrum. Given that rain is a wel!-known phenomenon and that one of the
primary purposes of a dwelling is to keep the occupants and their
belongings protected from the rain, the pattern of contribution rain makes
to the most common cause of building failure (dampness) is noteworthy.
t-? 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-10 r0-t5 15-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-r00
Claim/contract price %
Rain Nl Ground ratcr [---.l constn procasc % Ar*o"phr""
Yatcr supply [--l Fautty s.nicca ffi uri^1on".""
I
Fig 6.15 Glafm as oA of contract prlce for BPGG clalms caused by
dampness, showlng sources.
6.2.3 The cost of clalms In dollar terms
When the cost of building failure claims is measured simply in dollar value
as at the date of the claim it may be argued that, because of inflation, a
more recent claim will appear to cost more than the same claim made a few
years earlier.
Number of claims
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Given that inflation may be increasing the value of later claims as compared
with earlier ones, it is interesting to look at the claim sums distribution for
all building failure claims made to NZACS and BPGC over several years.
As Fig 6.16 shows the dollar value of most of the claims is less than $1500
for BPGC claims while the NZACS claims have a tendency to be a great
deal more expensive.
Number ol claims
0-.5 .5-r l-l-5 t.5-2 2-3 3-{ r-5 5-t0 10-20 ?0-{0 40-50 50-100
Claim value ($tOOOs;
l--l nzlcs @ BPGc
Flg 6.16 Clalm sums ($1000s) for NZACS and EPGC clalms.
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When the BPGG claim sums are analysed by 'cause'the trend for most
claims to cost less than $1500 is just as marked. As Fig 6.17 shows, the
cause 'dampness' is predominant but only a few dampness-caused claims
cost more than $4000 to fix.
O-.5 .5-l l-1.5 t.5-2 2-3 3-{ a-5 5-r0 10-20 20-'t0 40-50 3o-lo0
Claim value ($1000s)
I Dampness NNI crrum/biological l-__| uovements
Flg 6.17 Clalm sums ($1000s) lor BPGG clalms by'natural causes'
Number of claims
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The impact of human error on the dollar cost of claims is shown in Fig 6.18
in which claim sums for claims caused by natural causes on the one hand,
and by human error alone on the other, are illustrated for all BPGC claims.
The similarity in the pattern is clear.
0-.5 ,5-l l-1.5 r.3-2 2-3 3-4 {-5 5-t0 10-20 ?0-{0 {0-50 50-r0o
Claim value ($tOOOs;
WA Natural causes f,'itTB Hrr*.r, error arone
Fig 6.18 Glalm sums ($10OOs1 lor BPGC ctatms by'natural causes,
and human eror alone.
Number of claims
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The etfect of inflation on the cost of claims and on the spread of those
costs is indicated in Fig 6.19 in which the distribution of claim sums for each
of 3 two year intervals is shown. lt is apparent that over the six year period
there is no obvious overalltendency for more claims to occur in increasingly
higher cost brackets. (ie for a larger proportion of claims to appear at the
right of the graph.)
0-0.5 0.5-l 1-r.5 r.5-2 ?-3 3-4 {-5 5-10 10-20 20-30 30-{0 40-50 50-10
Claim value ($tOOOsl
I re?B-re8o N\N leso-legz f] regz-1e84
Flg 6.19 Clalm sums ($1000s) for all BPGC clalms In period
1978 /80, 1980 /82 and 1982/84.
6.2.4 The loss adfusters'data
The loss-adjusters claim files did not provide information to the same extent
of detail as the BPGC files. Information about the estimated cost of
repairing the defect (as distinct from the consequential damage), the date
of the dwelling construction, the contract price or the time elapsed between
the completion of the building and the claim was not stated. What the claim
files do provide, en masse, is a sample of the relative number of claims
Number of claims
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arising from water and fire in dwellings and made by house-owners or
occupiers who were appropriately insured. The data provides evidence that
building failures caused by dampness not only dominate the claims pattern
in the first six years of a dwelling's life but continue to figure prominently in
the claims pattern in dwellings of all ages. lt also provides evidence that
while building failure cfaims may contribute to the frequently publicised risk
of fire in dwellings they also contribute to the far more common water
damage risk.
6.2.5 The lncldence of bulldlng fallures In dwelllngs
The data source which best provides some basis for estimating the
incidence of building failure in New Zealand dwellings is the BPGC.
1B/?e 7s/AO 8o/8r 8r/82 82/83 83/84
Financial years
f Completed buildings N Claime lodged
Fig 6.20 Dwelling annual completions and annual BPGC clalms.
Fig 6.18 shows the number of 'failure' dwellings completed and the number
of building failure claims lodged within each financial year from 1st April
Number of completions or claims
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1978 to 31 March 1984. (A 'failure' dwelling is one which became the
subjecl of a claim in the period from 1st April 1978 untilSl December 1984,
being the period for which the claim files were available for examination for
this study.) The graph demonstrates yet again that for a given sample of
claims (in this case claims in the period specified) the maiority of claims are
lodged within the first 2 years after completion of the dwelling (see Fig 6.1)
reflected in the larger number of 'faiture' dwelling completions at the start
of the period as compared with the end' The number of claims lodged
each year is naturally affected directly by the number of completions in the
preceding years.
The following table sets out the number of new house permits issued in
New Zeatand each year, the number of BPGC guarantees issued, and the
number of building failure claims lodged in those Same years, and
accumulative.
The years 1g7g and 1g80 are excluded from all but the accumulated claims
on the grounds that the first two years of operation of the BPGC would be
atypical because of the effects of launch publicity in the first year (and the
obviously small claim numbers as shown in Fig 6.20) and the observed
pattern of most claims being lodged in the first two years after completion.
Thus 1981 is arguably the first year which may be free of any distortions
arising from the introduction of the BPGC scheme.
Considering the years 1981 to 1984 inclusive the following may be
calculated from the Table above:
1981 1982 1983 1984 TOTAL
New Zealand New House Permits No's 14 442 19 006 15 99S 20 266 s713
BPGC Guarantees issued 4 015 5 592 2 479 3 546 13632
BPGC market share in each Year 27.8% 18.9% 15.5% 17.4%
Annual claims lodged with BPGC 36 fi 41 3l 1€
Cumulative claims lodged with BPGC 69 109 150 181
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Total New Zealand permits issued
Total BPGC Guarantees issued
BPGC market share
Total Failure claims lodged
with BPGC
69713
13632
13632
69713
= 19oA
= 148
xrca
1
xrca
1
= 148
13632
6.3
lf it is assumed, as observed, that the bulk of claims are lodged within 2
years of completion of a dwelling, and that by far the majority, say
conservatlely 7oo/o, are lodged in the first year, then a rough indication of
the number of dwellings, guaranteed by BPGC, which become building
failure claims
= 1.O9o/o
Since, as has been argued elsewhere, the BPGC scheme is open to all
comers this low rate of failure could be extrapolated to apply to the national
total of new houses for the four-year period (69713), whether BPGC
guaranteed or not. In that case the expected number of building failure
claims, of a severity similar to those which BPGC attracts, would be
69713 x 1.09%
= 759 nationally
SUMMARY
This chapter began by commenting on the varying usefulness of data
obtained from the three sources presented in Chapter 5, having regard to
the business objectives of each source and the method and detail of the
recording process used by each.
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lThe pattern of claims, including such aspects as the timing, cost and
causes of claims was then presented graphically. An estimation of the
annual number of building failures in New Zealand was made. From the
syntheses of claims patterns it is possible to draw conclusions which are
discussed in Chapter 8.
Apart from the conclusions which may be drawn from the data considered
in this chapter there is also the tantalising glimpse it gives of the potential
value of aggregated building failure data, if only such data could be located.
In the next chapter are considered the processes and procedures by which
the method used to identify and classify building failures in the sample of
dwellings so far discussed, could be applied to buildings in general. Also
examined are ways in which various interest groups in the industry
(architects, Insurers, contractors etc) could contribute to and benefit from
the use of the method.
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CHAPTER 7
WIDER APPUCATIONS
7.O INTRODUCTION
Earlier chapters have explained how building failures might be defined
and how, once defined, they might be classified according to their
cause or causes. In Chapter 5 the data obtained from the only
sources available in New Zealand were reported, while in Chapter 6
the few patterns or trends discernible in the data were presented. The
limitations of the amount of data and of the data sources themselves
strongly suggest the need to examine ways of generating larger and
purposetully designed databases.
ln this chapter the processes and procedures by which existing
industry organisations might contribute to a nation-wide pool of
building failure data are suggested, as are the benefits which those
industries might expec.t to gain in return. Possible repositories for
databases are suggested.
Other important issues such as confidentiality, ownership of the data,
the method of storage, future uses of the database, and the variable
standard of diagnoses in the failure reports are traversed.
Finally the requirement for building diagnosticians is considered with
suggestions made as to what educational and training background is
appropriate for such people, and what personal qualities they need to
work effectively.
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POTENTIAL DATA REQUIREMENTS
ldeal data source
The ideal data source was first described in 5.1.1 as a standard
against which the existing available data sources could be compared.
The criteria for the ideal data source for future use are no different.
They may be listed as follows:
A building failure report destined for entry into a failures
database must be as accurate and objective as possible.
Generally this precludes reports written by, for example, the
constructors of the failed buildings who, while well qualified to
be accurate reporters, might have their objectivity affected by
legal or economic considerations. Similarly, reports written by
lay people without experience of building technology are
precluded on the grounds that the accuracy of the information
must be suspect. (ln Chapter 3 the necessity for both the user
and the 'objective expert evaluator' to identify a failure was
justified on the grounds that the interests of the user were thus
fairly protected and objectivity and accuracy assured.).
A building failure report destined for entry into a failures
database must be written in a format which meets the needs of
researchers. The most reliable research results are likely to
emanate from the most reliable data. The more researchers
have to interpret from obscure reports the less reliable the
extracted data becomes, despite the expertise and objective
intent of the interpreter. As a simple illustration, a report
attributing water entry to 'a faulty flashing' leaves the way open
for the interpreter of the report to suppose that the flashing was
either poorly sized, or poorly fixed, or poorly shaped, or
decayed, or a combination of all these possibilities.
1.
2.
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A suggested format for a building failure report is appended
(See Appendix B).
Some potential sources of reliable failures data, the processes
and procedures each would need to adopt, and the incidental
benefits each might gain are discussed in the following
sections.
BUILDING INDUSTRY
Nature of the Industry
The building industry in New Zealand, as in many other economies,
contains a mixture of large development and construction companies,
a much greater number of smaller companies whoSe number and
individual size varies according to the economic state of the country'
a variety of professional consultants, and a continually changing host
of materials suppliers and manufacturers. There is no central
organisation to which all these participants in the industry could
belong. Some building companies belong to the New Zealand Master
Builders Federation and some do not' There is no licensing or
registration of builders to encourage membership of a national body'
The professionals may belong to Institutes of Valuers, Architects,
Building, Professional Engineers, or Quantity Surveyors, while the
manufacturers and suppliers may belong to the Manufacturers
Federation or the Plastics Institute, for example'
Outside the universities, research into buitding is largely confined to
the Building Research Association of New Zealand (BRANZ)' an
organisation funded partly from a levy on building consent fees paid
to Territorial Local Authorities.
167
7.2.2
7.2.3
Enquiries made in the course of this research soon revealed that
confidentiality is important to those engaged in the building industry'
Information about building failures simply could not be obtained from
industry sources other than BRANZ, despite guarantees of
confidentiality, undeftakings to render alldata unidentifiable, and other
precautions. The building industry is a very competitive one which
explains, to some e)ftent at least, its preoccupation with confidentiality.
Repository tor lailure rePorts
The evident trust which the industry has in BRANZ, manifested in a
willingness to allow BRANZ Technical Advisors to advise on problems
on building sites and in the supply to BRANZ of new products for
testing and appraisal suggests that BRANZ could be the best
repository for building failure claim reports. BMNZ is demonstrably
neutral, as befits a research institution, and could analyse the data to
identify patterns and trends and report these in its publications.
Another possibility is that one or more of the Schools of Engineering
or Architecture could Separately, or in collaboration with BRANZ,
maintain the database. The universities share with BRANZ the
capacity to provide the necessary analysis, confidentiality of data, and
objectivity in analysis.
Failure reporting
ldeally the building failure report would be written by someone
unconnected with the contract in which the failure occurred. This will
be difficult for smaller firms in which everyone may be involved with all
current contracts. Nonetheless, given the emphasis that the report
places on cause rather than simply on blame, it should be possible to
have the report completed by someone in the organisation who was
not physically associated directly with the failure or implicated in its cause.
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In every case the failure must be identified as such by both an
objective expert evaluator and by someone who can reasonably be
said to be representing the would-be owner's viewpoint. This ensures
that technical failures which do not in themselves amount to failure in
the eyes of a lay person are not added, incorrectly, to the database'
(For example an unexpectedly uneven surface in a floor system using
pre-cast concrete planks, which is readily repaired by the contractor
when a topping is poured, should not be reported as a building failure'
Similarly, blemishes which might offend a particularly fastidious
layperson, but which are well within the range of tolerance normally
achieved in construction, should not be reported')
Benefits
The main benefit to the industry would be the collection of some
factualdata where none exists now. Supplied with reliable information
about the weaknesses in current building design and practice the
industry or its various sector groups would be able to:
concentrate training, supervisory and educational resources to
overcome proven weaknesses
debate the value of professional and trade practices
argue to support regulatory controls which have a proven need
and to oppose those that have not
measure reductions or increases in the incidence of buildings
failures, from all causes, from year to year.
At present none of these benefits are available. The present position
is little changed from that which applied in 1980 fiippett, 1980) when
a new requirement, impossible to meet, could be added to an existing
1.
2.
3.
4.
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mandatory code without the production of any evidenee that it was
necessary. That this is still possible is because there exists no
evidence to produce.
INSURANCE INDUSTRY
Nature of the IndustrY
The insurance industry is quite ditferent from the building industry in
several respects. One of these is the extent to which the participants
in the industry agree to belong to one national organisation, the New
Zealand Insurance Council, which represents industry interests at the
highest level. Another is the extent to which the individual insurance
companies compete with each other for new business while frowning
upon unethical attempts to persuade clients to cancel existing
insurance with one company in order to place their business with
another.
Most importantly, the insurance industry differs by having a long-
established practice of independent investigation of claims' a practice
not common in the building industry. Any insurer providing cover for
the owners of buildings is inevitably going to become involved in
investigation of building failures and their consequences.
Repository for failure reports
The New Zealand Insurance Council seems to be the most logical
repository for building failure reports supplied to insurers' lf the
reports received from insurers are in the same format or contain the
same information as those which, it is proposed, the building industry
should produce, then researchers from either industry or from
academia could aggregate the data from both sources with possible
7.3.2
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improvement in the reliability of the findings drawn from that data' lt
is theoretically possible that the insurance industry would be prepared,
with suitable assurances of confidentiality, to supply failure reports
directly to BRANZ or a university research unit.
Failure reporting
Loss-adjusters are already acting as investigators and reporters for
insurance companies in many claims involving damage to buildings
arising from building failure. As explained in Chapter 5 the loss-
adjusters are employed to act impartially between the interest of the
property owner and the insurer. Frequently their level of expertise is
such that they do indeed meet the ideal of the objedive expert
evaluator familiar with the usual standards of the building industry'
The building failure reports prepared by such adjusters do describe
building failures as recognised by the building user (the insurance
claimant) and the objective expert evaluator (the loss-adjuster).
Benefits
The benefits to the insurance industry arising from the systematic
reporting of building failure claims would include:
the ability to detect failure trends in new or existing building
materials, components, and construction techniques, and
hence
the ability to tailor premium rates to take account of the failure
record of different construction, materials and Component
types.
At present, according to repeated enquiries made to the New Zealand
Insurance Gouncil, no aggr€gated data about types of claims is
1.
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maintained by any insurer in the country. Insurance companies know
how much they pay out in claims for fire, motor-vehicle, marine, and
other policy types, but none apparently know how much claims
resulting from water leaks (building failures) cost each year as
compared with those resulting from accidents such as burst washing
machine hoses or a sink overflow. The loss-adjusters data in Chapter
5 is the only national insurance data available showing some break-
down of the types of water and fire claims which arise. lt was
obtained not from an insurance industry database but by manual
extraction from archived files. (At one location the 'archive' was a
leaky garage full of limp cardboard beer cartons packed with files')
RESEARCH ISSUES
Gonfidentiality
For building failure reports to be most useful they need to be
completely frank. For this to happen the reporters must be confident
that, provided they have acted in good faith and to the best of their
abilities, they will suffer no legal consequences from having written
their reports. The best way to guarantee that confidence is for each
report to have all information identifying a particular building (ie the
address of the building and the name of the owner) erased before
being entered into a database. This is not to say that the contributing
organisation, be it an insurance company or a building company
cannot retain all the information it requires for its own needs, but the
aggregated database which others will use for research purposes
must preserve confidentiality.
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Ownership of data
It seems reasonable to restrict access to a database to those
organisations which have contributed to it and to researchers who
have the consent of all the parties. Thus if a national database of
insurance and industry failure repofts was established, all contributing
organisations would expect to be granted access to the data, and,
more usefully in many cases, the results of analysis of the data carried
out by researchers.
Method of data storage
Ultimately, with the falling cost of computer storage it should become
both practicable and economicat to store electronically all the words,
numbers, and images on a building failure report form. Until then a
compromise method of storage would be to use a form-based
database with fields which can be encoded to allow the data to be
manipulated by researchers and analysis. The 'hard-copy' failure
report forms, which would probably contain explanatory diagrams or
sketches and extra words, could be filed under a unique number
allocated to its entry in the database.
The number of fields in the database is a matter for conjecture' lf
reporting of building failures to a database is to be a voluntary task it
is unlikely that the reporter will want to supply exhaustive details even
on a well-designed multiple-choice format report form. The
information sought in the proposed Report Form (Appendix B) is
sufficient, it is suggested, to enable a researcher to use the database
to select most of the useful combinations of input data'
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Further developments, once a reliable system of reporting is
established, might include:
one or more experienced people bringing to bear their
collective knowledge and experience in some systematic and
objective way. At the moment the body of knowledge brought
to bear is unlikely to be comparable with that on which lawyers
and medical practitioners can call from a long line of
precedents, (Dutfy, 1991), but recent research suggests that
establishment of a failures database is feasible, even when
there is little data to form the nucleus of that database. (Davies
and Hegvold, 1991)
some form of expert system which is kept up to date with the
latest materials, techniques, and technologies and contains a
detailed record of all the significant factors involved in a wide
range of precedent failures. Reported work in canada
(cornick, Ruberg, and James, 1989) summarises the difficulties
which have dogged the numerous prototype expert systems
which have been developed forthe construction industry. Ghief
amongst these difficulties has been the highly'personal' nature
of the system which has meant that only the authors of the
system have been able to add to the rule base. A new different
approach being taken at the Institute of Research in
Construction under the auspices of the National Research
Council in Canada uSeS what is termed a 'rule authoring
assistant', a system which allows many authors to co-operate
in the building of a rule base, at the expense of some constraint
on the form of reporting building faults. Clearly there is a need
to treat 'expert systems' with caution until they are proven in
building industry aPPlications.
1.
2.
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3. some form of symptom list which tends to combine the skills of
the human diagnostician in (1) with the logic and virtually infinite
memory of the comPuter in (2),
Standard of diagnosis
The standard of diagnosis of building failures will depend heavily on
the competence of the diagnosticians involved. That competence will
vary because there is no formal standard of competence or
qualification required for people who carry out building failure
diagnosis. In the course of examining Severalthousands of insurance
claims in the search for building failure cases (see 5.4.2) it became
clear that some loss-adjusters' knowledge of buildings is quite
thorough, while in others it was sketchy. lt is reasonable to assume
that in the absence of formal training in building science and building
technology most loss-adjusters learn from experience.
ln the case of the BPGC failure claims, the investigators appointed by
the Corporation were builders or Clerks of Works employed by the
Housing Corporation of New Zealand, and consequently wellqualified
to diagnose failures in dwellings.
One of the benefits of creating a large database of building failures is
that generally the patterns and trends which emerge from analysis of
the data will be less harmfully affected by the inclusion of a few faulty
diagnoses than would be the case when the database is small. Where
the faulty diagnosis occurs frequently in one type of relatively rare
building failure the size of the database will provide no such smoothing
effect on the data, and mistaken conclusions may start to be drawn.
175
7.5
7.5.1
DIAGNOSTICIANS
Lack of recognition of diagnostic skills
The quality of the building failure data available for inclusion in a
database is clearly dependent on the skill of the diagnostician who
reports on the failure. A barrier to progress in encouraging good
diagnosticians is the lack of recognition of diagnosis as a skill in its
own right. After all, the maiority of builders and sub-contractors are
trained to build using new material. Some may become involved with
repair, demolition, and rebuilding but few if any are likely to obtain
much experience in diagnosis of faults in buildings and none will have
received any formal training in diagnostic techniques. (lt should be
noted that these people's skills in making good the damage resulting
from building failures are not being denigrated here, but the point that
diagnosis and repair are different skills needs to be made).
As a consequence most diagnosis is not done by diagnosticians but
by people who are untrained and therefore resort, quite reasonably,
to the trial and error type of remedy where guess work (otten well-
informed guesswork) is substituted for a methodical analysis of the
evidence presented. Such an approach may be acceptable when
fixing the failure is allthat is desired, but it is hardly the best approach
to diagnosis of the original cause of failure.
This lack of diagnostic skilt within the industry is a threat to the
accuracy of failure claim records, and to the validity of analysis of
those records.
Existing tradition of diagnosis
There is little history or tradition of diagnostic work in the building
industry, which has tended to see itself as existing for the purpose of
7.5.2
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constructing new work, sometimes after demolishing a building to
clear the site. There are few diagnostic instruments in use. Even
plumbers and electricians have few diagnostic techniques and fewer
instruments. In many respects the building industry's diagnostic tools
compare with those of a medical practitioner deprived of access to X-
Idy, laboratory, or specialist referral facilities. This means that
diagnosis has to be based on experience and is only as good as that
experience. Skill in diagnosis then improves with greater experience,
preferably experience of some diagnoses which have been proven to
be correst.
ldeally diagnosis should be dependent upon the diagnostician having
a good grounding in the theory of building as well as experience
gained in practice. lt is the theory which gives an understanding of
why building processes are carried out in particular ways. Many
builders in New Zealand have no formal theory background to their
often well-developed practical skills and knowledge of how to build.
This lack of a theoretical base to their building experience must at
least retard the development of diagnostic skills in such builders.
lf the shortage of diagnostic skills is not in itself a great enough
obstacle to the development of a tradition of skilled investigation and
accurate objective recording of building failures, there is the fear of
dire legal consequences hanging over many diagnosticians as they try
to attribute blame fairly, on the insistence of lawyers. There can be
few influences more likely to damage the objectivity of a diagnostician
than the knowledge that one or more parties affected by the building
failure are more concerned with the attribution of blame than with the
analysis of cause. ln such circumstances the diagnostician must be
an independent person free of any real or imagined loyalty to any
party to the failure. (ln Britain, recent successful appeals against
convistions for acts of terrorism have focused attention on the frailty
of scientific evidence when objectivity is diminished. (Price, 1991).
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The consequences of error by diagnosticians of building failures and
by diagnosticians of pathological evidence may be ditferent, but the
importance of total objectivity is the same.)
Future diagnosticlans
lf building failure diagnosis is to become a valued activity in the
building and insurance industries, then diagnosticians will have to
become recognised for their qualities of technical expertise, objectivity,
and discretion. The best diagnosticians will exhibit the lawyer's
cautious phrase when speaking or writing, the building contractor's
appreciation of what is practicable in given circumstances, the
technical knowledge of architects and professional engineers, and the
physician's ability to diagnose from visible or palpable evidence.
Not all building failures need such people, any more than someone
with an ordinary headache needs a doctor. Some building failures
require no diagnostic skills for their cause(s) to be readily identified.
Others are difficult to diagnose and should signal the need to consuh
a specialist diagnostician. To do so makes good sense since the
repair of the failure, and of its consequences, is a cost which most
building owners would prefer to outlay with some certainty that the
cause has been found and remedied.
The practice of building failure diagnosis is one in which architects,
building scientists and professional engineers, competent in the skills
described above, could engage.
178
7.6 SUMMARY
This chapter described ways in which the method of identification and
classiftcation of building failures, developed in earlier chapters, could
be extended more widely into the building and insurance industries.
ln doing so it suggested who might carry out investigations of building
failure, diagnose the failure, and report it to a database.
The content of a building failure report form was suggested, and
suggestions made as to the repositories for the databases which
could be established.
This chapter also considered research issues such as confidentiality,
ownership of the data, and methods of storing and using the data.
Finally the chapter drew attention to the importance of competent
diagnosticians, the reasons for the present lack of diagnostic skills, the
qualities a good diagnostician will exhibit, and what categories of
buiEing professionals might engage in diagnosis in the ft.rture.
In Chapter 8 the methods of building evaluation, identification of
building failure, and the classification of those failures, all of which
were developed and described in earlier chapters, are summarised in
a statement of the methodology used in the research. The summary
is followed by discussion of conclusions which may be drawn from the
application of the methodology to the sample of failures considered in
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 and from the possibilities proposed in this
chapter.
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CHAPTER 8
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
INTRODUCTION
This chapter begins with a summary of the methodology used in the
research, and explains the methods used to evaluate, identify, and
classity building failures. lt then describes how the methodology was
tested.
The limitations of the findings are explained before the findings
themselves are summarised. The findings are followed by the
conclusions drawn from the research.
8.1.2
METHODOLOGY
Evaluation, identilication, and classification combined
The methodology used in the research was a combination of a
method of building evaluation, a method of identification of building
failures, and a method of classification by cause.
Method of building evaluation
The modified evaluation technique is described in Chapter 2, where it
is argued that both the users and producers of buildings should be
involved in their evaluation if the evaluation is to discover and
comment on all those aspects of the buildings' performance which
affect the lives of those concerned with it. To some extent this
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technique was modified to be appropriate to the sample of buildings
in the study. The sample comprised dwellings. For example, in the
case of dwellings it is argued that a 'most knowledgable person' could
be used to adequately represent the producer, in the absence (as is
usually unavoidable) of the builder. The objective, experienced and
qualified investigator of claims of building failure, as used by such
organisations as the Building Performance Guarantee Corporation to
act impartially between the claimant and the insurer is proposed as
such a 'most knowledgable person' in this context. A further
modification was necessary to overcome the lack of access to the
failure sites resulting from privacy and confidentiality considerations,
or from the impracticability of visiting all the failure sites before the
defec'ts had been repaired. Instead of analysing and classifying the
failures on site, the task had to be done by careful examination of the
confidential written records held in the offices of the various data
sources.
Method of identilication
A definition of building failure based on the largely coincident
perceptions of the expert producers and the generally lay users of
buildings was developed in Chapter 3. This definition is a practicable
means of identifying building failures from the usual evidence available
when a claim of failure is made.
Method of classification
Classifying building failures according to the natural causes involved
posed few problems. The work of Addleson required only the
slightest modification (to allow for insect attack) to enable it to be
transplanted from the United Kingdom to New Zealand. The
classification by natural causes, adapted from Addleson's original,
works as well in New Zealand as it apparently does in the United
Kingdom. lt makes little provision for catastrophic events leading to
building failure but as this study deliberately excluded the, mercifully,
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rare cases of catastrophe in buildings, the absence of that provision
is of no concern. There appears to be no reason why this
classification should not be applied in other studies of this type.
The element of human error was another matter. While many
commentators have written abOut various human tendencies to err, nO
single list of commonly-agreed types of human error which might
cOmplement Addleson's 'natural causes' appears to have been
proposed in the literature. The list eventually assembled and used in
this report is one of many difierent lists which might legitimately be
drawn out of the reports of various commentators. The content of the
list is important, but it is the use of a list as a classification toolthat is
paramount in the methodology of the research.
TESTING THE METHODOLOGY
Appllcation of the methodology to the data
The test of the methodology proposed in this report was its application
to such building failure data as could be obtained. lt is evident from
findings reported in Chapters 5 and 6 that the methodology does
produce useful results which are not inconsistent with the experience
of those involved with buildings from day to day.
ln particular the division between the forces of nature and the errors
people make appears to provide an objective way of acknowledging,
if not apportioning, the contribution of each. This objectivity is
enhanced by the use of failure records which contain both the building
Users' complaints of perceived shortfalls in performance and the
reports of the 'most' knowledgabte persons' representing the
producers' unbiased assessment.
There also appears to be no ditficulty in applying the methodology to
all the building failure cases so far encountered'
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The classification of human error derived from the most frequently
cited errors reported in the literature draws attention to the range of
error types and to the unhelpfulness of the idea of 'negligence' when
the aim of research is to find causes rather than to apportion blame
for them. Use of the classification as part of the methodology focuses
attention on the nature of the mistake rather than on the legal liability
of its maker.
LIMITATIONS OF THE FINDINGS
Limitations of the data
lf ever evidence was needed to illustrate how little is known about
building failures the author's search for objectively recorded data
would provide that evidence. A willingness to consider building failure
data related to any class of buildings in New Zealand made no
appreciable ditference to the difficulty found in unearthing reliable data.
That difficulty was, in fact, a result of the surprising failure of those
organisations ostensibly concerned with maintaining and promoting
building quality to record, in some systematic way, information about
the building failures they have observed.
More disturbing than surprising, given the extensive system of Acts.
regulations, bylaws, codes of practice, and other legal instruments
promulgated to control the activities of the building industry, is the lack
of easily accessible data to show whether the whole building
regulatory system is working. There is obviously no evidence yet that
the Building Act 1991 will be more relevant than previous legislation to
the control or reduction of the incidence of building failure.
It is certain that limited information about the incidence of building
failures of various types in New Zealand caused by various agencies,
can be obtained from existing records. Those records were never
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designed and have never previously been used as a source of
information about building failures.
It should be noted that the information unearthed for this research did
not come from records in which the failures were classified by natural
cause or human error (or both) but was based on the author's
interpretation of whatever apparently factual statements had been
written into the record. None of the records had been kept by
organisations which envisaged that they would be used for the
purpose to which the author put them. From this it must be
concluded that the results and findings in this report must be taken as
indicative rather than absolute. The fact that the interpretation of the
data was performed by the same person in each case should be
some guarantee of consistency. The potentialvalue of reliable results
and findings are the justification for arguing that the systematic
approach to classifying building failures, described and tested in this
report should be used as often as possible by allthose involved in the
investigation of perceived building failures.
Limitatlons of the data sources
Various promising information sources were investigated during the
research, but in the end this report is based on an analysis of one
source of building failure records, available in New Zealand. Each of
the three promising sources has its limitations:
Building Performance Guarantee Corporation (BPGC) - recorded *
objective information with a view to accepting or rejecting a
claim for building defect or non-completion, but is more
concerned with how the defect can be fixed, by whom, and at
what cost, than in analysis of cause. lt deals with buildings up
to 6 years old.
The past tense is used here because the Corporation ceased
accepting new business from January 1992.
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New Zealand Architects Cooperative Society (NZACS) - an
organisation providing professional indemnity insurance to
architects. The number of claims records found in that source
was much smaller than from other sources. This reflects the
small proportion of dwellings designed by architects rather than
any inherent lower incidence of building failures in those
dwellings.
Insurance Loss-Adjusters - record objective information as to what
happened to cause a claim to arise, but are not interested in
the cause of building failure. They deal with buildings of all
ages.
FINDINGS ABOUT RISK OF FAILURES
Low incidence of failures
As the previous chapter reports the incidence of reported and
confirmed building failures in dwellings is low - about 1olo of new
houses appear to exhibit a building failure in the first 6 years after
completion. Common knowledge suggests that there are often
multiple defects in a new dwelling when first occupied but it is evident
from the research that all but a few of these are remedied, by the
builder or a sub-contractor, sufficiently quickly and efficiently to avoid
the need for a formal building failure claim. The incidence of failures
in other categories of buildings, or in buitdings in general, may be
quite ditferent from the incidence in dwellings.
Inevitability of some fallures
That there should be teething troubles with a new building is not
surprising. The entire process of procuring a new building, from
choice of site through design, selection of materials and allthe myriad
activities which must occur before the building is complete, entails risk
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(Starbuck and Milliken, 1988). The risk is present because in one or
more ways every such process of procurement is unique. No new
building has a precedent identical in every respect. Change one
aspect of the procurement process and the unforeseen can, and
probably will, happen. The Auckland builder (see 4.3.S) who
constructed building after building on ground-supported concrete floor
slabs with no waterproof barrier between the soil and the slab is a
case in point. His luck held, the sites were all well-drained, the slabs
were made of dense concrete and did not crack and no damp floors
developed to alert him to the risk he had been running. Add to the
need for luck the need to counter the 'forces of nature' and to avoid
human error, and the risk becomes even more obvious.
Management of risk
Where there is risk the prudent turn to insurance against that risk.
That is why fire insurance, earthquake, and contents insurance for
buildings is so common. Few buildings burn down each year, (more
are damaged) yet fire insurance of a building is almost universal. The
risk is low but the consequences for the unlucky few owners or users
are at least irritating and inconvenient and at worst disastrous. The
same is true of building failure.
Forms of insurance against the risk of building failure in new dwellings
are not expensive (generally well under $1000) and in any event the
'one-otf' cost can be included painlessly in the financial arrangements
made to pay for the construc'tion of the new building. lt is therefore
surprising that such a small proportion of all new house-construction
is so insured (see 6.2.5), especially when it is considered that new
house-owners are often rendered financially vulnerable by heavy
borrowing to purchase the house and to equip it.
Until researchers gain access to information about buibing failures in
commercial buildings, and can carry out the same sort of analysis that
was applied to the sample of dwellings, it will not be possible to
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calculate the cost of insurance against building failures in those
buildings on any other basis than guesswork. At the moment there
appear to be no recorded data discoverable.
FINDINGS ABOUT CAUSES OF FAILURES
Gauses are proven
The research clearly proves that the causes of building failures are
varied and complex, frequently involving a mix of the effects of nature
(which are referred to as 'natural forces') and of human error. Both
are unpredictable in occurrence, intensity, and effest and obviously
contribute to the extent of the element of risk always present when
new buildings are being constructed.
Learning from investigation of causes
Attempting to analyse and hence to understand the causes of a
building failure helps in the understanding of the many forms of
building failure phenomena and adds to the precedent knowledge
which can accumulate in the memory, if not the literature, of the
building industry. The outcomes for the short-term (remedying the
immediate fault), the medium term (improving the next building), and
long-term (providing improved criteria for measurement of
performance) were first mentioned in 2.4.1.
Adding each building failure episode to a database, complete with an
analysis of how and why it happened, is a helpfulconstructive process
that ensures that some good may come from the disappointment and
cost of the failure itself. Quite apart from databases, which do not in
themselves distribute new knowledge, the building industry could
benefit from imitating the regular case-reporting that is a feature of the
journals by which the legal and medical professions share new
developments and experiences.
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Pelorative labels can conceal causes
Less constructive is the use of the lawyers' term 'negligence', an
unhelpful and pejorative label to apply to human mistakes made in a
risky activity like building, unless there is very strong evidence that the
builder was careless or inattentive. lt is easy in a relatively
comfortable court room to attribute a lack of reasonable care and
attention to a builder who, working in unpleasant conditions on a
unique building on a unique site, makes a mistake in some aspect of
his or her work. lt is much harder, but more usefulto posterity, to find
out how the mistake was made.
lf, as the research suggests, there is knowledge to be gained from the
systematic identification, evaluation, classification, and recording of
building failures, then the use of the term negligence is
counterproductive. In fact the negligent use of the word "negligence"
to describe the cause of building failures may well have the effect of
1. suppressing the truth by suggesting that the sole cause of a
failure is a human failing, and/or
frustrating attempts to build up a local or national database by
ensuring that cases are not reported, or are reported only in
terms of legal issues and/or
impeding the establishment of a line of precedent knowledge
on which fair arbitration, systematic diagnosis and even expert
systems could depend.
Drawbacks to legal procedures
Failures are not necessarily the result of negligence. Reliance on legal
action for negligence may have the effect of
2.
3.
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1. concentrating attention on the legal niceties of measuring
human actions against some almost arbitrary yardstick of
negligence,
2. diverting attention from the particular combination of human
error and natural causes which initiated failure,
3. adding further cost (by reason of delay and legal expenses) to
the task of making good the building,
4. and adding to the long list of legal precedents, none of which
are likely to be continually in the mind of builders and their sub-
contractors as they perform their daily work.
8.6 CONCLUSTONS
8.6.1 Dealing with the causes of fallure
The research has shown that the classification of building failures in
dwellings according to the type of human error and or the 'forces(s)
of nature' which have contributed to the failure, embraces all the
factors which can cause building failures. Although the evaluated
building sample consisted of dwellings there is no reason to limit this
finding to dwellings only.
With this knowledge it is obviously possible to state confidently that
building failures could be avoided by:
1. protecting buildings from the 'forces of nature' from the
moment construction of buildings is commenced, and
2. perfecting human behaviour so that human errors are not
made.
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These two objectives are likely to take some time to attain' Until then
the building industry must conduct its affairs in ways which will
minimise the impact of the known causes of building failure' The
,forces of nature" which are by definition virtually omnipotent in their
effect on inanimate objects (such as buildings), yield only slowly to the
advance of science and technology, but human error is easier to
anticipate and to counteract in various ways. That is why Quality
Assurance attracts greater interest in the commercial world than
earthquake or meteorological predictions. Quality Assurance seeks
to organise human processes in error-proof ways, while earthquake
or meteorological predictions can, at best, forecast probabilities in
uncontrollable sYstems.
This report does not pretend to be an authoritative treatise on
methods of altering peoples' tendency to err, but it does argue that
reduction of human error shows the most immediate promise for a
reduction in the incidence of building failures'
The incidence of failure in larger buildings is unknown. lt may be as
fow as for dwellings in New Zealand, but until research is encouraged
by the providers and users of such buildings, the building industry
must remain ignorant of the facts.
Dealing with the risk of bullding tailure
There will always be a risk of building failure when a new building is
constructed. This report shows that the risk of a particular dwelling
developing a significant failure in the first six years after completion is
fow (aboul1o/") even in a country with no licensing or registration of
builders. The data used to show this low incidence of failure came
from an insurance organisation which took no account of the
qualification, experience, or previous record of a client's proposed
builders before agreeing to indemnity the owner against building
failure.
191
8.6.3
That the risk of failure is low is no consolation to the unlucky few
victims of building failure, for whom the shortfall in building
performance may be expensive, stressful and disruptive. This risk
should be properly recognised and managed by prospective new
building providers and users and their advisers. The risk may be low,
but is real, and insurance schemes are an obvious method of
management.
Evaluating 'at arm's length'
The original investigation set out to test whether benefits might be
gained by enfranchising building users in the technical evaluation of
their own buildings. Commonly, evaluations of building failures have
been conducted entirely by experts whose sage pronouncements take
no account of the users' expectations of the building. In this research
the bulk of the data used was extracted from a source (claim files) in
which the users' indications of a shortfall in building performance were
recorded along with the report of an independent technically-
competent evaluator who represented the viewpoint of the ordinary
builder. Thus the user was accorded the same consideration as the
'expert' when the existence of a building failure was confirmed and
analysed.
The technique yielded useful and sensible results, despite the fac-t
that the claim records had never been intended for the post-claim
analysis to which they were subjected. lt seems likely that the
evaluation technique would produce more ceftain results if it could be
carried out not 'at arm's length', but on the failure site, when the
evaluation would benefit from all parties being able to see the evidence
at first hand and to agree on what should be written into the building
failure report. ldentification of the cause of failure could be carried out
on site, even while the failure persists, giving greater certainty of
accuracy than is obtainable from the 'at arm's length' review of the
written record of another observer. As with many other aspects of the
identification, diagnosis and recording of building failures there is
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APPENDIX A
PERCEIVED CAUSES OF BUILDING FAILURES
PORTEOUS, W.A. Perceived Gauses of Building Failure.
Unpublished paper, 1984.
This unpublished paper was written, in the course of research into building failures,
with a view to recording the findings of a survey of the literature from 1969 to 1983.
The survey sought the opinions of various commentators as to the causes of
building failures and the nature of the human errors which can contribute to those
failures.
INTRODUCTION
As previously noted23 a survey of the literature concerned with building failures leads
one to the conclusion that 1970 saw the beginning of both a growing interest in
building failure within the building industry and efforts to define the phenomenon of
building failure in some universally acceptable way.
It should, therefore, be borne in mind that while the various opinions as to the
causes of building failures are described in chronological order in this paper there
was a concurrent development of the definition of building failure. lt is thus possible
that the earlier opinions about reasons for building failures may have been
expressed by people whose concept of a building failure ditfers from that of more
recent commentators.
The occupations of those whose opinions have been recorded in this paper have
been clearly stated wherever possible in order to illustrate the range of expertise on
which it has drawn, and to enable the reader to form a personal view of the relative
significance of the various commentators' opinions.
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once the more than 70 bibliographical references to reasons for building failures
were located, it remained only to assemble those in chronological order'
Chronological order was chosen because it was considered that Some
commentators might, by publishing their views, have influenced subsequent writers'
EARLIER OPINIONS
one of the earliest observations about the causes of building failure was made by
G.E. Stringef then Solicitor to the Royal Institute of British Architects, in an address
to a two day conference held in 1g69 during the International Building Exhibition at
Olympia.
In the course of his address Stringer noted -
',...1 think the problems of leakage are becoming more important
nowadays with component development than they ever were in the
past with the traditional building methods "'
I suppose the component has always been with us, but it's now
becoming much more important and is in fact a basic method of
constructing the entire building, whereas previously they were bits and
pieces."
As far as can be ascertained this was the first time component-building had been
put forward as a cause of building failure.
At the same conference T.P. O'Brien2a from the Research and Development Group'
Ove Arup and Partners, and Lecturer in Building Materials at the Bartlett School of
Architecture, University of London, spoke about quality control on site' In his
concluding notes O'Brien makes a number of assertions, from which the following
selection is relevant to a study of causes of building failure:
Specifications often include too much about'how'to do something, and not
enough about'what' must be achieved.
Designs too frequently call for site operations which, due to their difficulty, are
unlikely to be done well.
1.
2.
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3.
4.
5.
Materials and component manufacturers often do not pay sufficient attention
to site conditions, and the effects of these on the use of their products.
Transfer of work from site to factories does not necessarily result in better
quality control, and, without new techniques, site staff have less control than
before as they do not see all stages of the work.
Gonstruction is involving an ever increasing number of specialist operations,
carried out by specialist contractors, but this trend is not matched by the
emergence of supervisors with corresponding specialist knowledge.
Commenting on the content of letters and articles concerning building failures
published in the Architects Journal2s early in 1971 that Journal said:
"... What emerges from these and other letters is that there appears
to be no categorical answer to many building problems. Sound
detailing and construction are still too much matters of opinion, too
little based on effective feedback from site. Many failures occur
through changing one small detail or material from a standard detail
and specification which has always worked well in the past. Architects
do not always realise the cumulative effects of making slight changes
in a group of materials used in a particular way in a certain contelt.
Change the balance, and failure can be the results."
In September 1971 the building industry journal Building introduced a fortnightly
series of information sheets on building failures prepared by Bickerdike, Allen, Rich
and Partners, architects, with Turlogh O'Brien,6 structural engineer, as materials
consultant. In the introduction to the series it is stated:
"... Therefore in various cases and to various degrees it may be the
designer, specifier, assembler or user of the 'machine' not to mention
the supplier of the materials used, who is responsible for the failure of
part of it to function ...
Usually failures occur as a result of either ignorance, dereliction or
both. Sometimes, however, the reason is almost a motive and is
almost wilful."
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October 1971 saw the production by the UK Housing Research Foundation of a
report.The|ncidence,causesandPreventionofDefectsintheConstructionofNew
Houses,27. This publication is an abridged report of an investigation carried out by
one Michael Powell Msc, A.l.o.B. for the National House-Builders Registration
council in conjunc.tion with the university of Aston in Birmingham'
In the 'Summary of Main Findings'the report states:
"Designers and site supervisors were considered to be responsible for
the most costly defects. Numerically, the most defects seemed to be
attributable to bad site supervision and bad workmanship' 30% of all
defects complained of could easily have been prevented by systematic
check before the house was handed over to the purchaser"'
while the report acknowledges that there are defects primarily attributable to
material behaviour and manufactured goods, it found that such defects constitute
a very small proportion of the total number of defects costing 9100 stg or more to
remedy.
The construction Industry Research Information Association (clRlA) in the uK
produces the Development and Materials Bulletin. In March 1973 a report on
serviceability of buildings appeared in the Bulletin4' As a general comment on
performance problems in buildings the report notes:
,,ln most cases, the problems continue not through lack of the
technicalknOwledge of howto counterthem but more because' where
there is a division in the responsibilities for design, specification or
construction, the detailed consequences of the one stage are not
properlycommunicated,appreciatedandprovidedforinthe
subsequent stages'"
some of the general comments made by organisations which responded to the
CIRIA survey add reinforcement to the views expressed by others in the building
industry.
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(Respondent) P - ''Unti|a||participantsinbui|dinggeartheiractionsmore
positively to serviceability and reliability as long-term
concerns, these problems will remain "' according to a
BRS report, 2O"/o ol all maintenance expenditure is
attributable to mistakes by designers and builders. A
reduction in mistakes will come more quickly from a
change of approach to serviceability than from new
solutions to specific technical problems'"
"... the relationship between first cost and subsequent
maintenance cost has a direct effect on the serviceability
of buildings. The fact that one sum comes out of capital
and the other out of revenue seems to have been the
justification for the system over many years, but if we
are going to improve the quality of our buildings then
this problem must be resolved sooner or later"'
(Respondent) G -
To these comments the clRlA report adds the following, based on the results of the
survey of building organisations:
,,Frequently, despite good pre-contract work (drawings, specification
etc) the serviceability of buildings suffers because of poor and
indifferent suPervision."
and
,,The .state of the market' influences the future serviceability of
buildings. When the economy is at a low ebb, contractors may have
to put in tenders which are too low but needed to keep themselves
afloat. Then, if the economy improves during the course of the
contract, the work will suffer in consequence'"
ln the same month as the CIRIA Bulletin carried the report on its building problems
Survey, a seminar entitled 'Faults in New Buildings' was held at Shirecliffe College
of Further Education at sheffield. The content of the seminar was subsequently
reported in The Architect and Surveyof. The final speaker in the seminar was E'
wadsworth F.R.l.c.s., chief Land and Building Surveyor to the sheffield Hegional
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Hospital Board. He made suggestions as to ways in which maintenance costs
could be reduced. Those of his suggestions which are directly linked to perceived
causes of building failure include:
2.
3.
4.
extending the period during which the contractor was responsible for
remedying faults.
designers paying more attention to maintenan@ records in order that
faults could be designed against.
adequate performance standards for building components.
the inclusion of the cost of maintenance over the first ten years as part
of the capital cost.
Wadsworth also commented that in his opinion:
"... one of the troubles was due to the fact that craftsmen were very
often not fully informed of the dm of the job. lf they could be more
fully informed they very often were able to produce a much more
suitable result."
It is also reported that he felt:
u... at present many builders were taking on too much work at one
time and as a result were not able to give the attention to each job,
and further there was a great need for technical supervision during the
construction process. "
In the course of his summing up the seminar, the Chairman, J. Hall FIOB, MBIM,
MRSH, Principal of Shirecliffe College said he felt:
"... that to some extent it was a criticism of modern education in the
construction industry, as a lot of the faults seemed to be traceable to
the fact that designers do not seem to comprehend basic technical
education. This also applied to the education of craftsmen and
operatives."
1.
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He also felt:
,'[hat the decisions with regard to the relative costs of the various
parts of buildings were often made by people'not qualified to do so
and there seemed to be a fault at the political level in that there
seemed to be a willingness to provide insurance against faults rather
than to educate against faults. lt was important to be able to
diagnose the cause of a fault but it was even more important to be
able to design against the fault happening'"
He went on:
"There was also a need for increase in the quality of supervision and
management in the construction industry. lt would seem to be
necessary to harness the evidence available on the elfrreme costs of
maintenance and appeal both to the politicians and the consumers for
action to reduce this. The standing of the clerk of works also ought
to be considerably increased and he should be put into the category
of a quality control engineer. He also felt that it was a great pity that
there were not more people from the design and construction side of
the industry present at seminars on the lines of the present one and
perhaps this indicated one of the reasons why maintenance ran at its
present level in that the interests of the design and construction sides
were not in maintenance and until this was remedied we should not
see a great imProvement."
ln october 1973 an address on 'Pathology of Building' by K.G. Kimber, partner in
the R. Harry H. Stanger consultancy, was reportedT. In Kimber'S view,
u... Deficiencies pertain to design, specification, materials or
workmanship. There are four primary causes of defects: inadequate
briefing, inadequate design, errors in construCtion or defects in
materials and comPonents..."
217
A month later an issue of Building carried an article by D'W' Cheetham' lecturer at
the Lanchester Polytechnic, entitled 'Defects in Modern Buildings'o. As Cheetham
saw it,
"... The occurrence of defects in the fabric of a building can result from
many unrelated design decisions: poor material specification;
inadequate assessment of loads; inadequate appreciation of
conditions of use and inadequate assessment of expgsure ""'
He went on to stress,
"... Many defects may occur for reasons which are outside the control
of the designer. Poor workmanship manifests itself in inadequate
protection of materials, inadequate quality control and just plain
carelessness! Poor maintenance often results from insufficient
budgeting on the part of corporate clients "'"
The views about human error disclosed by the literature survey to the end of 1973
are summarised in Table 1.
HUMAN ERROR YEAR:
Defective materials
Overlooked site condition
lgnorance
Over-emphasis on first cost
Defective documentation
Unanticipated consequence of change
Specialist contractor's lack of knowledge
Design too ditficult to build well
Dereliction or negligence
Poor communication
'69-73
1
3
3
2
4
1
5
3
3
4
No of references to human error causes
publication (to the end of 1973).
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Table 1. of failure bY Year ol
Early in 1974 Karl Fantl, Director of the Austrian Institute for Building Research
discussed the role of building research in relation to building defestslo' Fantl wrote'
"ln the wider meaning of the term, a building defect or building flaw
occurs when, as a result of poOr workmanship in the erection of a
building or because of faulty design, there arise avoidable costs during
its construction ..."
Fantl,s views appear to have been endorsed by H.C. Higby, Estate and
Development Officer for the University of Liverpool in a paper produced a few weeks
htef.
Higby began with a discussion of the conflicts within the building process, such as
that between durability and low initial cost, or architectural awareness (sic) and
'sheer utility', and went on,
,,1 ought to talk a bit more about defects caused by design and
construc'tion because such defects result from the conflicts I have
outlined and the remedies lie, to Some extent, in the answers'"
The May 1974 issue of Building carried a report on a symposium on design failures
in buildings, held in Newcastle. The opening address was given by A'C' Hardy's
Professor of Building Science, University of Newcastle upon Tyne' As reported in
Building,
"Opening the Newcastle symposium, Professor Hardy said that in his
view failures had their roots in poor design, inadequate knowledge of
new materials, unSatisfactory workmanship, and materials which, when
used together, caused unusual and unexpected chemical reactions'
He accused architects of trying to be too clever, 'too unique' in
attempting new forms of construction."
In November 1974 a joint BRE:loB seminar on Building Defects and Failures
provided an opportunity for the results of some of the first obiective research into
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the subject to be published. Among the researchers who delivered papers were H.
Eldridge'' a former BRE employee and now an author and consultant in his field.
Eldridge, commenting on defects in general, noted early in his paper that,
"Defects occur for a very wide range of reasons, but far too often they
are ascribed to poor workmanship, bad luck or settlement. lt is
doubtfulwhether it is possible to construct a building without a defect
being present in view of the fact that the majority of buildings are
constructed of a number of materials, produced under a wide range
of conditions and having different properties, and that the buildings are
exposed to many different climatic and occupancy conditions, which
can act individually or together in adversely atfecting the materials."
He goes on to group building defec'ts according to their causes and produces the
following list:
a.
b.
Faults arising from incorrect design and construction
The incorrect use of sound materials
Faulty materials
Poor workmanship
Defects caused by dampness
Defects caused by other agencies
c.
d.
e.
f.
Another speaker at the Seminar was l.L. Freeman,'then Head of Advisory Services
Division at BRE, who delivered a paper'Failure Patterns and lmplications'. Freeman
produced a table of causes of defecls and listed the causes, with definitions, thus:
"Faulty design: all cases where the defect could reasonably be
attributed to a failure to follow established design criteria, whether in
Codes or Standards or in accepted good practice. The design fault
would often lie with the mdn designer, but could also be in a bought-
in component (such as a window unsuited to a severe exposure
condition for which it had, knowingly, been supplied) and in a sub-
contracted service (for example granolithic flooring). A design was
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also considered to be at fault if it was clearly so complex that the
probability of it ever being properly executed seemed very low;
Faulty execution: defects attributed to the failure on the part of the
contractor, or sub-contractor, effectively to carry out a design which
was satisfactory in itself, and properly specified;
Faulty materials components or proprietary systems: failure of these
elements to meet their advertised or otherwise accepted performance
levels;
Unexpected user requirements: defects caused by the user expecting
more from the design than the designer anticipated at the time of
design;"
Freeman went on to note
"Faults in design or in execution, or in a substantial minority of cases
in both, could etfectively explain most defects investigated."
Not allthe Seminar speakers were associated with BRE research. D. Harper,P then
Professor of Building, University of Manchester, Institute of Science and Technology,
former Chief Architect to Corby New Town from 1952-57, and a Past President of
the Institute of Building, spoke from "The Designer's Viewpoint'. He spoke at length
of the risks of innovation in relation to building failures.
"... Many of the risks of defects and failures start at 'programme
conception' (what is required) which largely involves a management
role and continues into 'design conception' (what to build) which
involves an art/technology role. When both these roles involve
innovation - and in many modern projects, they do, then there may be
conflict between an understanding of requirements and of technical
solutions, which could lead to increasing (untried) innovation on too
many fronts at once. Thus we may find new untested proposals in the
use of space, the structure, in comfort standards and the way they are
obtained and the eventual building may well be used and serviced in
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unexpected ways. lt must be true that while innovation within a limited
field can be carefully analysed, simultaneous innovations across allthe
above fronts, produce interfaces much too complex for analysis in a
limited time, and thus the risks taken are very great. An accumulation
of defects leads to failure."
Continuing the 'risk' theme Harper went on to discuss the effest of fashion in
building.
"... In general real risks of failure are taken when particular design
fashions are insisted upon at an early stage, and they may well include
the selection and use of new 'wonder' materials, covered by sales
jargon. Add to these hazards - a complex geometry and continuing
efforts to save money - and we can face a design situation where
nothing of the new project format has been seriously tested ..."
The end of 1974 saw the appearance of further comment on building failures in the
G.L.C. Development and Materials Bulletins. In classifying various types of failures
the Bulletin goes close to classifying failures by causes, as follows,
"lt may be convenient to classity and consider various types of failures
under the following headings
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
0
(g)
(h)
Catastrophic failures
Planning failures
Detailed design failures
Failures resulting from aesthetic decisions
Failure to withstand 'normal' and 'robust' use
Failure to discourage vandalism
Failures of general construction
Failures of workmanship and supervision.
In an effort to expand on 'Catastrophic failures'the Bulletin asserts,
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u... In most cases, catastrophic failures can be traced back to
erroneous assumptions on the part of their designers. Fortunately
such failures are rare and receive sufficient publicity without any
contribution from the author, who would prefer to dwell on the
muhitude of failures and the means by which some of them may be
avoided.'
The Bulletin for January 1975,34 continuing the theme of avoidance of building
failures includes under a heading 'Safeguards against failure' a list of ways of
avoiding causing building failures. As the Bulletin puts it,
"An examination of the 'problems' referred to the Scientific Branch for
investigation shows that the following safeguards are needed if
genuine failures are to be avoided:
(a) The building must be correctly designed and detailed.
(b) Possible alternative forms of the component and the
materials used in its production must be correctly
evaluated and a suitable component approved.
The approved component must be correctly specified.
The component must be correctly manufactured.
The component must be correctly stored prior to
installation.
The component must be correctly installed and
subsequently correclly protected after installation.
The component must be correctly maintained."
Referring to the installation of building components later in the Bulletin, the author
goes on,
"The product is now available for assembly and many feel, no doubt,
that it is at this point that detailed design and careful planning are
nullified because of inadequate workmanship and supervision. Whilst
this may certainly be true in some cases there are mitigating
circumstances where some failures are almost bound to result unless
suitable preventive measures are taken. For instance, does the work
force have an adequate opportunity of learning to handle and install
(c)
(d)
(e)
(0
(s)
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unfamiliar products before it is called upon to perform its tasks in
earnest? Many industries feel it necessary to have 'dummy runs' yet,
all too often, the work force on a building site is expected to be able
to handle new forms of component with little prior warning and with
inadequate information about the procedure to be used. lt must now
also be questioned whether the supervisory staff is not being called
upon to do too much, in relation to new materials and components,
with inadequate tools at their disposal."
The work of LL. Freeman, previously discussed,e appeared in the Architects Journal
early in 1975, marking the recognition of building failure as a serious subject for the
architectural press. In the same month a leader in Building was devoted to a
discussion of ways of avoiding building failures.
ln April 1975 Freeman's work appeared in a BRE Digestlz adding further to the
respectability of building failure as a subject for serious scientific study. Then in July
1975 SAAT News 11 reprinted some of the GLC Bulletin material already
discusseds's for the benefit of its readers.
So seriously was building failure now being treated that in August 1975 a British MP
who also happened to be a director of a building company and a former director of
the House Builder's Federation was moved to write in Building,s with reference to
BRE,
"lt would surely be desirable to appoint an additional deputy director
specifically and solely responsible for initiating and co-ordinating all
work on preventive research into possible faults into new techniques,
components and materials, and with sufficient powers to insist that a
new material is not used until he is fully satisfied with its safety from all
angles - a lot to ask, certainly, but then it costs a lot to put them right."
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By the end of 1975 the opinions surveyed could by summarised by Table 2'
HUMAN ERROR YEAR: '69-73 74 75
Defective materials
Overlooked site condition
lgnorance
Over-emphasis on first cost
Defective documentation
Unanticipated consequence of change
Specialist contractor's lack of knowledge
Design too ditficult to build well
Dereliction or negligence
Poor communication
Table 2. NO Of references to human error causes of fallure by year of
Publication (to the end ol 1975)'
About a year later Gordon wigglesworth, a GLC housing architec't, writing in the
Architects Journal,3T said,
"lt is easy to point a finger and attach blame, but to understand what
has happened since the war we have to remember that building has
been through a period of exceptionalinnovation' Traditional methods
have been set aside to make way for new materials, produsts and
techniques, generally exposed to no more than simulated test
procedures, if that.
There has been unprecedented intervention by central government in
building matters. lts agents, the ministries, have exercised control
which was intended to give better value for money by the introdustion
of cost limits. But these limits have been concerned only with first or
capitalcost and have explicitly excluded revenue costs' The ministries
have also promoted the use of systems of construction, principally for
schools and housing, without a corresponding investment in the
6
6
1
1
3
3
2
4
1
5
3
3
4
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development of performance standards, testing methods and testing
facilities.
There has also been an immense increase in the number of estates
and buildings owned and managed by local authority education and
housing departments with barely adequate resourc€s to maintain them
properly. To this must be added poorly organised feedback from
maintenance organisations to design teams. summarising, there has
been:
exceptional innovation in building materials and
techniques since the war:
intervention by Government in local authority building
programmes by the use of cost limit systems based on capital
cost only;
inadequate investment in the development of performance
standards, testing methods and equipment;
a large increase in local authority owned and managed estates
without a corresponding review of maintenance and feedback
arrangements."
ln defence of innovation and the risk innovation may entailAdam Neville, Professor
of Givil Engineering at the University of Leeds was moved to assert,la
"... As l see it, the best modern design must include an element of risk
if it is to be rationally based on economic criteria and possibly even if
it is not but is to be new and imaginative. Yet the risk must be
acceptably small, although to discuss what is acceptable and who
determines what is acceptable is a large enough topic for another
note.
This is not necessarily to say that we always follow this rational
principle, that we all eschew other than safety considerations in
making decisions in the construction industry. Departures occur'
fortunatelY rarelY ..."
1.
2.
3.
4.
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Neville's contribution was part of an on-going series of contributions to what Building
called "our current debate'Rethinking the Professional Role"', and was followed by
a letter to that journal from William Allens of Bickerdike, Allen, Bramble in London.
Allen raised the problem of inadequate specialist sub-contractors,
"... The so-called specialist sub-contractors have displayed some
serious deficiencies in their understanding of the chemistry and
physics of their specialisms and in our experience have been major
contributors to contemporary problems. When architects lean on
them for advice about products and techniques, they are often leaning
on weak reeds ..."
fn February 1977 Lyall Addlesonre began his technical studies under the title 'A.J.
Guide to Building Failures' in the Architects Journal. Commenting on the lessons
which could be learned from earlier failures, Addleson referred to the 'pressure of
economics' and cited the following,
"The weaknesses of well tried materials are known and allowed for in
good design; but even the best designer may have to use materials
with known shortcomings because, tor a particular purpose, there
exists at the time no economically acceptable alternative'. (NBS
Special Report 33 A qualitative study of some buildinos in the London
area. London, HMSO. 1964. pl.)"
Addleson went on,
'... With hindsight it is now patently obvious that, during the post-war
period, far too many new materials and building techniques, most of
whose shortcomings were not necessarily understood, have been
used mostly because no economically acceptable alternatives seem
to exist. The building industry has been under intense pressure (the
social, economic and political forces alone have not been
inconsiderable) to produce without adequate resources an
unprecedentedly large number of buildings with quite different
performance requirements from those previously encountered ..."
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1.
The phenomenon of building failure provides, in Addleson's view, some lessons for
architects. Some of those lessons may have more validity in the U.K. than in New
Zealand but they are now listed, in Addleson's own words, for consideration:
Use of materials
(Architects) should understand the discipline that the combined use of
materials, especially in modern multi-layer constructions, imposes on design
solutions; or, more creatively, use this discipline as a motivation in design.
Determination of risk
They should recognise that modern building is not risk-free and that the best
available techniques should be used to determine the risks in particular
circumstances. These risks, together with the criteria on which they have
been based, should be made known to (and understood by) their clients.
Limits imposed by cost
They should be realistic about the limitations that cost-limits or yardsticks
impose on the standards that can be achieved, and resist the temptation of
trying to get too much out of too little.
4. Intended life-span
The significance of the sixty-year economic life of buildings should be
reappraised because, if taken too literally, buildings could be beyond
economic repair after sixty years.
Building regulations not enough
It should be recognised that conformity with the requirements of building
regulations and by-laws does not guarantee a successful building in all
respects - condensation risk, for example, may be greatly increased because
permanent ventilation is no longer required, and because standards of
thermal insulation are in no way related to usage of the building.
Site craftsmanship lacking
Architects should recognise that the disappearance of the craftsmen on site,
who used to be able to sort out detail difficulties, imposes on them the need
2.
7.
for closer three-dimensional examination (including making models if
necessary) of proposed details and the subsequent need to communicate the
details chosen, clearly and explicitly, to those who will be responsible for their
assembly on site. ... In addition to carefully thought-out and clearly-drawn
details, rigorous specification and site supervision are required to ensure that
the designer's intentions are carried out. Site personnel should be given an
unmistakable indication of the quality of execution which willbe insisted upon'
Low safety factors
It should be understood that the understandable tendency to reduce' as
much aS possible, factors of safety without a sound quantitative (or
sometimes reliable empirical) basis leaves the building with very little' if any
,fat, with which to counteract unknowns - the technological imbalance is
usually so fine that it does not need much to alter it, with deleterious result'
it is almost true to say 'the better the science, the smaller the safety fastor' -
and the less leeway for faulty workmanship and abuse of the completed
building.
Use of quantitative data
Architects should learn to use and interpret quantitative data' to understand
that empiric and science-based approaches cannot be mixed (except with
great insight), and to accept the need for a more rigorous engineering
approach to those problems that used to be solved satisfactorily by empiric
means (for example, fixings and wind loading especially, and provision for
differential movements, both of which have structural implications)'
Repair of modern construction costly
Finally, they should recognise that modern types of construction are
extremely costly to repair if failures occur, due partly to their greater rigidity'
partly to the greater use of adhesives and partly to the greater use of
mastics. As regards the latter, there is a strong case for architects to Stop
having such unparalleled faith in mastics to fill each and every gap in a
building. They have their uses, but must be used appropriately and it must
be remembered that no mastic will last the life of a building'
9.
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In a discussion about the diagnosis of causes or sources of building defects
Addlesona had this to say:
"... One of the most ditficult aspects of any diagnosis is that very often
more than one cause may be responsible for the defect, although in
most cases it is possible (and indeed necessary) to identify the
primary cause. For example, movement may have initially been
responsible for the cracking of part of an element. The crack(s) would
then make rain penetration possible and the water penetration would
manifest itself as dampness. In this case there would have been no
dampness if there had been no cracking. But equally important, the
existence of a crack and the appearance of dampness does not
necessarily mean that the crack has provided the means of ingress for
the water. In some cases the two defects are not related, although
both will have to be remedied. Nothing can be taken for granted ...
... lt is important at the outset to distinguish clearly between the
cause(s) of a defect, and the agency or factor ('source' may be more
descriptive) that has so to speak activated the cause(s). The cause(s)
of a defect may be identified fairly easily as there are really only three
basic causes of defects, namely:
dampness
movements
chemical/biological change. "
In a report (author unknown) in the Architects Journal{ in May 1977 on a one-day
seminar organised by the RIBA, the Association of Consulting Scientists and the
Council for Science and Society, and attended by senior representatives of BRE,
DOE, GLC, BSI and others, the following key ideas were said to have emerged:
1. lmproved design competence can make the greatest contribution (to
improved technical performance of buildings). Execution on site is the next
most important area. Faulty materials or products are a comparatively minor
problem.
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4.
5.
Lack of design competence is rooted fundamentally in an education system
run largely by theoreticians rather than practitioners; in the lack of any
accepted master/pupil training relationship in offices; and in the fiction that
the newly qualified designer is as competent as the highly experienced.
There should be a ladder of progression via recognised grades of increasing
competence, based on experience as well as education.
At the level of design procedures, the greatest need is for improved checking
systems, to pick up mistakes and omissions before building commences. An
increased fee to allow for independent checking would be money well spent.
(lt is accepted without fuss in Belgium).
Site supervision, and the checking of materials and workmanship for
compliance with the specification, must be improved. ln view of the
complexity of modern building technology, specialist assistance may in many
cases need to be called in.
Possibly the greatest difficulty faced by the designer is that of information
proliferation. And even if that is overcome, there remains the secondary
problem of incentive to find the information.
It has to be made easy and presented in a way which suits the user's needs;
and there must be sufficient sanctions against not using information such as
liability for future defects.
Finally, there is too much unnecessary innovation, and not enough reliance
on standard, tested solutions of known reliability.
7.
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The report included a diagram (the source was not stated) which is reproduced
below
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The mystery of the source of this diagram could not remain so for long. In SAAT
News in August 1977, an article by J. Nelsonto from the BRE Advisory Division
established that the diagram was based on an analysis of BRE Advisory Division
investigations over recent years. In a paragraph headed 'The Causes of Failure'
Nelson writes:
"One important conclusion we are forced to make from our analysis
of failures, and indeed from our continuing daily workload is that many
happen because existing, authoritative guidance, for example in BS
Codes and BRE Digests, is not followed.
Failures originating in the design process appear to fall into two main
categories. First, there is a neglect either through ignorance or error
of well established properties of new materiats before employing them.
Thus either the wrong material is selected for the job or an acceptable
material is used in a way which almost ensures failure.
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ln the latter case the fault lies in the detailing. The properties most
often disregarded Concern thermal and moisture movement, water
absorbency and the behaviour of the material when wet. Using a
material outside the context in which it has been tested can lead to
misfortune.
secondly, designers or their detailers misiudge or ignore the
conditions under which a material or an element will have to perform'
Externally this applies most to the severity of exposure to wind and
rain, or the heat of the sun; internally, to humidity levels and.
temperature fluctuations.
A further cause of failure is the poor standard of communication
between the design team and the builders. An apparent lack of
appreciation on the part of the detailer of the information needs of the
operative, particularly when new materials or methods are specified,
leads to much uncertainty and makeshift solutions. This is matched
on the builders' part by a failure to assess at an early stage what
information will be needed, while there is still time to acquire it'
Building operations should not become experiments'
one consequence of the information problem is that the clerk of works
spends his time seeking design solutions on the ground or enquiring
about the designer'S intentions, and neglecting his proper role of
supervision. For the same reasons there is a lack of close supervision
on the part of the builder.
Builders'failures also originate from neglect of good building practice,
from a failure to adhere to specification, from the use of sub-standard
materials, or more likely, from a failure to store, handle properly or
protect materials on site. Mention must also be made of the effect on
workmanship of operative labour which either has not the appropriate
skills or is poorly motivated or superuised."
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Another view of the causes of building failures was offered by H. Grahamal
F.f.Mun.B.M, MIOB writing in Municipal Building Management late in 1977.
"... My architectural colleagues both in private practice and in the
public sector claim that the causes of current bad building are
stringent financial constraints; they are forced to design down to
comply with cost yardsticks or tight financial restrictions with the
objective of keeping initial costs down to a minimum regardless of
subsequent maintenance costs. The fact is that buildings up and
down the country are being erected within the financial constraints, but
many are producing defects both in construction and in installation of
services where urgent and costly remedial work is necessary to keep
the properties habitable.
These defects which may be subdivided into basic design defects and
those arising during construction on site, are now estimated to be
costing building owners throughout the uK over t400 million per
annum in remedial work. More care and technical competence is
necessary from all levels of staff, professional, technical and artisan,
to eradicate the mistakes of the last decade.
The problems are found to be resulting from incorrect detailing, poor
choice of materials, defective construction techniques and
workmanship and failures of innovation requiring urgent attention to
protect the structure. They are quite distinct from cyclical
maintenance of the normal day to day requirements of buildings in use
...u
fn September 1977 W.W. Abbot,a2 Principal Lecturer in Building at Lanchester
Polytechnic at Coventry, reported on the results of the national survey of the
opinions of four independent groups:
1. Managers in large and medium size general contracting firms.
2. Architects in medium size private practice.
3. Clerks of works employed by local authorities.
234
1.
4. Craftsmen directly employed by medium size general contractors.
The purpose of the survey was "to obtain an overall view of the relative importance
of the various causes of substandard quality (in building)". Abbott found that:
1. Quality of operatives was generally agreed as the most important single
factor.
Quality of supervision was the second most important single factor in the
opinion of contractors, architects and clerks of works.
In Abbott's view, if establishing priorities for improvement of building quality is an
objective, it should be remembered that the "total cost of quality" consists of three
elements:
Prevention
Expenditure on preventing the occurrence of defects, such as time spent on
selection and checking the previous experience of operatives, checking the
quality of materials before use, specifying correct methods of working,
establishing priorities, planning the allocation of supervisory time and
arranging special training for operatives.
Inspection
Supervisory time spent on the assessment of quality of work during progress
or on completion, related to the standards required by the speciftcation.
Failure
Expenditure and loss caused by substandard workmanship and defective
materials which have not been eradicated by prevention or inspection
including materials which have to be scrapped, additional replacement
materials, remedial work time, extra supervision, delays, arguments, disputes,
loss of future business by failure to complete on time, redustion of client
goodwill, loss of productivity due to low morale, and friction between
individuals and departments.
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Abbott believes there is some evidence to indicate that, on average, total "quality
cost" consists of about five percent prevention, 30 percent inspection and 65
percent failure.
A claim that negligence is the mdn cause of the cost of correcting defects in
modern buildings was made by Eric Downey€ a director of the Macdata (Material
and Components Development and Testing Association) Unit of Paisley College, in
an article published in Ostober 1977. Downey recognises that dangerous and costly
disasters on the scale of Ronan Point do occur but points out that,
"... the largest part of the annual expenditure on building faults lies in the
mass of relatively small-scale remedial work. The need for much of this work
arises out of the failure of many of those concerned in the construction of
buildings to fully utilise information readily available, concerning materials and
components and their method of application, in planning the form of
construction to be used. Frequently, well documented and widely accepted
standards of good building practice are ignored when detail drawings are
prepared. Where new or untried materials and methods are used, or where
doubts exist, regarding properties of materials, these should be thoroughly
tested. Testing in advance of use must invariably be cheaper than remedial
work which might be needed afterwards. Faulty workmanship is, of course,
responsible for a great many defects, but even here those responsible for the
selection of the design, method of construction, or materials, might often
have been in a position to foresee the possibility of such shortcomings and
to cater for these in their plan."
fn November 1977 the 29th Conference of the Building Science Forum of Australia
New South Wales Division, considered defects in buildings as its theme. The
keynote address was given by Mr Bruce McDonald M.|.A,n, Member for Kirribilli, a
chartered civil engineer and urban planner. In the course of his address McDonald
asserted,
"Much better links must be established between the researchers and
architects and they in turn must move to eliminate the barriers
between the expensive professional structure which they create and
the proprietor/builder.
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With the rapid technological changes, consultants and architects in
particular generally have less knowledge about materials than the
builders who are closer to the new products.
The inbuilding of such safeguards and communication linkages (as
suggested) will go a long way to minimising defects before they even
arise."
David Littlemorett Chairman of Directors of a firm of Architects practising in Australia
and Papua New Guinea, and one time visiting lecturer in the Department of
Architectural Science, University of Sydney, and at the University of New South
Wales, was another speaker at the Gonference. Gommenting on the lack of hard
evidence from which to draw conclusions about the causes of building failures,
Littlemore notes:
"... Generally there is little available as useful feedback, case history
records about defects in buildings, which overall would be so useful
to us. For I think they would disclose that almost invariably the cause
is broadly in the area of the phenomenon of human error.
The absence of case history material, the silence in this area, is due
at least in part to the existing defamation law. Our Journals are
perhaps reluctant to publish although I am sure that such exposure,
perhaps explanation, would help us all to avoid repetition of failures
and faults by others. I am not suggesting really that there is nothing
available as feedback and case history records for I know that in
certain privileged positions, and of course under wraps, there is a
record ..."
Arguing that the training for the building industry should include a larger content of
'practical' in relation to 'academic' in the programme, he goes on:
"lt will be obvious that I am pretty sure that much of the blame for the
defect situation lies in adequate and narrow preparation acquired in at
least partial ignorance and out of insutficient exposure to the realities
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of life/work in a complex industry. Technology is rapid in
development. Materials, techniques are more and more sophisticated
but the fundamentaltruth remains unaltered and unchanged. I would
never reject development and change, part of technology, nor would
I object to the avant garde ideas man. There must be no inhibition or
restriction, just guidance and vigilance. I insist that I welcome
controlled innovation, but I want to see that it is tested and understood
before any of it is put into use..."
These themes and others were picked up in the address to the same conference
by A.C. Smiths President of the Master Buitders Association of NSW. He listed the
following causes of building failure:
1. Poor design and documentation
2. Ineffective communications within and between the many sections of the
industry, and the undercurrents of its hierarchial structure.
3. Bad workmanship,
to which he proposed the following - "relatively recent additions".
4. The building boom of the last decade.
Rapid technological changes, affecting both design and construction method.
Inadequate knowledge of the multitude of new materials and techniques.
Influx of migrant labour.
Inadequate training both on the job and in the education institutions.
The rapid expansion of sub-contracting.
Consumer awareness and protec'tive legislation.
As would be expected at such a conference, there was a lawyer speaking on the
subject. In an address entitled "Who Pays if the Roof Falls In?" A. Mclnness,le a
Barrister-at-Law practising in Sydney and experienced in building disputes, had this
to say about defects in buildings:
"Defects in buildings almost always result from one or two causes.
The first is a design or supervision defect caused by the architect or
engineer or a mistake made by a surveyor. The contracts in such
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
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cases are often of an informal nature, often oral and made without any
thought of an error being made.
From a lawyer's viewpoint, when such a mistake occurs, it is in most
instances easy to prove. Experience tends to suggest that, indeed,
the author of the mistake admits to the error and the only question left
is how the error is to be rectified and how much is it to cost.
The second, and far more frequent defect arises from poor
workmanship by the builder or the use of poor or unsuitable
materials."
One other speaker who expressed a view about the cause of building defects was
l. McDowell'6 Head of the Technical Information Branch of the Commonweahh
Department of Construction. Alluding to the need to transfer information from its
source to where it is needed. he said:
"... Defects and failures in buildings are more often due to the failure
to apply known information than to lack of information in any absolute
sense. The message I wish to get over to you is to select critically
and then study thoroughly, an amount of information which is
appropriate to your role and responsibility in the construction industry."
ln December 1977 the Overseas Division of BRE published a paper by G.E.
BesseyaT a former employee of BRE who later became an independent consultant
concerned with building materials manufacturing problems and feasibility studies for
new buildings as well as with the performance of materials in existing buildings. In
"Avoiding Faults and Failures in Building" Bessey refers to the RIBA Seminar held
earlier in the year, € and goes on to list the following causes of "unsatisfactory
building performance, defec'ts and failures":
1.
2.
3.
Inadequate provision of money in relation to the indicated requirements of the
building.
Design in relation to choice of materials.
Inadequate consideration of environmental factors.
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4.
5.
6.
7.
The control of work on site.
Control of materials.
Inadequate maintenance.
Misuse, or alteration of use, of a building.
Writing in Building Technology and Management in January 1978, J. Newlove,*
Construction Management Consultant to the UK National Building Agency with an
earlier career in civil and structural engineering and architecture, commented on
what he saw as "the causes of defective design". He wrote:
'The causes of defective design can be found in the management
system. Design faults arise from errors of judgement,
misunderstandings and lack of care and are evidence of deficiencies
in staff selection and supervision. They ought to be avoided or
remedied by normal office procedures and it should be impossible for
a serious design error to escape detection before completion.
In addition to any earlier controls which are applied, adequate safeguards
necessitate some controlof information just before it leaves the design office.
It needs to be checked before it is used by quality surveyors, other
consultants, or contractors. How is it, then, that such information rarely
bears a checker's signature? Notwithstanding this neglect, the fact that
major design faults get built would seem to imply some criticism of
subsequent users of the information (or at the very least lack of awareness
on their part)."
By the end of 1977, the opinion expressed by the various commentators can be
summarised by Table 3.
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HUMAN ERROR
Defective materials
Overlooked site condition
lgnorance
Over-emphasis on first cost
Defective documentation
Unanticipated consequence of change
Specialist contractor's lack of knowledge
Design too difficult to build well
Dereliction or negligence
Poor communication
YEAR: '69-73 74 75 76 77
1
3
3
2
4
1
5
3
3
4
6
6
1
1
12
5
13
3
4
17
3
4
6
Table 3. No of references to human error causes of failure by year of
publication (to the end of 1977).
Tom Hughesae lately regional works officer in the UK Property Services Agency
(PSA) South East Region, discussed failures and remedial work in an article in
Gonstruction in March 1978. Advocating improvement of the "interface between
design and maintenance" Hughes asserts:
"The cause of many failures in the building industry generally, is often
due to there being little contact between the designers/providers of
new buildings and those who use, operate and maintain them. lt is
easier in the PSA because all these facets are embraced by the one
organisation, but even so, more needs to be done to ensure that
design staff get early enough advice on the maintenance implications
of their proposals."
April 1978 saw publication of a paper by E. Bampton$ FIOB, in the Institute of
Building (lOB) Maintenance Information Service series. Examining the causes of
defects or failures in buildings, Bampton comments:
"lt is difficult, for a number of reasons, in most cases to establish the
absolute cause of failure, if indeed there is one. In general terms,
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(ii
(iii)
(iv)
(vi)
however, they can usually be regarded as being initiated from one of
the following:
(i) The client either did not provide a brief or provided one which
was inadequate.
The client changed his mind during construction.
The site investigations were not satisfactory.
The design team failed to provide, on time, the necessary
detailed drawings.
The design team's details did not allow for differential
expansion, or for proper damp proof coursing, or for weather-
proofing.
The contractor/subcontractors interpreted instructions
incorrectly.
The contractor/subcontractors used the materials incorrectly or
used wrong jointing materials.
The contractor/subcontractor's lack of proper site supervision
or poor craftsmanship.
(vii)
(viii)
(ix)
It is clear that all three parties involved - the client, the architect and
the contractor - can contribute to failure but the main factor would
appear to be that of communication. lt is in the interests of all parties
to exert their efforts in resolving the problem and thereby improve
efficiency and reduce costs."
An article in New Scientist in May 1978 probably crystallised some of the issues
involving building failures and their cost to the industry. Peter Marsh2 began his
report on events with an estimate of the cost of failure:
"Some maintenance (of buildings) is, of course, to be expected - just
as humans need a dose of medical care once in a while - but repairs
and improvements nowadays account for about 83.5 billion of the
industry's annual output of t12 billion. An estimated fifth of this
maintenance is due to construction errors. The industry is becoming
increasingly concerned because the number of mistakes coming to
light appears to be growing every year.
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The injection of more scientific thinking - the job of organisations like
the BRE - might be expected to improve matters. But science is not
an easy discipline for the industry to take on board. The basic
activities of the building industry - job such as mixing cement or laying
bricks - have little likeness to laboratory processes, especially when
carried out on a dirty, chaotic building site."
After describing the complicated structure of the UK building industry, Marsh goes
on:
"Superimposed on this welter of human activity is a mass of
regulations bombarding the builder from almost every conceivable
angle. First there are the official Building Regulations, statutory
documents applying to every new buiHing. These are so wrapped up
in legaljargon that they are incomprehensible to most people including
many of the architects and council officers who have to interpret them.
There are planning rules laid down by both central and local
government which cover everything from maximum densities,
expressed in fractions of people per acre, to the number of outside
drains a structure can have. Add to this approximately 2000
certificates and codes of practice from organisations such as the
Agr6ment Board and the British Standards Institution - covering
recommended ways of going about the minutiae of construction - and
it is a wonder anything gets built at all."
Marsh points out that a quarter of the BRE's budget is spent on disseminating
information about the fruits of its research, but notes:
"The BRE has estimated that 90 percent of design errors arise
because of a failure to apply existing knowledge. Many of the defects
that have come to light over the past few years had eminently
avoidable causes."
He goes on:
"lronically, many of the faults showing up today are the results of the
'high technology' era of the 1960s when the construction industry
flirted with 'system' building. ln theory this approach had much to
otfer. The assembly on site of factory-made components - such as
concrete slabs to form the basic building blocks of walls and floors -
seemed much more efficient than the old fashioned use of bricks and
mortar. However, the industry failed to come to terms with the high
precision demanded by the new techniques. The concrete panels
which should have slotted neatly into place often didn't; the seals
between the panels were sometimes of incorrect material and let In
water. Simple things - for example, the concrete in the slabs
expanding after drying and pushing out adjacent brickwork - were not
allowed for".
"... There has been no clearer indictment of these 'innovative' building
methods than the Greater London Council's report, published two
years ago, which blamed the methods almost totally for 838 million
worth of design problems on council estates barely ten years old.
Today, system building is scorned because of the maintenance
problems and the fact that it lent itself to the high-rise buildings
methods in favour in the 1960s which are so roundly condemned on
social grounds."
Writing in Technical Record 448 published in February 1979 by the Experimental
Building Station, Department of Housing and Construction, in New South Wales,
V.R. Beckst recorded that in a survey of failures of watl claddings and finishes there
were some common aspects. Usually at least one of the following was listed as a
reason for the failure:
During the design there was a failure to recognise fully the significance of
differential movement (due to inherent material properties and/or different
load and exposure conditions) between the various materials used.
Gontract documents failed to provide details of construction techniques to be
adopted in critical areas, or omitted to highlight the relative importance of
certain aspects of the design for the guidance of builders and supervisors.
In some cases reliance was placed on "accepted practice" without an
assessment of its adequacy.
1.
2.
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3.
4.
Critical requirements were not faithfully carried out during construction.
Adequate resources were not provided for the supervision of critical aspects
of the construstion.
Analysing the question of blame for building defects, Paul Marsh'* Chief Architest
for a construction company and a visiting lecturer at Surrey University suggested:
"The blame sequence goes like this. First the material of construction
is blamed. Something must be wrong with it, or the particular form it
takes in this particular building. As the material is inert and voiceless
unless it is a proprietary material backed by a large commercial
organisation, this is easy game - and the buck may prematurely come
to rest there. lf it passes on, it moves inexorably to the builder.
lmputations of bad workmanship are made. Cavities are peered
down, as though for the first time, the client's architect forgetting that
that was what his clerk of works was supposed to be doing during the
process of the works. Whoops of joy are emitted over the discovery
of a dirty walltie, but let's face it, there is not one building in the world
where there is not at least one minor lapse of workmanship. This is
the sort of game building is; and basic building design should be able
to cope with the occasional slight lapse. The very last thing to be
blamed is the design; and yet the design is more likely to contain the
fundamental weaknesses from which, maybe with contributions from
the other two buck stages, the failure originated.
With the best will in the world, the architect will look for weakness first
in the materials of construction, then in the standard of workmanship
before (if he ever gets around to it) questioning his own detailing.
The problem is that too little respec't is given by designers to the less
tangible aspects of providing a weathertight building shell, such
aspects as the site exposure, linked with building height and the
relationship of one building to another. In addition, they are curiously
unaware that a lot of the techniques they have rushed to use in the
last twenty years are relatively untried and without historic evidence of
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survival. Thesethey force into evermore demanding climatic locations,
often with a personal experience which does not - could not - allow
them to assess the validity of what they are doing. ..."
He concludes
"The lesson to be learnt is that if failure occurs, it is most important to
investigate allthree aspects of the operation - materials, workmanship
and design. Do not let the buck stop prematurely, even if
shortcomings are discovered. You may still have not found the real
culprit."
In the summary to a report on building defeds in private and public seclor housing
prepared by the UK National House-Builders' Councils in June 1979, it was
recorded:
"Subjective judgement by NHBC inspectors is that recognition of bad
ground, simple design and good site supervision are allcrucialfastors
(in the incidence, causes and prevention of defects)."
Looking to the future, the report says:
"The evidence, both from Scotland, and from the comparison of
defects in public and private sectors, suggests that fewer defects
occur where design is simple, and where traditional methods are used.
In both public and private sectors no evidence has been produced
which shows any correlation between the incidence of defects and the
scale on which local authority building control is provided ...,,
A plea for deeper understanding of the properties and limitations of building
products, not solely by the architect, was made by Bill Allens of Bickerdike, Allen
and Partners, a former senior architect at the BRE, at a seminar on failures and
defects in modern council housing. Allen claimed no-one was to blame for building
defects which arose from the unforseen consequences of changes in the
characteristics of building materials or building use.
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A report in the November 23, 1979 issue of Building Designswas less reluctant to
attribute blame. Under the bold headline "scandal of New Failures" the publication
reports on BuiHing Design's survey of 22local authorities in England and Wales,
dealing with nearly 50 estates housing 30,000 people. The report claims:
"Poor workmanship, faulty design and shoddy materials on local
authority housing completed since 1974 willcost millions of pounds to
remedy ...
... The investigation claims that none of the horrors of the 60s have
caused mistakes to be rectified in the late 1970s despite increased
technical knowledge ..."
After the literature survey has covered a period of 10 years since the first opinion
considered, the opinions about the types of human error can be summarised in
Table 4.
HUMAN ERROR YEAR: 74 75 76 77 78 79
Defective materials
Overlooked site condition
lgnorance
Over-emphasis on first cost
Defective documentation
Unanticipated consequence of change
Specialist contractor's lack of knowledge
Design too difficult to build wetl
Dereliction or negligence
Poor communication
'69-73
1
3
3
2
4
1
5
3
3
4
1
2
5
3
31
41
71
31
42
63
2
1
2
2
3
2
1
6
6
1
No ol relerences to human error causes of fallure by year ot
publlcation (to the end ot 1979).
Table 4.
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In the course of a paper on the role of feedback in building design, Derek J
Croomem Senior Lecturer at the School of Architecture and Building Engineering,
Universig of Bath, wrote:
'The causes of failure in building design are various - an inadequate
brief and specification; a genuine lack of data on certain aspects;
poor communication between the client and the design team, and
between the members of the design team, themselves; inadequate
analysis or synthesis of solutions; unpredictable quirks of human
behaviour resulting in poor installation or maintenance may each or all
contribute."
The Architect's Journal of 30 April 1980 carried a report from R. Bonshof on
interim results ftom a survey of faults in traditional low rise housing. Bonshor
reported:
"This interim report has covered only the most frequently occurring
and readily explained faults revealed by limited site inspection.
Inspections could not cover every stage of construction on a site and
yet each site typically yielded between 100 and 150 faults.
Analysis shows that those faults are about equally distributed between
design and construction errors. And they occur despite - or perhaps
in part because of - the prodigious quantity of information,
recommendations and mandatory requirements that already exists."
The Building Science Forum of Australia (NSW Division) selected the subject 'Use
or Misuse of Building Material'for its 36th Conference in Sydney. One speaker at
the Conference was Graham Hollands, Senior Lecturer in Architecture, University
of Sydney, who dealt with the sort of education (on the selection and behaviour of
building materials) required by consultants in general and architects in particular.
He began:
"lt is important that this education should concentrate on the principles
of materials and their behaviour rather than just transmit current
industry lore. That is, it should concentrate on the way materials are
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made, their characteristics such as density, strength, thermal,
acoustic, electrical and optical properties, colour, texture, ease of
cleaning, deformations caused by applied loads, temperature and
moisture changes and so on, rather than merely describing the
materials and the way they are used. lt needs to be explanation and
not just description."
Later he says:
'The behaviour of materials in their assembled form is also fairly well
documented, but as the situations in which materials are used willvary
greatly, it is not possible, and as I have suggested earlier, nor
desirable, to try and describe recipes for every situation, but rather
ensure that the appropriate principles are known and applied ...
It is not really possible to educate designers about materials, without
dealing with the way in which materials are put together. This includes
methods of handling materials, assembling them on site, and
workmanship."
On the subject of 'short cuts'for cost-saving purposes, Holland comments:
"Some of the short cuts with materials taken by designers are the
result of pressures to reduce costs, sometimes for clients who don't
seem to realise, or care about the long term consequences,
particularly in cost, of taking risks with materials and their assembly.
Design decisions also involve risk taking, a nervous process at the
best of times. The risks may result from pressure to reduce costs, or
they might result from a desire to innovate, to try something new, and
hopefully better. Designers need to assess very carefully the
information available to them, and unfortunately some of the
information, particularly about new materials, leaves much to be
desired."
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1.
Another speaker was R.D. RoxburghsT an architect and Associate Director (Proiects)
in the NSW office of the Gommonwealth Department of Housing and Construction.
Starting with the premise that:
"Defects arise from a number of sources most of which are inter-
related and some of which are the result of the selestion and utilisation
of inappropriate materials, ..."
he went on to mention the following factors contributing to materials misuse and
consequent building defects.
The abundance of information from thousands of sources upon which the
designers and builders base many of their decisions in selecting systems and
materials, the availability of sophisticated materials and the wide range of
associated literature which is part of the marketing process, is not matched
by etfective information on the performance of some of these materials in
practice.
Most materials produced by reliable and well established firms are
satisfactory in themselves if properly selected for the purpose, and it is
generally in the installation or application of them that difficulties arise,
particularly as a result of the interaction between materials installed by
different trades groups.
The difficulty with trade ortechnical information which is readily available from
many sources is deciding which is the most appropriate for each purpose.
Until designers are experienced enough to rely on their practical experience
to determine the effectiveness of particular materials or systems they
constitute something of salesman's dream.
It is a point of conjecture whether there is reasonably widespread industry
knowledge of the results of research on particular problems associated with
buildings.
The fundamental problem is not that there is a shortage of information but
that there is an overabundance of it, which is generally not effectively used
2.
3.
4.
5.
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throughout all levels of the industry. lf this is not so, then why do the same
problems occur?
John Palmefl Direc-tor of an Australian company specialising in building
maintenance and waterproofing also delivered a paper to the Conference. On the
subject of building materials failure he commented:
"lt is significant that the company for which I work, spends more of its
resources on investigating and providing solutions for maintenance on
'new' buildings than it does on buildings of our heritage. And that is
because of an ever-increasing need to 'prop up' our highly technical
construction systems, to interpret failure mechanisms in new materials
and technology which are sometimes on the part of the designer the
failure of practicality rather than of material performance.'
Later he goes on:
"However, an understanding of the fundamentals of material types
helps to relate the interaction and possible areas of failure.
Knowledge and use of regulations do not excuse impractical design
or construction systems and very often the excuse of warranties or
guarantees or performance specifications, call them what you will,
offer building owner or clients very serious maintenance problems well
within the periods prescribed."
At a seminar on weathertightness and water penetration of buildings held in
November 1980, E. Downeys,o3 suggested that building defec'ts are the result of bad
design, which manifests itself in one of the following ways:
1.
2.
3.
The designer has not given sufficient thought to specific details.
The designer has relied upon a standard of workmanship and adherence to
tolerances which are not normally achievable.
New materials or processes have been adopted in the design which are
incompatible with other features.
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In November 1980, P.H. Nicem a consultant on matters of building failures and
defects, contributed an article to Building Technology and Management, reporting
on the experiences of his organisation. He wrote:
"Most of the failures we have investigated were due to a combination
of bad design and specification, incorrect choice of materials and
deviations from good practice. lt would appear that on occasion too
much is expected from new materials which, although subjected to
vigorous testing, have not yet been proven over a number of years in
service. Testing in accordance with specification involves standard
samples tested on standard machines in standard conditions which do
not and cannot claim to stimulate service conditions.
We have also found that compatibility of materials is often a problem.
Different materials with different properties (eg thermal, creep, strength,
resistance to exposure) behave in ways which may be detrimental to the
adjoining material or component."
Nice's views appear to be endorsed to some elrtent by W.H. Ransomol in his book
Building Failures. In his introduction he writes:
"Most building defects are avoidable; they occur, in general, not
through a lack of basic knowledge but by non-application or mis-
application of it. Knowledge seems to become mislaid from time to
time. Those with long memories, and those whose business it is to
make a particular study of building defects, are often struck by the re-
emergence of problems which have been well researched and
documented."
Interestingly, Ransom takes up a theme first developed at the 36th Conference of
the NSW Division of the Building Science Forum$ which is that of the appropriate
training for people entering the building industry.
"Current training in design tends to concentrate on what to do rather
than what not to do. A similar situation exists in training in
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constructionaltechniques, where the craftsman is instruc'ted how best
to undertake a particular operation but, to a lesser extent, in the
dangers of deviation from an accepted technique. Understanding of
the likelihood of defests through inadequate design or construction is
taught implicitly rather than explicitly. The level and nature of defects
in building construction currently encountered suggests that more
guidance is required on the avoidance of failures. A need is seen,
too, for such guidance to be a positive part of a training curriculum.
Indeed there a good arguments for suggesting that, as the first
essential in design and construction is to ensure that the structure
provided is stable and durable, specific education in the avoidance of
failure should be a maior part of any design and construction
syllabus."
After citing the results of BRE studies of building failure, Ransom goes on to write
about reasons for failure.
"There seems little doubt that a major reason for failure in construction
is the complex structure of the building industry. Despite the calls for
closer integration of design and construction, made many times over
the years, these two vital roles are still essentially separate."
Gommenting on changes in the construction industry:
'The loss of craft skills has been matched at a more professional level
by a reduction in the number of those able to comment sensibly on
the likely interactive effects of changes in materials, components and
procedures. Many of the problems which have beset so-called
industrialised building systems have stemmed directly from the general
inability in the construction industry to understand these interactions,
together with inadequate matching of site skills to the new
technology."
On technical recommendations:
"ln some cases, the technical recommendations, although available,
are not readily available, and while they do state 'the truth and nothing
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but the truth' it is, sometimes, 'not the whole truth'. Thus, some
failures, though probably a relatively small portion of the whole, do
stem from knowledge which is less than comprehensive."
On innovation:
"While innovatory pressures have been considerable, the requirement
for adequate control and certification of these has lacked 'bite'. ... In
the longer term, and at its most extreme, there is a possibility that
innovation will make existing knowledge and skills redundant. lf the
innovation is enduring and valuable, this may be acceptable, but if not,
the nation will be the loser. But, perhaps the biggest danger of all lies
in the inadequate mechanism for control of the innovation to safeguard
the user"
Editorial comment in the Chartered Surveyore in April 1981 was trenchant in its
criticisms of those whom it felt were responsible for building defects.
"Prime otfenders are architects, many of whom have responded
irresponsibly to the demands of their clients to cut costs. This is
married to an inadequate training in building construction and
maintenance and an emphasis on innovative design. The resulting
absence of tried and tested prototypes means faults are not revealed
before designs are built in large numbers. Contractors with an eye to
low costs and high profits also share the blame; for instance,
inadequate on-site supervision has contributed to the inetfectiveness
of some system housing.
The Government will largely be footing the UK's building defect bill and
the Government played a role in the creation of those defects by
pressuring local authorities to build fast and inexpensively."
In the same issue, C.A. Druryn a partner in a firm of chartered surveyors,
categorised building defects and causes in the course of an article on the effects of
major defects on investment in buildings. His categories were:
1. Defects in design
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Defects in workmanship
Defects in materials used
Defects in services
Defects through lack of maintenance
Defests through obsolescence
Defests through extraneous circumstances.
Collective amnesia
Side effects of innovation
Lack of anticipation
Bureaucratic confusion
Misplaced optimism
Andrew Rabenekr a Director of Building Systems Development (UK) Ltd, was writing
at about the same time as Drury, but in the Architect's Journal. By this time the
problem of building failures was becoming so serious that Rabeneck was able to
state, without exaggeration,
'Those closely involved with building defects - maintenance staff,
investigators, insurance underwriters and managers of testing
laboratories, not to mention occupants of new housing - are coming
to believe that a high potential for failure is endemic in our system of
design and construction. Defec'ts happen because of, rather than in
spite of, the way we go about getting the buildings we need.
... Naturally those failures which are discussed in the press tend to be
spectacular, involving innovations that went wrong, and so on. As a
result an impression could be gained that innovation is the root cause
of failure, but that would be imprecise. lt is truer to say that as the
specifier's choice has broadened away from well understood
conventions, so the scope for uncertainty and error has increased,
and thus the probability of defects arising."
Rabeneck then goes on to suggest a list of causes of building failures, with
examples of each.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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6. The false economy
7. The ignorant specialist
8. Sheer incompetence.
Similar causes of failures or defects were mentioned by G.Atkinsons in an article on
the subject published in May 1981. Commenting on the fact that failures persist
despite existing knowledge of ways of avoiding them, Atkinson wrote:
"For one or more reasons - inexperience, carelessness, pressure of
work, poor office organisation, ill-defined responsibilities, excessive
enthusiasm for novelties, unquestioning acceptance of a supplier's
claim - readily available advice had been ignored, or the seriousness
of its neglect not appreciated".
A Current Paper from BRE published in 1981 reported on a study of quality control
on buiHing sites. The author, M.J.C.Bentleys drew the following conclusions from
the research.
In general, quality standards on site did not rely significantly on formal
checking and acceptance or rejection of completed work. Instead they
resulted from the clerk of works, together with the site agent, putting great
efforts into creating an environment where good work could and was likely
to take place.
For a disturbing number of problems, particularly the serious ones,
identification of the problem on site did not result in effective remedial action
being taken. Major reasons for this were that the clerk of works did not
normally have the authority to press for etfective remedial ac'tion and
architects put too little etfort into understanding and solving problems on site.
Tradesmen's lack of skill produced comparatively few faults, a much larger
number being produced by lack of care. However, clerks of works and
contractors' site statf seemed able to cope with most of these types of
problems fairly well.
1.
2.
3.
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4. The architect's contribution to quality was predominantly through the quality,
completeness and accessibility of the project information ie drawings,
specification, and bills of quantities. Poor project documentation could have
a very detrimental effect on quality, both because of the errors and delays
arising directly, and because of the depressant effest on site morale.
The clerk of works and site agent had key roles in determining the quality
actually achieved. Deficiencies in one's knowledge could be made up by the
other, at the risk of some blurring of their contractual roles. On balance, this
willingness to work outside formal limitations, by allowing fuller pooling of
available expertise, was beneficial.
Sites with acceptable quality standards tended to be characterised by a
'consultative' approach to problem-solving - anyone on site could raise
questions and many individuals could contribute to solutions - whereas sites
with low quality standards tended to be 'non-consultative'with only the clerks
of works really concerned with quality matters.
The range of industry opinion revealed by the literature survey up to the end of 1981
in summarised in Table 5.
HUMAN ERBOR YEAR: '69-73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81
6.
Defective materhls
Overlooked site condition
lgnorance
Over-emphasis on first cost
Defective documenlation
Unanticipated consequence of change
Specialist contractor's lack of knowledge
Design too difficult to build well
Dereliction or negligence
Poor communication
12
3
31
2
4
12
51
36
36
41
1
2
5
3
31
41
71
31
42
63
1
12
12
242
23
331
233
144
2
1
1
1
No of references to human error causes ol fallure by year of
publication (to the end of 1981).
Table 5.
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Any examination of the causes of building defects or failures must take account of
the point made by H W Harrisonz from BRE in a paper prepared for presentation
to a CIB Symposium in June 1982.
"We need to distinguish carefully between a fault in design or
construction giving an immediate risk of deficient performance, and a
fault where initial performance is satisfactory, but which can be
expected to deteriorate with time.
The immediate deficiency in performance can be illustrated with the
fault, common in the survey, of gaps being left in the masonry of a
separating wall between dwellings. That the wallwill certainly failfrom
the point of view of both sound and fire is not in question. There are
however different probabilities of failure with time for the different
performance attributes. The first days of occupation of the dwelling
will produce noise of a kind, which will be heard next door, whereas
the risk of a major fire, exposing the lack of integrity of the wall, might
be as little as once in one thousand years."
The degree of understanding of materials by designers was again alluded to in an
editorial in the IOB Journal Building Technology and Managements in April 1982.
The editorial underlined points made by a consulting engineer at a 'failures'
conference in London a month earlier, asking why, when the effects of rain, frost
and wind are well-known, buildings have been constructed which let the elements
take their toll. Also queried was the lack of understanding which resulted in
composite structures failing through differential movement or incompatible materials.
Was the science of materials sufficiently understood by builders and designers?
Writing in the same journal a month later, W.G. Roberts6T argues that innovation is
not of itself a proven cause of building defects. Roberts argues,
"First of all, what constitutes an innovation? In the strictest dictionary
terms an innovation is 'the introduction of novelties; the alteration of
what is established'. To put it simply, I take this to mean a new
product, material or technique which supersedes an existing method.
Of course implicit in the word innovation is the hidden assumption that
the 'new' is also superior. Within this broad definition the term
innovation can be applied not only to a new product, material or
technique but also to imported products and technology which have
not been previously used in this country, the use of established
products in a 'new' way - change of function or location; design
solutions at variance with established practice - where, for example,
an architect designs his own solution to a standard problem or detail,
Clearly, if the term is used in its widest sense then the proposal can be
verified since almost all failures can be attributed to poor design,
inappropriate use of materials or faulty workmanship. However, I do not
believe this is the valid interpretation for the subject of this paper. For our
purpose, innovation will be taken to mean stricfly a new product, material or
technique used in the construction of a buiHing. lt then becomes apparent
that the statement 'innovation is a major factor ...' cannot be substantiated
in the face of the available research evidence on failures and defects. This
is one of industry's 'myths' originating from the media's pre-occupation with
spectacular disasters like Ronan Point, HAG and more recently Bison
Wallframe, all of which at one time or another have been attributed to
innovation. Although innovation may be a contributing factor either on its
own as a minor cause or, to a greater extent, in combination with other
factors, it certainly cannot be classified as a major cause."
Research results published in Australia by R. Donaldsons Lecturer in Construction
and Technology and Design, Department of Architecture, Universtty of Newcastle,
NSW in June 1982, was based on the following categories of faults:
1. Faults in documentation.
2. Faults in construction including -
(a) workmanship
(b) quality control
3. Faults in occupied buildings.
In his conclusion, Donaldson wrote,
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"Many of the failures evident in the surveyed housing stock can be
directly attributed to poor quality workmanship and the lack of close
site supervision during the progress of the construction of the
buildings. The need for proper site supervision is particularly
important, when the nature of the site personnel and their building
expertise is considered. This is especially so in remote areas where
personnel may come as a result of high wages rather than building
expertise. Too few works supervisors inspecting the work of many
semi-skilled personnel can too often result in the poor standard of
work and the wide range of faults described in this paper.
The economics of building in remote areas willvery often demand that
products be manufactured from local material on site rather than be
transported thousands of kilometres by rail or road. When materials
such as concrete and concrete blocks are manufactured on site, strist
control is necessary to ensure that the end product conforms to the
minimum conditions of quality established by the various building
codes and the Standards Association of Australia. However, no
amount of quality control kept on the materials or their assembly can
produce a satisfactory building unless that building has been designed
appropriately from the outset.
Houses which were intended for families in a temperate climatic setting
have no place in the extreme climate of most Australian mining
townships. Materials and components which are acceptable in more
temperate climates simply do not behave as predictably under
extremes of temperature, wind and moisture. Decisions, often made
without an understanding of the technological or environmental
problems of housing in hot dry regions, causs massive expenditure on
the part of the building's owners and unnecessary inconvenience on
the part of its occupants."
Meanwhile, discussion about the role of innovation in buildings defects and failures
had not stopped. Professor E. Happolds from the University of Bath, writing about
the historical record of innovation in the building industry since 1751, comments:
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"The question to be answered is not whether innovation in materials
and technology makes a major contribution to difficulties and failures
in building but whether our existing organisation is well adapted to use
innovation in materials and technology, not just for today but to serve
efficiently the needs for the immediate future."
BRE News Winter Edition 1982 announced the completion of a three year study of
nearly 1000 different kinds of faults in low-rise traditional housing by R.B. Bonshof
and H.W.HarrisonTo.
It was noted that few fauhs were related to innovation - only about 3 percent were
related to new material or construction methods introduced since 1975. As the
authors point out:
"When frequency of occurrence (and not simply type of fauh) is taken
into account, design faults - which were apt to repeat on all dwellings
of the relevant type - tended to outnumber faults of site origin. Out of
the total number of faults, 50 percent were attributed to design, 41
percent to site and 8 percent to materials."
The final optimistic word, for the moment, goes to John DuellTl a partner in a firm
of British architects, writing in the Architect's Journal. While noting that building
failures are still happening, Duell suggests that headway is being made in combating
the various causes of failure, frequently by improvement in the communication of
information. Duell believes:
"Building defects are rarely caused by a basic lack of knowledge in the
construction industry as a whole. The problem is to ensure that the
relevant information is available to the individual at the time a decision
is made. The complexity of modern construction makes it impossible
for the designer to retain all the information in his head."
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SUMMARY
The opinions of the various commentators as to the types of human error which can
contribute to building failure are summarised in the table below. The table shows
the number of references to human error causes of failure in each year surveyed.
HUMAN ERROR YEAR: '@-73 74 75 76 Tl 78 79 80 81 82 8if Total
Defectlve materials
Overlooked slte condhlon
lgnorance
Over-emptnsis on first cost
Defectlve documentation
Unanticlpated conseguence of change
Speclallst contractor's lack of knowledge
Design too difficult to bulld well
Dereliction or negligence
Poor communication
12
3
31
2
4
12
51
36
36
41
1
2
5
3
31
41
71
31
42
63
2 12
111
1
12
12
42
3
31
33
44
9
9
10
10
11
17
n
22
25
25
2
2
3
2
1
1
1
t
2
2
11
Table 6. No ol references to human error causes of fallure by year of
publlcatlon (to the end ol 1983).
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APPENDIX B
BUILDING FAILURE REPORT FORM - PROPOSED FORMAT
Section A (to be completed in full)
Date of inspection:
Address of property:
Name of reporter:
Section B (to be completed only where relevant to the failure)
Structure
Roof Structure - materials
- horizontal elements
- vertical elements
- other elements
- materials
- horizontal elements
- vertical elements
- other elements
- materials
- horizontal elements
- vertical elements
- other elements
Wall Structure
Floor Structure
Rool
Exterior description:
- main roof materials
- other roof materials
- materials
- pipes materials
- penetration materials
(e.9. pipes, flues)
Walls
External materials
Finish
Decoration
Eaves
Gutters
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Wndows
Doors
Balconies
Internal flnlshs
Ceilings
Walls
Floors
Trims
- materials
- tiles
- sheet
- other
- finish
- materials
- tiles
- sheet
- other
- finish
- materials
- tiles
- sheet
- other
- finish
- materials
- tiles
- sheet
- other
- finish
- type
- position on wall
- view
- effecting lighting
- material
- sub-frame
- sill
- position in rebate
- type (hinged, revoMng, automatic)
- material
- ease of location
- frame
- threshold
- construction
- rail
- finish
- usefulness/purpose
Hardware materials - handles
- hooks
- hinges
- other fiftings
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(ilher
SECTION G, (to be cunplated as filfy as poselble)
1. Reeord the evidenrm whigh is visible sr deteotabb by toucf-t, srnell or hearirg.
Record thE evidenca of others wttfr knoruledge sf the frailure site" (lnclude
occupdions oJ wturesses and comment on thoir apparont levd of oqgb).
Remrd you c€nclusion eB :fie oauss of failuro.
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SECTION D (to be completed on the basis of your observatlons, the evldence
available, and your professlonal ludgment).
1. Human error. This failure was caused wholly or in part by the types of
human error ticked below:
( ) 1. Defestive materials( ) 2. Overlooked site condition( ) 3. lgnorance( ) 4. Over-emphasis on ftrst cost( ) 5. Defective documentation( ) 6. Unanticipated consequence of change( ) 7. Specialist contractor's lack of knowledge( ) 8. Design too difftcult to build well( ) 9. Dereliction or negligence( ) 10. Poor communication
2. Natural causes. This failure was caused wholly or in part by the natural
cause ticked below:
( ) 1. Movement( ) 2. Dampness( ) 3. Chemical/biological change
Gost of repair: $
Gost of all consequences of failure: $
(fees, consequential damages etc)
Signed:
Dated:
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